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The house of representatives can not only refuse, but they alone
can propose the supplies requisite for the support of government.
They in a word hold the purse; that powerful instrument by which we
behold, in the history of the British constitution, an infant and humble
representation of the people, gradually enlarging the sphere of its activ-
ity and importance, and finally reducing, as far as it seems to have
wished, all the overgrown prerogatives of the other branches of the
government. This power over the purse, may in fact be regarded as the
most compleat and effectual weapon with which any constitution can
arm the immediate representatives of the people, for obtaining a re-
dress of every grievance, and for carrying into effect every just and
salutary measure.I
* Member, Holliman, Langholz, Runnels & Dorwart, a professional corporation, Tulsa,
Oklahoma: B.A., suinina can laude, Southwestern College, Winfield, Kansas, 1972: J.D. with spe-
cial distinction, University of Oklahoma, 1975.
1. THE FEDERALIST No. 58, at 394 (J. Madison) (J. Cooke ed. 1961). One must remember.
however, that the avowed purpose of THi- FEDERAI.IST Papers was to convince New York to ratify
the Constitution, not to provide a definitive commentary on the Constitution. Consequently. the
authors sometimes exaggerated the Constitution's advantages and glossed over its objectionable fea-
tures. Id. at xx (Preface by J. Cooke); State v. M'Bride. 24 S.C.L. (Rice) 400 (1839). Nevertheless.
the opinions expressed in THE FEDERAI.iSr have traditionally been accorded high respect. See. e'g..
Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co.. 158 U.S. 601, 627 (1895); Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6
Wheat.) 264, 418 (1821): McCulloch v. Maryland. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316. 433 (1819). For a dis-
cerning evaluation of THE FEDERALi ST as authority, see Wilson, The Most Sacred Text: The
Supreme Courts Use of The Federalist Papers, 1985 B.Y.U. L. REv. 65. See also. Pierson. The
Federalist in the Supreme Court. 33 Y.%i ii, L.J. 728 (1924); A. FURTWANGIER, THE AUTHORrY 01
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I. INTRODUCTION
Thus did Madison grandly describe the power conferred on the
House of Representatives by the origination clause of the federal Consti-
tution: that clause requiring all bills for raising revenue to originate in
the House of Representatives.' Today, variants of the origination clause
are found in twenty state constitutions, 3 the federal Constitution,4 and
the Constitution of Puerto Rico.' At least eighteen states have by spe-
cific constitutional provisions rejected or abrogated exclusive house reve-
PUBLIUS: A READING OF THE FEDERALIST PAPERS (1984).
2. One scholar described the reposing of the revenue power in the House as follows: "The
House of Representatives was thought of as the heart of the government. Its exclusive power would
be the precious one belonging to the people - to lay taxes; that is, to require participation in com-
mon activities, at least by paying for them...." R. TUGWELL, THE EMERGING CONSTITUTION 66
(1974). Of course, the emergence of a system of permanent revenue exaction has diminished the
impact of the origination power. S. MILLER, LECTURES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED
STATES 205-07 (1893).
This article is restricted to a study of the treatment of revenue bills in terms of origination. The
issue of revenue bills, however, in terms of constitutional law, can arise in other contexts. See, e.g.,
ALASKA CONT. art. II, § 16 (imposing a requirement of three fourths of the membership to over-
ride a veto of "[b]ills to raise revenue and appropriation bills or items" as opposed to a two-thirds
requirement for other vetoed bills); MIss. CONST. art. 4, § 68 (prohibiting the passage of revenue
bills in the last five days of the legislative session); N.C. CONST. art. II, § 23 (providing special
legislative procedure for revenue bills).
Furthermore, the origination clause is only one of a variety of constitutional provisions regulat-
ing the raising of revenue and expenditure of revenue. As the origination clause to some extent
governs the raising of revenue, other constitutional provisions govern the spending of revenue. For
example, the federal Constitution, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 7, and most state constitutions, see,
e.g., CAL. CONST. art. XVI, § 7; COLO. CONST. art. V, § 33; PA. CONST. art. III, § 24; TENN.
CONST. art. II, § 24, provide that public funds can be withdrawn from the treasury only by appropri-
ations made by law. Traditionally, this clause has been interpreted to vest near-exclusive spending
power in the legislature. Harrington v. Bush, 553 F.2d 190 (D.C. Cir. 1977); National Ass'n of
Regional Councils v. Costle, 564 F.2d 583 (D.C. Cir. 1977); Hart's Case, 16 Ct. Cl. 459 (1880),
aff'd, 118 U.S. 62 (1886); State ex rel. Kurz v. Lee, 121 Fla. 360, 163 So. 859 (1935); Blaine County
Inv. Co. v. Gallet, 35 Idaho 102, 204 P. 1066 (1922). See, Note, Mandel v. Myers: Judicial En-
croachment on Legislative Spending Powers, 70 CALIF. L. REV. 932 (1982); Miller, Estoppel and the
Public Purse: A New Check on Government Taxing and Spending Powers in Florida Law, 9 FLA. ST.
U.L. REV. 33 (1981); Note, Judicial FinancialAutonomy and Inherent Power, 57 CORNELL L. REV.
975 (1972).
3. Regarding "bills for raising revenue," see ALA. CONsT. art. IV, § 70; COLO. CONST. art. V,
§ 31; DEL. CONT. art. VIII, § 2; IDAHO CONST. art. III, § 14; IND. CONST. art. 4, § 17; KY.
CONST. § 47; MINN. CONT. art. IV, § 10; N.J. CONST. art. IV, § 6, 1; OKLA. CONST. art. V,
§ 33; OR. CONT. art. IV, § 18; PA. CONST. art. III, § 14; S.C. CONST. art. III, § 15; TEX. CONST.
art. III, § 33; Wyo. CONST. art. 3, § 33. Regarding "bills for raising a revenue," see ME. CONST,
art. IV, pt. 3, § 9. Regarding revenue and appropriation bills, see GA. CONST. art. III, § VII, f 2;
LA. CONST. art. III, § 16. Regarding "money bills," see MASS. CONST. pt. 2, ch. I, § 3, art. VII;
N.H. CONST. pt. 2, art. 18. Regarding "all revenue bills," see VT. CONST. ch. II, § 6. All the
constitutional provisions except those of Georgia, Idaho, Indiana, and Oregon specifically permit
senate amendment of revenue bills.
4. "All Bills for raising Revenue shall originate in the House of Representatives; but the Sen-
ate may propose or concur with Amendments as on other Bills." U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 7, cl. 1.
5. "All bills for raising revenue shall originate in the House of Representatives, but tile Senate
may propose or concur with amendments, as on other bills." P.R. CONST. art. III, § 17.
2
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nue origination.6 The clause, however, has largely been treated as an
historical anachronism, 7 narrowly construed, and enforced only in a
handful of decisions.8
Justice Story, in his highly influential9 Commentaries on the Consti-
tution of the United States,t° set the course for the courts to strictly con-
strue the federal origination clause. Story found that the practical
construction given to the origination clause was one of narrow meaning
applying only to bills levying taxes in the strict sense, notwithstanding
the apparently broader sweep of the clause's language. The practical
construction already applied to the clause excluded from its operation
bills incidentally raising revenue in pursuit of some other legislative
purpose. 11
6. FLA. CONST. art. III, § 7; HAW. CONT. art. III, § 6; ILL. CONsT. art. IV, § 8(b); IOWA
CONST. art. III, § 15; KAN. CONST. art. II, § 12; MD. CONST. art. 3, § 27; MICH. CONsT. art. IV,
§ 22; MISS. CONST. art. 4, § 59; Mo. CONST. art. III, § 21; NEV. CONST. art. 4, § 16; N.M. CONST.
art. IV, § 15; N.Y. CONT. art. III, § 12; OHIO CONsT. art. II, § 15(a); S.D. CONsT. art. III, § 20;
TENN. CONST. art. II, § 17; VA. CONST. art. IV, § 11; WASH. CONST. art. II, § 20; W. VA. CONST.
art. VI, § 28.
7. See, e.g., Lang v. Commonwealth, 190 Ky. 29, 226 S.W. 379, 381 (1920) ("that reason [for
lodging power of revenue in the lower house] is not very impressive in this country at the present
time."); Mikell v. School Dist., 359 Pa. 113, 58 A.2d 339, 341 (1948) ("its present-day inappropriate-
ness"); Kervick v. Bontempo, 29 N.J. 469, 150 A.2d 34, 39-40 (1959) ("an ancient concept"; "tech-
nical insistence").
8. 1 J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA, & J. YOUNG, TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: SUB-
STANCE AND PROCEDURE § 10.2(c) (1986). For cases upholding challenges to legislation based on
the origination clause, see Weissinger v. Boswell, 330 F. Supp. 615 (M.D. Ala. 1971) (applying
Alabama clause); Wofford Oil Co. v. Smith, 263 F. 396 (M.D. Ala. 1920), appeal dismissed, 256 U.S.
705 (1921) (applying Alabama clause); Hubbard v. Lowe, 226 F. 135 (S.D.N.Y. 1915), appeal dis-
missed, 242 U.S. 654 (1916); Opinion of The Justices, 379 So. 2d 1267 (Ala. 1980); Opinion of The
Justices, 342 So. 2d 787 (Ala. 1977); Glasgow v. Aetna Ins. Co., 284 Ala. 177, 223 So. 2d 581 (1969);
Opinion of The Justices, 260 Ala. 81, 68 So. 2d 840 (1953); Opinion of The Justices, 259 Ala. 514, 66
So. 2d 921 (1953); Opinion of The Justices, 249 Ala. 389, 31 So. 2d 558 (1947); Opinion of The
Justices, 238 Ala. 289, 190 So. 824 (1939); Opinion of The Justices, 232 Ala. 95, 166 So. 807 (1936);
Perry County v. Selma, Marion & Memphis Ry. Co., 58 Ala. 546 (1877); Dumas v. Bryan, 35 Idaho
557, 207 P. 720 (1922); H.A. Thierman Co. v. Commonwealth, 123 Ky. 740, 97 S.W. 366 (1906);
Cobb v. Louisiana Bd. of Inst., 237 La. 315, 111 So. 2d 126 (1959); Succession of Sala, 50 La. Ann.
1009, 24 So. 674 (1897); Succession of Givanovich, 50 La. Ann. 625, 24 So. 679 (1897); Morgan v.
Murray, 134 Mont. 92, 328 P.2d 644 (1958); State ex rel. Davis v. Cox, 105 Neb. 75, 178 N.W. 913
(1920); Thiokol Chem. Corp. v. Morris County Bd. of Taxation, 76 N.J. Super. 232, 184 A.2d 75
(1962), aff'd, 41 N.J. 405, 197 A.2d 176 (1964); Ex Parte Fuller, 31 Okla. Crim. 289, 238 P. 512
(1925).
9. Among the noteworthy decisions relying extensively on Justice Story are: Twin City Bank
v. Nebeker, 167 U.S. 196 (1897); United States v. Norton, 91 U.S. 566 (1875); Anderson v. Rit-
terbusch, 22 Okla. 761, 98 P. 1002 (1908). Day Land & Cattle Co. v. State, 68 Tex. 526, 4 S.W. 865
(1887).
10. (Ist ed. 1833).
11. Id. § 880. In considering Story's authoritative dismissal of the orgination clause, one must
remember that Story's commentaries were published prior to the publication of Madison's Notes of
Debates and were premised only on the records of the motions and votes contained in the Conven-
tion's Journal. See C. WARREN, THE MAKING OF THE CONSTITUTION 479, 803 (1928).
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The origination clause, however, as its parentage would indicate,
should not be so lightly dismissed. It was a product of British parliamen-
tary experience under the House of Commons' 2 and colonial experience
under charter governance.' 3 The clause played a prominent role in the
final shaping of the federal Constitution 4 and is, for better or worse, still
part of the Constitution. As such, it deserves enforcement.' 5 Further-
more, an understanding of the origination clause helps illuminate the
constitutional machinery of legislative enactment, as origination clause
issues often center on legislative procedure.' 6 Consequently, this article
12. Opinion of The Justices, 233 A.2d 59 (Del. 1967); Opinion of The Justices, 126 Mass. 557
(1878); S. MILLER, LECTURES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 205-08 (1893);
Comment, The Origination Clause, the Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982, and the
Role of the Judiciary, 78 Nw. U.L. REV. 419, 421-23 (1983); Sargent, Bills for Raising Revenue
Under the Federal and State Constitutions, 4 MINN. L. REV. 330, 333 (1920).
13. Comment, supra note 12, at 422; Township of Bernards v. Allen, 61 N.J.L. 228, 39 A. 716
(1898). See also J. MAIN, THE UPPER HOUSE IN REVOLUTIONARY AMERICA 1763-1788 (1967); A.
KELLY & W. HARBISON, THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION: ITS ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENT 30
(1948). Indeed, the independence constitutions drawn in 1776 or shortly thereafter commonly had
stricter origination clauses than those adopted in later constitutions. See, e.g., MD. CONST. OF 1776
(House of Delegates empowered "to originate money bills"), noted in Kelly v. Marylanders For
Sports Sanity, Inc., 310 Md. 437, 530 A.2d 245 (1987) (money bills included bills providing for the
raising of the public revenue and for the making of grants or appropriations of public money in the
treasury); N.H. CONST. OF 1776 (all bills for raising, levying, or collecting money to originate in
lower house); N.J. CONST. OF 1776 art. VI (upper house may not propose or alter money bills), S.C.
CONST. OF 1776 art. VII (money bills may not be originated, altered, or amended by upper house);
VA. CONST. OF 1776 (all laws to originate in lower house; upper house may not amend money bills),
cited in 4-7 F. THORPE, THE FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS 2451-53, 2596, 3244, 3812-19
(1909); see also W. ADAMS, THE FIRST AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONS: REPUBLICAN IDEOLOGY AND
THE MAKING OF THE STATE CONSTITUTIONS IN THE REVOLUTIONARY ERA 262-71 (1980).
14. See infra notes 21-31 and accompanying text. It is interesting that even Alexander Hamil-
ton, hardly a democrat, paid homage to the popular appeal of lower house control by including a
variant of the origination clause in his written proposal: "Bills for raising revenue, and bills for
appropriating monies for the support of fleets and armies, and for paying salaries of the Officers of
Government, shall originate in the Assembly; but may be altered or amended by the Senate."; 3 TH I;
RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 620 (M. Farrand ed. 1937) [hereinafter
RECORDS]. Although this written proposal was never submitted to the Convention, important ele-
ments were contained in Hamilton's speech to the Convention on June 18, 1787. See I RECORDS,
supra, at 304-11.
15. H. A. Thierman Co. v. Commonwealth, 123 Ky. 740, 97 S.W. 366, 369 (1906). Morgan v.
Murray, 134 Mont. 92, 328 P.2d 644, 654 (1958); Thiokol Chem. Corp. v. Morris County Bd. of
Taxation, 76 N.J. Super. 232, 184 A.2d 75, 81 (1962), aff'd. 41 N.J. 405, 197 A.2d 176 (1964).
16. Crucial to the operation of the origination clause in many instances is the scope of judicial
review over the "enrolled bill." An enrolled bill is a bill which "purports to have passed both houses
of the legislature and which has been signed by the presiding officers of the two houses." I N.
SINGER, SUTHERLAND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 15.01 (Sands 4th ed. 1985 rev.): Bi A.CK'S
LAW DICTIONARY 475-76 (5th ed. 1979). Many states and the federal courts refutse to go behind the
enrolled bill to examine legislative journals and other parliamentary materials to determine whether
the legislature complied with the appropriate constitutional procedures. The leading case is Field %.
Clark, 143 U.S. 649 (1892). See I N. SINGER. supra. at § 15.03. A minority of states accord the
enrolled bill great, but not conclusive, weight. Id. § 15.04. A few states either permit attack by
extrinsic evidence or reverse the rule entirely, requiring that the enrolled bill affirnmatively show
compliance with constitutional requirements. Id. § 15.06. Absent such a showing. these courts will
4
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is divided into three sections. The first section briefly summarizes the
constitutional convention, surveys extensively the judicial decisions con-
struing the federal origination clause, and analyzes the body of congres-
sional precedent. The research reveals a consistent grudging inter-
pretation of the origination clause. The second section canvasses all the
state origination clauses and seeks to examine every decision and .avail-
able attorney general opinion on each state origination clause. The third
section briefly explores the concept of the origination clause in other
British-influenced nations in order to place the American experience in
perspective.
The basic philosophy behind the origination clause should continue
to be enforced: accountability for tax legislation must be reposed in the
House of Representatives. A requirement that Senate amendments be
germane to House revenue bills would appear to be the least intrusive yet
still effective means of enforcing the policies behind the origination
clause. Future court challenges should be governed by that central
theme.
conclusively presume that the proper proceedings were not followed. Id. § 15.05. The scope of
evidentiary materials in relation to the origination clause is critical since the enrolled bill will nor-
mally only show (1) the house where the bill originated, and (2) the text of the bill as finally passed
by both houses. The enrolled bill will not show the bill as it existed upon introduction into the
originating house, nor will it show the source of amendments to the bill as it journeyed through the
legislative process. For discussions of the enrolled bill doctrine in terms of the origination clause, see
Comment, supra note 12, at 454-59; Annotation, Application of Constitutional Requirement That
Bills for Raising Revenue Originate in Lower House, 4 A.L.R.2D 973, § 2 (1949). For more general
discussions of the enrolled bill doctrine, see Comment, Judicial Review of the Legislative Process:
Louisiana's "Journal Entry" Rule, 41 LA. L. REV. 1187 (1981); Grant, Judicial Control of the Legis-
lative Enactment Process: The Federal Rule, 3 W. POL. Q. 364 (1950); Lloyd, Judicial Control of
Legislative Procedure, 4 SYRACUSE L. REV. 6 (1952); Dodd, Judicially Non-Enforceable Provisions of
Constitutions, 80 U. PA. L. REV. 54 (1931); Note, Pennsylvania's Enrolled Bill Rule: A Reappraisal
in Light of HB 1413 and Velasquez v. Depuy, 75 DICK. L. REV. 123 (1970); Note, Judicial Review
of the Legislative Process of Enactment: An Assessment Following Childers v. Couey, 30 ALA. L.
REV. 495 (1979); cf Swinton, Challenging the Validity of An Act ofParliament: The Effect of Enroll-
ment and Parliamentary Privilege, 14 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 345 (1976) (analyzing Canadian and
other commonwealth precedents). A student note suggests a possible constitutional basis for federal
and state courts to bypass the enrolled bill doctrine through the use of the guaranty clause of the
federal Constitution. Note, The Rule of Law and the States: A New Interpretation of the Guarantee
Clause, 93 YALE L.J. 561 (1984) (guaranty clause to be used to require states to observe their own
constitutions and laws). But see Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89 (1984).
limiting federal courts' jurisdiction to enjoin state from violating its own laws. Pennhurst is dis-
cussed critically in Shapiro, Wrong Turns: The Eleventh Amendment and the Pennhurst Case. 98
HARV. L. REV. 61 (1984), and analyzed approvingly in Althouse, How to Build a Separate Sphere:
Federal Courts and State Power, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1485 (1987).
For two case studies on legislation, see D. BERMAN, A BILL BECOMES A LAW: CONGRESS
ENACTS CIVIL RIGHTS LEGISLATION (1966), and S. BAILEY, CONGRESS MAKES A LAW, THE
STORY BEHIND THE EMPLOYMENT ACT OF 1946 (1950). See also J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA, & J.
YOUNG, supra note 8, ch. 10.
1987]
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II. THE FEDERAL EXPERIENCE: A STRICT READING OF THE
ORIGINATION CLAUSE
A. Introduction
* The federal origination clause has been strictly construed to apply
only to bills designed "to levy taxes in the strict sense of the words."' 7
The judicial and the senatorial precedents basically agree on this point.
The House of Representatives has understandably taken a slightly more
expansive view of its constitutional prerogative.'" It is more than ironic
that the clause, which caused so much debate at the Constitutional Con-
vention and nearly collapsed the convention at one point, is now treated,
by and large, as a constitutional backwater.' 9 Professor Warren has re-
marked on the clause's lack of relevance to today's world:
That such importance should have been attached to a matter which
today seems of minor importance, can only be understood by realizing
how deeply the delegates felt, on the one side or the other, regarding
any increase in the powers of the Senate.20
Nevertheless, the clause deserves examination as it represents a princi-
pled decision of the framers to repose a particular power in one house of
the Congress.
B. The Convention
The origination clause was initially part of the Great Compromise in
which the small states obtained equal representation in the Senate.2 ' Af-
ter the concept of House origination of revenue bills was accepted, the
next point of contention concerned the Senate's power to amend revenue
bills.2" Earlier drafts of the clause forbade Senate amendment, but the
17. See United States v. Norton, 91 U.S. 566, 569 (1875); J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA, & J.
YOUNG, supra note 8, § 10.2(c).
18. See infra notes 114-27 and accompanying text.
19. See Kervick v. Bontempo, 29 N.J. 469, 150 A.2d 34, 39 (1959), where the New Jersey
Supreme Court described the New Jersey origination clause as "an ancient concept ... [which] had
lost much of its meaning." Id. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court viewed the clause as inappropriate
in the modern world. Mikell v. School Dist., 359 Pa. 113, 58 A.2d 339, 341 (1948).
20. C. WARREN, supra note 11, at 670.
21. The reader is directed to the extensive discussions of the convention history contained in
Hoffer, The Origination Clause and Tax Legislation, 2 B.U.J. TAX L. 1, 2-6, 7-11 (1984); Comment.
supra note 12, at 423-31; Sargent, supra note 12, at 331-34. Charles Warren, in his book, Ttt.
MAKING OF THE CONSTITUTION 274-78, 435, 664-71 (1928), provides much needed texture to the
origination clause issue. See also 1 F. THORPE, THE CONsTITUTIONAL HISTORY O1 TH- UNIT|ItI)
STATES 427, 494, 504-06 (DaCapo reprint 1901); A. PREsCOTr, DRAFTING THiF FEERAl CONS I I-
TUTION 433-51 (1941) (rearranging Madison's notes to provide consecutive development of the orig-
ination clause).
22. Hoffer, supra note 21, at 8-Il.
[Vol. 23:165
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final version permitted amendment. 23  Finally, the origination clause
served as a trade-off for the exclusive powers granted to the Senate: the
treaty and appointment confirmation powers.24 The import of the con-
vention's debate and the significance of the origination clause were co-
gently summarized by a student comment:
[T]he origination clause was adopted on a theory of bicameralism.
"The legislative authority was seen by the framers as the most exten-
sive, and therefore, the one most open to abuse." Accordingly, the
framers deemed it necessary to design not only extracongressional
checks such as the presidential veto, but intracongressional checks as
well. The origination clause was an important part of this system of
bicameral checks and, as it turned out, was one of the few constitu-
tional provisions that the supporters of the Constitution could cite to
rebut the argument that the new republic was in reality an
aristocracy.
2 5
The debate thus clearly discloses the origination clause's crucial role
in the allocation of distinctive powers to the Senate. Without the repos-
ing of the revenue power in the House, the Senate would most likely have
not been granted the appointment and treaty powers.2 6
It is interesting, and perhaps significant, to note that even during the
period of the Constitution's drafting and ratification, the value of the
origination clause was subject to question. Some viewed the clause as an
important, even determinative, prerogative.27 Others viewed the clause,
23. Id. The role that the framers' intent should play in construing the Constitution is the sub-
ject of a continuing debate. For a sampling of views see Rehnquist, The Notion of a Living Constitu-
tion, 54 TEx. L. REV. 693 (1976); Monaghan, Our Perfect Constitution, 56 N.Y.U.L. REV. 353
(1981); Simon, The Authority of the Framers of the Constitution: Can Originalist Interpretation Be
Justified?, 73 CAL. L. REV. 1480 (1985); Powell, The Original Understanding of Original Intent, 98
HARV. L. REV. 885 (1985); Perry, The Authority of Text, Tradition, and Reason: A Theory of Con-
stitutional "Interpretation, " 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 551 (1985); Fallon, A Constructivist Coherence The-
ory of Constitutional Interpretation, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1189 (1987).
24. In retrospect, the power trade-off between the House and the Senate redounded greatly to
the Senate's benefit. See Essay No. 66 of THE FEDERALIST, where Hamilton discusses the relative
powers of the two houses, concluding that the House's prerogatives will enable it to be the full match
to the other branches of the government. The House's exclusive prerogatives of origination, U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 1, and election of the president upon failure of the electoral college, U.S.
CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 3 (as amended by the twelfth amendment), have proven largely valueless. On
the other hand, the Senate's powers of advice and consent on appointments and treaties, U.S.
CONsT. art. II, § 2, cl. 2, and equality on all non-revenue bills have elevated the Senate to a position
unique in the world: a second chamber more powerful than the lower house. See D. OLSON, THE
LF.GISLATIVE PROCESS: A COMPARATIVE APPROACH 23 (1980); THE SENATE INSTITUTION 1 (N.
Preston ed. 1969); C. STRONG, A HISTORY OF MODERN POLITICAL CONSTITUTIONS 213 (1963).
25. Comment, supra note 12, at 428-29.
26. Id.
27. THE FEDERALIST No. 58 (J. Madison) (at least for public consumption); 1 J. TUCKER, THE
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES § 209 (1899). The origination clause was advanced by the
Constitution's publicists as a protection against the aristocratic Senate. See, e.g., the Letter of Cas-
1987]
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with its approval of Senatorial amendment, as virtually meaningless. 28
On balance, however, the most probable view, as noted in a controversial
decision,29 was that the House would be a bulwark against the other gov-
ernmental branches. 3° The framers probably assumed that by giving the
House the power to originate revenue bills, they granted the House the
power to set the legislative agenda.31
sius, IX, published in Massachusetts Gazette December 18, 1787, reprinted in ESSAYS ON THE CON-
STITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 34 (P. Ford ed. 1892):
Sec. 7 provides that all bills for raising revenues shall originate in the house of representa-
tives. Here again must the antifederalists appear weak and contemptible in their assertions
that the Senate will have it in their power to establish themselves a complete aristocratic
body; for this clause fully evinces that if their inclinations were ever so great to effect such
an establishment, it would answer no end, for being unable to levy taxes or collect revenue
is a sufficient check upon every attempt of such a nature.
To the same effect, see 2 M. JENSEN, THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE
CONSTITUTION 145, 190 (1976); III J. ELLIOT, THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVEN-
TIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION As RECOMMENDED BY THE GENERAL
CONVENTION AT PHILADELPHIA IN 1787 376-77 (1836). See also IV J. ELLIOT, supra, at 172-73; 3
RECORDS, supra note 14, at 148, 318 (Madison defends the origination clause's Senatorial amend-
ment provision); Comment, supra note 12, at 430; Hoffer, supra note 21, at 7-11; C. WARREN, Supra
note 11, at 276-77; C. VAN DOREN, THE GREAT REHEARSAL 114-15 (1948).
28. A. PUTNEY, UNITED STATES CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY AND LAW § 133 (1908); C.
WARREN, supra note 11, at 670-71. Warren felt that the amendment power was crucial:
When, however, the large States surrendered on the point of allowing the Senate to
amend the House revenue bills, they really surrendered on the whole proposition; for, as
William Grayson (an opponent of the Constitution) pointed out in the Virginia State Con-
vention as early as 1788: "The power of imposing amendments is the same, in effect, as that
of originating. The Senate could strike out every word of the bill except the word whereas,
or any other introductory word, and might substitute new words of their own." Grayson's
prophecy constitutes exactly what has taken place, in practice, in the Senate.
Id. See also 3 RECORDS, supra note 14, at 265-67 (Senate's power of amendment violated the com-
promise creating equal representation in the Senate), at 318 (Madison comments in debate on Vir-
ginia's ratification that "there is some difference, though not considerable" between the power to
originate and the power to amend); M. FARRAND, THE FRAMING OF THE CONSTITUTION 172-73
(1913); E. DUMBAULD, THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 103 (1964) ("little practical
importance"); A. KELLY & W. HARBISON, THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION: ITS ORIGINS AND
DEVELOPMENT 131 (1948) ("of small importance"). The antifederalist argument emphasizing the
weakness of the House's origination prerogative is comprehensively documented in THE ANTIFED-
ERALISTS 152-60, 191-95, 209-10, 315-16, 389-92, 409-15 (C. Kenyon ed. 1966); R. KETCHAM, THE
ANTI-FEDERALIST PAPERS AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION DEBATES 174 (1986). The
standard anti-federalist collection is H. STORING, THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST (1981).
29. Davi v. Laird, 318 F. Supp. 478 (W.D. Va. 1970) (unsuccessful suit to declare the Vietnam
war unconstitutional).
30. Id. at 480; see also 2 D. WATSON, THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 342-51
(1910).
31. Comment, supra note 12, at 427-30; Hoffer, supra note 21, at 15-16; cf Sargent, supra note
12, at 352 ("Perhaps the greatest present-day advantage of the system is that by it each House is able
to concentrate on the preparation of certain kinds of bills, thus assuring more expert knowledge and
less duplication than would otherwise exist."). See also 3 M. FARRAND, supra note 14, at 201-02
(Luther Martin, in a broadside delivered to the Maryland legislature, criticized the House's origina-
tion prerogative, viewing the provision as disabling the Senate from participating in the formulation
of policy, noting the potentially broad and undefined nature of the revenue bill); see also id., App.
CXLVIb (also setting forth the opinion of Luther Martin on the issue).
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C. Federal Judicial Precedents
There has been relatively little substantive judicial construction of
the federal origination clause, partly as a result of the lack of an advisory
opinion procedure,32 and partly as a result of the diligence of the House
of Representatives in protecting its constitutional prerogative. 33 There is
no question that the enrolled bill doctrine embraced by the United States
Supreme Court,34 and the initial restrictive interpretation placed on the
origination clause by the federal courts and commentators, have also
served to discourage litigation. In fact, in only one instance has a federal
statute been held to violate the origination clause.35
1. The Early Cases
a. Supreme Court
The Supreme Court has considered the origination clause five
times.3 6 In United States v. Norton,37 the act establishing a postal money-
order system was held not to be a revenue law for purposes of a statute
imposing criminal penalties on persons convicted of crimes arising under
the revenue laws of the United States.38 The defendant had been charged
with embezzlement of money belonging to the New York money-order
office, and several of the offenses charged occurred between two and five
years before the indictment was handed down. 39 The government there-
fore desired to prosecute the party under the revenue law criminal statute
which had a five year statute of limitations.4" The general federal crimi-
32. As will be discussed, the origination clause is frequently involved in advisory opinions
sought by the legislature or by the governor. Comment, supra note 12. at 432 n.74. The federal
courts, on the other hand, have long disclaimed jurisdiction to render advisory opinions. Dahlquist,
Advisory Opinions, Extrajudicial Activity and Judicial Advocacy: A Historical Perspective, 14 Sw.
U.L. REv. 45 (1983); Aumann, The Supreme Court and the Advisory Opinion, 4 OHio ST. L.J. 21
(1937); Comment, The Advisory Opinion and the United States Supreme Court, 5 FORDHAM L. REV.
94 (1936). Federal cases construing state origination clauses are discussed infra, under the particular
state section.
33. See infra notes 114-27 and accompanying text.
34. Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649 (1892). The enrolled bill doctrine in the context of the origina-
tion clause is discussed in Comment, supra note 12, at 454-59. The author advocates the abandon-
ment of the enrolled bill doctrine. See also supra note 16 and accompanying text.
35. Hubbard v. Lowe, 226 F. 135 (S.D.N.Y. 1915), appeal dismuissed, 242 U.S. 654 (1916).
36. See also Justice Clifford's dissent in The Legal Tender Cases, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 457, 631
(1870). where lie enumerates the constitutional limitations on the Federal Taxation power, including
the origination clause.
37. 91 U.S. 566 (1875).
38. Id. at 569.
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nal statute of limitations otherwise applicable was two years.4 The
Court examined the purpose for establishing the postal money-order sys-
tem, which was to insure greater security in the transmission of money in
the mail.42 The fees to be charged for the service did not indicate a desire
to raise revenue.43 Applying the standards for revenue bills under the
origination clause, the Court determined that the offenses charged in vio-
lation of the postal money act were subject to the two year statute of
limitations.' The Court referred to Congress' interpretation of the origi-
nation clause to only include "bills to levy taxes in the strict sense of the
words, and... not... to extend to bills for other purposes which inci-
dentally create revenue."4"
In Twin City Bank v. Nebeker,46 a federal act which provided a na-
tional currency secured by bonds and which imposed a tax on the notes
41. Id.
42. Id. at 567-68.
43. Id. at 568.
44. Id. at 569.
45. Id. at 569, quoting Justice Story. The federal courts have often employed origination clause
analysis in other revenue contexts. The Court assumed that Congress was familiar with the con-
struction given "bills for raising revenue." As the Norton Court observed, "'[b]ills for raising reve-
nue' when enacted into laws, become revenue laws." Id. See, e.g., (1) cases under former 28 U.S.C.
§ 76 permitting officers acting by authority of a United States revenue law to remove cases brought
against them in state court to federal court: Smith v. Gilliam, 282 F. 628 (W.D. Ky. 1922) (National
Prohibition Act not a revenue law, relying on Norton, since purpose was not to raise revenue but to
enforce prohibition); Twin Falls Canal Co. v. Foote, 192 F. 583 (D. Idaho 1911) (Reclamation Act is
not a revenue law permitting removal; court finding revenue law to be substantial equivalent of "bills
for raising revenue"); People's United States Bank v. Goodwin, 162 F. 937 (E.D. Mo. 1908) (post
office assistant attorney general sued for libel not acting under revenue laws of the United States;
court noting that a distinction could be drawn between revenue acts and "bills for raising revenue,"
but not reaching the issue); and (2) criminal statutes enforcing the revenue laws: United States v.
McConnell, 10 F.2d 973 (E.D. Pa. 1926) (National Prohibition Act not a revenue law within mean-
ing of statute prescribing penalties against officers acting under authority of the revenue laws who
conspire to defraud the United States; discussing many of the early federal origination clause cases
and concluding that the National Prohibition Act's potential for raising revenue was only incidental
to the main purpose of enforcing the eighteenth amendment); United States v. Mayo, 26 F. Cas.
1230, 1231 (C.C.D. Mass. 1813) (No. 15,755) (Justice Story determined that penalties provided
under the Embargo Act were not subject to the longer statute of limitations available for revenue
laws; noting that "revenue laws" mean "such laws as are made for the direct and avowed purpose for
creating and securing revenue or public funds for the service of the government."); The Nashville, 17
F. Cas. 1176, 1178 (D.C.D. Ind. 1868) (No. 10,023) (prosecution for penalties under statute regulat-
ing the carriage of passengers on steamships not a revenue bill for purposes of statute authorizing in
rem action to enforce laws: "I suppose that 'bills for raising revenue' are, when passed, 'revenue
laws'...."). But see United States v. James, 26 F. Cas. 577 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1875) (No. 15,464),
where the court distinguished an earlier Supreme Court decision (United States v. Bromely, 53 U.S.
(12 How.) 43 (1851)), which had held an act to reduce rates of postage was a revenue act within the
writ of error statute concerning revenue laws. In James, the court found that a Senate amendment
(raising the postage rate) to a House appropriations bill was not a "bill for raising revenue." Com-
pare United States v. Jin Fuey Moy, 241 U.S. 394 (1916), where the Court upheld the Opium Regis-
tration Act as constitutional, deciding that it was a revenue measure, not a police measure.
46. 167 U.S. 196 (1897) (adopted in Lumberman's Bank v. Huston, 167 U.S. 203 (1897)).
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held by national banking associations was determined not to be a revenue
bill. The act had originated in the House, but the tax provision had been
inserted by the Senate.47 Relying on Justice Story's definition of the reve-
nue bill. The Court held that the act was not a revenue bill. The act's
main purpose was to provide a national currency for the United States,
the tax being merely a means to effectuate the act's general purpose.4"
Twin Cities was followed in Millard v. Roberts,49 where the Court
found that the act of Congress authorizing payment to railroads of funds
raised by taxing property in the District of Columbia was not a revenue
bill.50 The taxes imposed were "but means to the purposes provided by
the act."51
In Flint v. Stone Tracy Co.,52 the House had passed a general bill for
the collection of revenue which contained an inheritance tax. The Senate
deleted the inheritance tax and inserted a corporation tax; the act was
then passed as amended. The Court rejected the challenge that the Sen-
ate's action violated the origination clause and found that the Senate
amendment was germane to the subject matter of the House bill.53
The Court returned to the Senate's power of amendment in its brief
opinion in Rainey v. United States.5a Adopting the opinion of the court
below on the issue, Chief Justice White found the Senate's addition
47. Twin Cities, 167 U.S. at 198, 200. The Court found this fact reflected in the legislative
journals, but cautioned that the disposition of the case did not require the Court to consider the issue
of whether such journals could be used to attack an enrolled bill showing no defect on its face. Id. at
203. Prior to making this cautionary statement, the Court discussed its earlier decision of Field v.
Clark which had adopted the enrolled bill doctrine. Id. at 200-01.
48. Id. at 202. The Court specifically declined to provide a general rule as to what bills would
be encompassed within the origination clause, finding that "it is the part of wisdom not to attempt,
by any general statement, to cover every possible phase of the subject." Id.
49. 202 U.S. 429 (1906).
50. Id. at 436-37.
51. Id. at 437. The Court's reasoning is criticized by Sargent, supra note 12, who claimed that
the purpose of the bill could not have been accomplished except by the raising of revenue. Id. at 388.
The revenue aspects of the bill were not incidental; they were crucial to the successful implementa-
tion of the bill's objectives. Id.
52. 220 U.S. 107 (1911).
53. Id. at 143. The Court reasoned:
The bill having properly originated in the House, we perceive no reason in the constitu-
tional provision relied upon why it may not be amended in the Senate in the manner which
it was in this case. The amendment was germane to the subject-matter of the bill, and not
beyond the power of the Senate to propose.
The Court derived the fact of Senate amendment from the government's brief. The Court again
cautioned that it was not holding that legislative journals could be used to invalidate an act comply-
ing with the requirements of an enrolled bill. Id. The requirement that Senate amendments be
germane is convincingly articulated in Hoffer, supra note 21, at 13-18. The Senate rules do not
currently require that amendments be germane. 1 J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA, & J. YOUNG, supra note
8, § 10.5.
54. 232 U.S. 310 (1914).
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of a revenue amendment to a House-originated revenue bill unobjec-
tionable."
b. Lower Federal Courts
In the influential case of United States ex rel Michels v. James,5 6 the
court considered a Senate amendment increasing the rate of postage
which had been added to a House appropriations measure. In deciding
whether a particular bill was a bill for raising revenue, the principle be-
hind the origination clause had to be considered."
The court reasoned that revenue bills are bills which either directly
or indirectly impose taxes, duties, imposts, or excises for the govern-
ment's use.5 8  The revenues so derived are exacted with no direct
equivalent value being returned. It was therefore reasonable that the
House of Representatives, being the house most accountable to the peo-
ple, would have the exclusive power to originate revenue legislation. 9
The safeguard of popular accountability would ensure that the House
would be especially watchful for the interests of those whom they repre-
sented.6° Under this reasoning, an amendment increasing the postage
rate would not be within the origination clause.
But the reason fails in respect to bills of a different class. A bill
regulating postal rates for postal service, provides an equivalent for the
money which the citizen may choose voluntarily to pay. He gets the
fixed service for the fixed rate, or he lets it alone, as he pleases and as
his own interests dictate. Revenue, beyond its cost, may or may not be
derived from the service and the pay received for it, but it is only a
55. Id. at 317. The Court preceded its adoption of the lower court opinion with the admonition
that it was not intimating that the Court had the power, after an act of Congress had been promul-
gated, "to inquire in which House it originated for the purpose of determining its validity ." Id. A
student comment extensively analyzes the justiciability issues and concludes that origination clause
challenges should be heard by the courts. Comment, supra note 12, at 431-54.
56. 26 F. Cas. 577 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1875) (No. 15,464).
In addition to the cases discussed in the text, see Varney v. Warehime, 147 F.2d 238 (6th Cir.),
cert. denied, 325 U.S. 882 (1945) (milk product assessment regulation and authorizing statute not a
revenue bill); Bertelsen v. White, 65 F.2d 719 (1st Cir. 1933) (Merchant Marine Act not a bill to raise
revenue, but one to establish American merchant marine on a firm and permanent basis; further-
more, the incidental tax provisions diminish, not increase, the revenue of the government); United
States v. Lucius Beebe & Sons, 122 F. 762 (Ist Cir. 1903) (noting that tariff act was a revenue bill
within origination clause); United States v. Billings, 190 F. 359 (S.D.N.Y. 1911), rey'd on other
grounds sub nom., Pierce v. United States, 232 U.S. 290 (1914) (In Billings the Senate tax amend-
ment to House revenue bill was not invalid; not for court to determine whether the amendment was
outside the purposes of the original bill).
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very strained construction which would regard a bill establishing rates
of postage as a bill for raising revenue, within the meaning of the con-
stitution. This broad distinction existing in fact between the two kinds
of bills, it is obviously a just construction to confine the terms of the
constitution to the case which they plainly designate.
6 1
Hubbard v. Lowe,62 is the only case striking down a federal law on
the basis of violation of the origination clause. Ironically, the enrolled
bill doctrine helped seal the fate of the statute, as the enrolled bill doc-
trine will in many instances preclude an origination clause challenge.63
The Cotton Futures Act originated in the Senate as requiring the use by
cotton exchanges of a form of contract for cotton futures.' 4 The law's
sanction would exclude from the mails all exchange business not using
the statutory contract. 65 The House struck out the entire bill after the
enacting clause and substituted a new act with a destructive excise tax as
the penalty for non-compliance. 66 As the parties in Hubbard had con-
ceded that the Cotton Futures Act as passed was a revenue bill,67 the
court found the bill to have been originated in the Senate, as reflected in
the enrolled bill.68 The court recognized that its action in striking down
61. Id. In contrast, in 1925, a Senate bill to reclassify postal salaries and increase postal rates,
similar to the statute upheld in James, was returned by the House to the Senate after the House
sustained a point of order that the bill infringed on its prerogative. 6 CANNON'S PRECEDENTS OF
THE Housa OF REPRESENTATIVES OF THE UNITED STATES § 317 (1935) [hereinafter CANNON'S
PRECEDENTS]. The Senate had earlier rejected a point of order on the same ground. The reasoning
of the James court was criticized in Sargent, supra note 12, at 338.
62. 226 F. 135 (S.D.N.Y. 1915), appeal dismissed mem., 242 U.S. 654 (1916).
63. Under the enrolled bill doctrine, the only document examined by the court is the enrolled
bill, signed by the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House, and, in most cases, by the
President. See supra note 16. Thusly limited, the court would be unable to discern when the bill
became a "bill for raising revenue." The enrolled bill only documents the house of origin of the
initial bill and the final text, not any amendments or deletions that occurred as the bill journeyed
through the legislative process. In Twin City Bank v. Nebeker, 167 U.S. 196 (1897) and Flint v.
Stone Tracy Co., 220 U.S. 107 (1910), for example, an origination clause challenge would have been
totally precluded under the enrolled bill doctrine. As the court in Hubbard observed, the interven-
ing congressional process in enacting the bill does not affect the origination issue. "What the Consti-
tution requires to originate in the House of Representatives is not the final product of the legislative
will, not the statute, but a project for a statute, which may by amendment take a very different shape
by the time it is ready for promulgation as law." Hubbard, 226 F. at 138. See also Zeak v. United
States, 84-I U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 9340 (S.D. Ohio 1984) (discussing Hubbard).
64. United States Cotton Futures Acts, ch. 255, 38 Stat. 693 (1914).
65. Hubbard, 226 F. at 138.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 137. The Court observed that even though raising revenue was not the real purpose
for the Cotton Futures Act, the Supreme Court decision of McCray v. United States, 195 U.S. 27
(1904), upholding a punitive tax on the sale of oleomargarine, prevented the court from examining
the motives of Congress. The Cotton Futures Act was really meant to prohibit certain activity by
the imposition of onerous taxes; however, the statute was described in its title as a tax bill and the
statute provided the machinery of levy and collection. Hubbard, 226 F. at 137.
68. Id. at 138-39. The constitutional necessity for the enrolled bill showing its origination is
compelled by article 1, section 7, clause 2 of the Constitution, which requires the President, if he
13
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a federal law as violating the origination clause was unprecedented: "[i]t
has not heretofore been found necessary to condemn an act of Congress
for this kind of careless journey work, though it sometimes required a
good deal of mental strain to demonstrate that some piece of legislation
originating in a Senate was not a 'bill for raising revenue.' "69 The court
then found the act unconstitutional.7 °
2. Recent Cases
a. TEFRA
The peculiar legislative history surrounding passage of the Tax Eq-
uity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982 (TEFRA)71 has led to a large
number of origination clause cases. The courts have uniformily upheld
TEFRA as not violating the origination clause.72 TEFRA originated in
the House of Representatives as the Miscellaneous Revenue Act of
198 l." As passed by the House, the net effect of the act would have been
objects to a proposed bill, to return the bill and his objections "to that House in which it shall have
originated." See generally, McGowan, The President's Veto Power: An Important Instrument of
Conflict in Our Constitutional System, 23 SAN DIEGo L. REV. 791 (1986); Zinn, The Veto Power of
the President, 12 F.R.D. 207 (1952). The court felt that Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649 (1892), was
controlling; but even if not controlling, was well-based and should be followed. Hubbard, 226 F. at
139. In dicta, the court observed that assuming the legislative journals to be competent evidence, the
result of unconstitutionality would remain. Id. The House substituted by amendment. Under ac-
cepted parliamentary procedure, substitution by amendment does not change the origin of the bill.
The alternative for the House was to reject the Senate bill, and pass its own bill on the subject. Id. at
139-40. To avoid the extra parliamentary steps that process would invoke, the House substituted by
amendment. "This was legitimate amendment, as that word is used in parliamentary law, and
though an amendment may be the most important part of an act, it remains formally only an addi-
tion or subtraction; it has no independent parliamentary vitality." Id. at 140.
69. Id. (rejecting an apparent argument that the origination clause was not mandatory). As the
Court noted "[i]f these courts had not assumed that a revenue bill of Senate origin was a nullity, why
spend so much time in proving that the act under consideration was not such a bill?" Id. But see
Mikell v. School Dist., 359 Pa. 113, 58 A.2d 339 (1948), where the Pennsylvania Supreme Court first
found the challenged act not to be a bill for raising revenue, and then gratuitously opined that the
origination clause, in any event, was only directory. Id. at -, 58 A.2d at 341-44.
70. Hubbard, 226 F. at 141. "It is one of those legislative projects which, to be law, must
originate in the lower house." Id. Rejecting the argument that the Supreme Court's admonition in
Rainey (see supra notes 54-55 and accompanying text) precluded the court from considering the act's
constitutionality, the court responded by noting that its actions were consistent with the enrolled bill
doctrine as set forth in Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649 (1892). Looking behind the enrolled bill was
unnecessary; the enrolled bill itself conclusively established its origination in the Senate. Hubbard,
226 F. at 141.
71. Pub. L. No. 97-248, 96 Stat. 324 (1982).
72. Several courts have also rejected TEFRA origination clause challenges on the procedural
basis that the plaintiff pursued the wrong remedy. See Graham v. United States, 573 F. Supp. 848
(E.D. Pa. 1983) (Anti-Tax Injunction Act precluded injunctive relief); Klingler v. Executive Branch,
572 F. Supp. 589 (M.D. Ala. 1983) (declaratory relief and injunctive relief precluded by the Anti-
Tax Injunction Act).
73. The legislative history is narrated in Moore v. House of Representatives, 553 F. Supp. 267,
14
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to reduce revenues by $976 million over five years.74 Upon receipt by the
Senate, however, the Finance Committee struck most of the House bill
after the enacting clause, renamed it TEFRA, and substituted tax provi-
sions designed to raise revenue in the amount of $99 billion over three
years.75 TEFRA, as so designated, passed the Senate, and the Senate
subsequently sought a conference with the House. In response, Repre-
sentative Rousselot offered a privileged resolution declaring that it was
the House's opinion that the Senate's action violated the House's consti-
tutional prerogative.76 The resolution was tabled by a substantial major-
ity upon motion by the chairman of the House Ways and Means
Committee.77 The chairman, Dan Rostenkowski, then moved that the
House send the bill to conference with the Senate. The motion passed
after a considerable debate on constitutional issues.7" Subsequently, a
conference bill which was substantially similar to the Senate bill was re-
ported to the House.79 Representative Rousselot filed a second resolu-
tion asserting the House's prerogative, but the resolution was voted
down."0 The conference bill passed both houses, and was signed into law
by President Reagan.8"
In Armstrong v. United States,82 the leading appellate decision,83 the
269-70 (D.D.C. 1982), aff'd on other grounds, 733 F.2d 946 (D.C. Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 409 U.S.
1106. See also Hoffer, supra note 21, at 18-20. The peculiar legislative history was compelled by
political events. The democratic-controlled House did not want to bear responsibility for originating
a massive tax increase, and by relinquishing its constitutional prerogative, permitted the republican
Senate and President to assume that burden. While perhaps a wise political decision, the House's
action was directly contrary to the principle of the origination clause: to place responsibility for
revenue bills directly on the House, which is the body most accountable to the people. Comment,
supra note 12, at 449-50.
TEFRA is not the first revenue act passed with an eye towards expediency and in disregard of
the House's constitutional prerogatives. In 1883, for example, the House permitted the Senate to
add to a minor bill affecting the tobacco industry a whole plan of tariff revision. See Sargent, supra
note 12, at 350; 2 HINDS' PRECEDENTS OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES OF THE UNITED
STATES § 1491 (1907) [hereinafter HINDS' PRECEDENTS].
74. Moore, 553 F. Supp. at 269.
75. Id.
76. A resolution asserting the House's constitutional prerogatives is the usual way to legisla-
tively assert origination clause issues. 3 DESCHLER'S PRECEDENTS OF THE UNITED STATES HOUSE
OF REPRESENTATIVES § 13 (1974) [hereinafter DESCHLER'S PRECEDENTS].




81. Id. at 270.
82. 759 F.2d 1378 (9th Cir. 1985).
83. Other appellate decisions affirming the constitutionality of TEFRA on the merits include
Hudson v. United States, 766 F.2d 1288 (9th Cir. 1985); Jolly v. United States, 764 F.2d 642 (9th
Cir. 1985); Boday v. United States, 759 F.2d 1472 (9th Cir. 1985); Harris v. United States, 758 F.2d
456 (9th Cir. 1985); Wardell v. United States, 757 F.2d 203 (8th Cir. 1985); Heitman v. United
15
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court of appeals rejected a claim by a taxpayer seeking a refund of a
portion of an airplane excise tax. The court first found that the taxpayer
had presented a justiciable controversy. 4 The taxpayer claimed that
since the tax bill which eventually became TEFRA had originated in the
House as a revenue-reducer, and had been amended in the Senate to in-
crease revenue, the bill had originated in the Senate as a bill "for raising
revenue." 85 The taxpayer sought to restrict the origination clause to bills
increasing revenue.8 6 The court rejected the claim, finding that the origi-
nation clause applied as well to bills decreasing revenue. 7
The court based its construction on the accepted legislative practice
that the Senate may not initiate any "bill for raising revenue." 88 Further-
more, the taxpayer's position would cause immense practical difficulties,
since members of Congress could have differences on whether a particu-
States, 753 F.2d 33 (6th Cir. 1984).
84. The government had contended that Congress' determination that TEFRA had originated
in the House should be given deference. The court rejected the contention, observing that
"[a]lIthough Congress has an obligation to enact legislation that it deems to be constitutional, its
determination that a particular statute is constitutional does not foreclose or relieve this court from
conducting its own analysis of that issue." Armstrong, 759 F.2d at 1380. The court examined the
criteria set forth in Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962), to determine whether the origination clause
issue was a non-justiciable political question, noting that the historical sequence was undisputed,
thus relieving the court of the necessity to delve into the "internal records or workings of Congress."
Armstrong, 759 F.2d at 1380. The court concluded that the Supreme Court in Flint v. Stone Tracy
Co., 220 U.S. 107 (1911), had implicitly determined origination clause questions to be justiciable. In
Texas Ass'n of Concerned Taxpayers v. United States, 772 F.2d 163 (5th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 106
S. Ct. 2265 (1986), however, the court found an origination clause challenge to TEFRA to be non-
justiciable. Finding the term "raising revenue" to be ambiguous, the court found no judicially dis-
coverable standards of resolution superior to the determinations made by Congress. Id. at 166.
Restricting the clause to bills increasing revenue would create uncertainty. Id. The House debates
on TEFRA's constitutionality were also entitled to deference by the court. Id. Finally, the court
relied on the enrolled bill doctrine. Id. Justices White and Brennan would have granted certiorari to
resolve the justiciability issue, noting that in Flint, 220 U.S. 107, a case distinguished by the Fifth
Circuit, the Court addressed an origination clause case on the merits. Texas Ass'n, 106 S.Ct. at 2266.
See generally Comment, supra note 12 (historical analysis of policy considerations behind adoption
of the origination clause which is used to determine proper interpretation and application of the
clause).
85. Armstrong, 759 F.2d at 1381.
86. Id.
87. Id. "We cannot accept this restrictive and strained reading of the origination clause. The
term 'Bills for raising Revenue' does not refer only to laws increasing taxes, but instead refers in
general to all laws relating to taxes." Id. (emphasis in original). It is somehow appropriate that the
court expansively construed the origination clause in order to sustain the statute. Federal and state
courts normally have construed the origination clause narrowly to sustain acts, sometimes employ-
ing "a good deal of mental strain." Hubbard v. Lowe, 226 F. 135, 140 (S.D.N.Y. 1915), appeal
dismissed mem., 242 U.S. 654 (1916). The state courts have split on whether a bill that decreases
revenue falls within the origination clause. The cases are collected in Annotation, supra note 16, at
977 § 4. Compare, Perry County v. Selma, Marion & Memphis Ry. Co., 58 Ala. 546 (1877) (yes)
with In re Paton's Estate, 114 N.J. Eq. 324, 168 A. 422 (Prerog. Ct. 1933) (no).
88. Armstrong, 759 F.2d at 1381, citing 2 HINDS' PRECEDENTS, supra note 73, § 1489.
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lar bill would increase or decrease revenue.89 Indeed, the same revenue
bill could have varying effects from year to year.90 Finally, the court was
unwilling to accept a construction which would prohibit the Senate from
amending a House bill lowering revenue so as to transform the bill into
one increasing revenue.91 The Senate's power of amendment, as con-
tained in the origination clause, was not that limited. 92
In Moore v. United States House of Representatives,93 the District of
Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals first reversed the district court's de-
89. Armstrong, 759 F.2d at 1381.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id. The origination clause permits the Senate "to propose or concur with amendments as
on other bills." Id. (emphasis by court). The Armstrong court found that the Senate amendments,
although far-reaching, were "germane to the subject matter of the bill," which was the reform of the
tax system. Id. at 1382. The Senate's power of amendment is critically analyzed in Hoffer, supra
note 21, at 7-18. The scope of the amendment power has been the source of considerable congres-
sional discussion. The House has properly insisted on a germaneness restriction upon the Senate's
power of amendment. See 2 HINDS' PRECEDENTS, supra note 73, § 1489. Representative Garfield
(soon to be President) articulated the House's position:
True we sent to the Senate a bill of three or four lines, and they have sent back a bill of
twenty printed pages. I do not deny their right to send back a bill of a thousand pages as
an amendment to our two lines. But I do insist that their thousand pages must be on the
subject-matter of our bill.
Cong. Globe, 42nd Cong., Ist Session, 2716 (1872). See also supra note 53.
The court in Armstrong found the Supreme Court decision in Flint v. Stone Tracy Co., 220 U.S.
107 (1911) influential, if not controlling. The district court decisions validating TEFRA have, for
the most part, relied primarily on Flint. See, eg., Schoffner v. United States, 627 F. Supp. 167 (S.D.
Ohio 1985); Morris v. United States, 616 F. Supp. 246 (E.D. Mich. 1985); House v. United States,
593 F. Supp. 139 (W.D. Mich. 1984), aff'd mem., 787 F.2d 590 (6th Cir. 1986); Vaughn v. United
States, 589 F. Supp. 1528 (W.D. La. 1984); Liljenfeldt v. United States, 588 F. Supp. 966 (E.D.
Wis.), aff'd mem., 753 F.2d 1077 (7th Cir. 1984); Karpowycz v. United States, 586 F. Supp. 48
(N.D. I11. 1984); Scull v. United States, 585 F. Supp. 956 (E.D. Va. 1984); Rowe v. United States,
583 F. Supp. 1516 (D. Del. 1984), aff'd mem., 749 F.2d 27 (3d Cir. 1984); Aune v. United States,
582 F. Supp. 1132 (D. Ariz. 1984), appeal dismissed in part,judgment aff'd mem., 765 F.2d 148 (9th
Cir. 1985); Brennan v. Commissioner, 581 F. Supp. 28 (E.D. Mich. 1984); Ueckert v. United States,
581 F. Supp. 1262 (D.N.D. 1984) (Senate action precisely the kind of change and compromise con-
templated by the origination clause); Gimelli v. United States, 84-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) $ 9289
(E.D. La. 1984); Stamp v. Commissioner, 579 F. Supp. 168 (N.D. Ill.), aff'd, 752 F.2d 187 (6th Cir.
1984); Milazzo v. United States, 578 F. Supp. 248 (S.D. Cal. 1984); Kloes v. United States, 578 F.
Supp. 270 (W.D. Wis. 1984) (All the Constitution requires is that the House, the body closest to the
people, make the original decision to introduce and pass a revenue raising bill. Only two possible
constructions of the clause are practical: either the Senate can amend at will, or it cannot amend at
all. The Convention chose to permit the Senate full participation in the process, once the House has
passed a revenue bill; otherwise, a cloud would exist any time the Senate amended a revenue bill in
any manner.); Tibbetts v. Secretary of the Treasury, 577 F. Supp. 911 (W.D.N.C. 1984); Bearden v.
Commissioner, 575 F. Supp. 1459 (D. Utah 1983); Frent v. United States, 571 F. Supp. 739 (E.D.
Mich. 1983), appeal dismissed and remanded mem., 734 F.2d 14 (6th Cir. 1984).
93. 733 F.2d 946 (D.C. Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1106 (1985).
The question of standing is beyond the scope of this article. See generally, Comment, supra note
12 (criticizing the district court decision in Moore). The issue of congressional standing is analyzed
in Dessem, Congressional Standing to Sue: Whose Vote is this, Anyway?, 62 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1
(1986).
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termination that House members did not have standing to raise an origi-
nation clause issue, but then refused to grant relief.94 The court
exercised its remedial discretion95 to conclude that court intervention
was inappropriate. The court was concerned about possible misuse by
members of Congress in shifting their intermural disputes to the courts.
96
The doctrine of remedial discretion permitted the court to avoid med-
dling in the internal affairs of the legislature by evaluating the separation
of powers concerns raised by suits of congressional members against their
colleagues. 97 However, the court observed that denial of relief in this
case would not preclude origination clause challenges by private
taxpayers.98
b. Non-TEFRA Cases
In Mulroy v. Block,99 a New York dairy farmer sought to enjoin the
Secretary of Agriculture from collecting sums pursuant to amendments
to the milk price support system. Among other contentions, the farmer
claimed that the penalties sought to be imposed were actually a tax, and
that the act authorizing the penalties was therefore a bill "for raising
revenue" which required House origination."° The court first found the
94. Moore, 733 F.2d at 955-56.
95. Id. (relying on Brillhart v. Excess Insurance Co., 316 U.S. 491 (1942); Wilderness Soc'y v.
Morton, 479 F.2d 842 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 917 (1973)). Judge (now Justice) Scalia
would have affirmed the district court on standing grounds and objected vigorously to the remedial
discretion doctrine. Moore, 733 F.2d at 956-65. Invocation of the remedial discretion principle in
origination clause challenges was criticized in the context of Moore in Comment, supra note 12, at
442-43. See also Henken, Is there a "Political Question" Doctrine?, 85 YALE L.J. 597 (1976).
96. Moore, 733 F.2d at 956.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. 569 F. Supp. 256 (N.D.N.Y. 1983), aff'd, 736 F.2d 56 (2d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S.
1159 (1985); see also Moon v. Freeman, 379 F.2d 382 (9th Cir. 1967) (in dicta, the court found that
provisions of two agriculture acts requiring purchase of wheat marketing export certificates were not
revenue provisions, noting that Congress had faced the issue and acted as if the provisions were
enacted pursuant to the commerce power); United States v. Ramos, 624 F. Supp. 970 (S.D.N.Y.
1985) (statute authorizing special assessments on convicted persons not a revenue measure requiring
House origination, because statute's purpose was to punish convicted criminals, not to raise reve-
nues); Sperry Corp. v. United States 12 Cl. Ct. 736 (1987) (revenue raising aspects of Senate-
originated Iran claims Act, permitting the United States to deduct and to retain a specified per-
ecentage from any award of Iran claims tribunal, was only incidental to the main purposes of the act:
to expedite settlement of claims against Iran and to pass on the cost of maintaining the claims
tribunal to those who ultimately received the greatest benefit from the claims procedure). In Leary.
v. United States, 395 U.S. 6, 21 (1969), the Court observed that the Marijuana Tax Act was a taxing
measure properly originating in the House. Cf State v. Block, 717 F.2d 874 (4th Cir. 1983), cert.
denied, 465 U.S. 1080 (1984) (Secretary of Agriculture's action in imposing a fifty cent deduction on
proceeds derived from sales of commercially produced milk not a tax requiring origination in the
House of Representatives).
100. Mulroy, 569 F. Supp. at 265.
[Vol. 23:165
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act in question not to be one for raising revenue, noting that a bill which
incidentally creates revenue is not automatically a bill for raising reve-
nue. 10 1 The court determined that the principal purpose of the act's pen-
alties was the regulation of milk production, not the raising of revenue.
"[W]hatever assessments are imposed are but means to the purpose pro-
vided by the Act."10 2
Examining the legislative history, the court proceeded to find that
the act did in fact originate in the House.1"3 The House bill did not
include the assessment which was added by the Senate. Nevertheless, as
the Senate amendment was germane to the subject matter of the House
bill, the legislation did not violate the origination clause."
In Swearingen v. United States,' 5 a taxpayer maintained an action
seeking to recover taxes assessed by the United States. The taxpayer
claimed that an international executive agreement implementing the Pan-
ama Canal Treaty, as well as the treaty itself, exempted from taxation
certain income derived by employees of the Panama Canal Commis-
sion.' 06 The court first found the executive agreement provision invalid
as conflicting with the Internal Revenue Code. 107 The court then deter-
mined that the treaty itself contained no such exemptions.10 8 In dicta,
the court observed that even if such an exemption were construed to be
part of the treaty, that exemption would still be invalid as being "in con-
travention of the exclusive constitutional authority of the House of Rep-
resentatives to originate all bills for raising revenues."'0 9
101. Id. (quoting United States v. Norton, 91 U.S. 566, 569 (1875), which in turn quoted J.
STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION, § 880).
102. Id.
103. Id. The court quoted the disclaimer of the Supreme Court in its Flint decision. In making
a determination that the House had indeed originated the Act, the court did not hold that the legisla-
tive journals could be reviewed to invalidate an act of Congress properly evidenced by the enrolled
bill. Id. The Court did specifically invoke the enrolled bill doctrine to preclude a challenge based on
the House and Senate's alleged failure to comply with their internal rules forbidding the insertion of
new matter into conference bills. Id. at 266. In its actions, as opposed to its words, the court seemed
to properly draw a distinction between constitutional procedural requirements and legislative or in-
ternal procedural requirements. Application of the enrolled bill doctrine is properly applied in a
more vigorous manner in the latter case than in a case involving a constitutional provision. See
Opinion of the Justices, 233 A.2d 59, 61 (Del. 1967).
104. Mulroy, 569 F. Supp. at 266.
105. 565 F. Supp. 1019 (D. Colo. 1983).
106. Id. at 1020.
107. Id. at 1021.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 1022 (citing Edwards v. Carter, 580 F.2d 1055, 1058 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 436
U.S. 907 (1978)). The court therefore implicitly accepted the view that bills which have the effect of
reducing revenue are nevertheless bills "for raising revenue." In Edwards, the court upheld the
Panama Canal Treaty against a challenge that in disposing of American property, the treaty required
1987]
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D. Federal Parliamentary Precedent
While legislative construction of constitutional provisions is not
controlling upon the courts, 110 legislative construction is entitled to
substantial deference in the judicial construction of the particular clause
in question."' Congressional precedent concerning the scope of the
origination clause should be particularly relevant.1 2 The precedents of
both houses establish that, in general, Congress has been attuned to the
policies which led to inclusion of the origination clause in the Constitu-
tion' 1 3 as these policies have been construed by the federal courts.
1. House of Representatives
A challenge to a Senate-originated bill as violating the House's con-
stitutional prerogative is addressed to and decided by the House, not the
House concurrence. In discussing the issue, both the majority, Edwards, 580 F.2d at 1058, and the
dissent, id. at 1070, agreed that the origination clause restricted the scope of the treaty clause,
prohibiting "the use of the treaty power to impose taxes." Id. at 1070. See Sargent, supra note 12, at
342-45.
110. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803); The Propeller Genesee Chief v. Fitz-
hugh, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 233 (1851); 16 AM. JUR. 2D Constitutional Law § 126 (1979); see also May
v. Rice, 91 Ind. 546 (1883). In addition, executive constructions of a constitutional provision may
also be persuasive. 16 AM. JUR. 2D ConstitutionalLaw § 127 (1979). Research was therefore under-
taken to ascertain if the United States Attorney General had ever issued an opinion on the origina-
tion clause. Only one opinion was found where the clause was mentioned, even in passing. 43 Op.
Att'y Gen. 18 (1977). As to the ability of an attorney general to declare a statute unconstitutional,
see Gornish, The Attorney General's Authority to Advocate and Advise the Constitutional Invalidity of
Statutes, 82 DICK. L. REV. 635 (1978) (concerning Pennsylvania attorney general). See also Rhodes,
'Opinions of the Attorney General' Revived, 64 A.B.A.J. 1374 (1978); Comment, An Attorney Gen-
eral's Standing Before the Supreme Court to Attack the Constitutionality of Legislation, 26 U. CHI. L,
REV. 624 (1959); Comment, The Confrontation of the Legislative and Executive Branches: An Ex-
amination of the Constitutional Balance of Powers and the Role of the Attorney General, 11 PEP-
PERDINE L. REV. 331 (1984). The Office of Legal Counsel to the United States Attorney General
has addressed the attorney general's duty to defend the constitutionality of statutes in two recent
opinions: 5 Op. Off. Legal Counsel 25 (1981); 4A Op. Off. Legal Counsel 55 (1980).
111. The Pocket Veto Case, 279 U.S. 655 (1929); Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 683 (1892);
United States v. Norton, 91 U.S. 566, 569 (1875) ("[tlhe construction of this limitation [the origina-
tion clause] is practically well settled by the uniform action of Congress"); McCulloch v. Maryland,
17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819); 16 AM. JUR. 2D Constitutional Law § 126 (1979).
112. As the origination clause primarily is an issue of the relative powers of the two branches of
Congress, the legislative precedents should be particularly relevant. Cf Glennon, The Use of Custom
in Resolving Separation of Powers Disputes, 64 B.U.L. REV. 109 (1984) (developing criteria under
which custom is to be used in evaluating disputes concerning separation of powers). Congressional
precedent involving the origination clause is discussed in Hoffer, supra note 21, at 11-12; Sargent,
supra note 12, at 341-42, 347-48.
113. It is perhaps this attitude, in conjunction with the lack of advisory opinions in federal court,
that reduces the possible number of origination clause challenges. See Comment, supra note 12, at
432 n.74 (noting use of advisory opinions in state courts to address origination clause disputes). But
see 2 W. WILLOUGHBY, CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES § 365 (2d ed. 1929) (noting con-
flicts between the two houses).
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speaker. 114 It is a privileged motion.1 5 If the House decides that the bill
trespasses upon its prerogative, the House will return the bill to the Sen-
ate with a resolution communicating the House's position.' 1 6 In many
instances the House has objected to Senate-originated measures as being
revenue bills. 17 Examples of bills and joint resolutions returned to the
Senate include: (1) a Senate bill proposing to amend the Silver Purchase
Act;" 8 (2) a Senate bill proposing to amend tariff legislation;".9 (3) a
Senate bill proposing to exempt from taxation Olympic game receipts;
120
(4) a Senate joint resolution authorizing the President to make a redeter-
mination of the Cuban Sugar Quota;' 2 ' (5) a Senate bill authorizing the
President to raise the duty on fishery products; 122 and (6) Senate amend-
ments adding revenue measures to House non-revenue bills.'23
The House advocates that it has the "sole and exclusive privilege to
originate all bills directly affecting the revenue, whether such bills be for
the imposition, reduction or repeal of taxes.... subject to the right of the
Senate to 'propose or concur with amendments, as in other bills.' "124
114. 3 DESCHLER'S PRECEDENTS, supra note 76, § 13 (1974); 2 HINDS' PRECEDENTS, supra
note 73, § 1490.
115. 3 DESCHLER'S PRECEDENTS, supra note 76, §§ 14.1, 14.2; 2 HINDS' PRECEDENTS, supra
note 73, § 1487.
116. 3 DESCHLER'S PRECEDENTS, supra note 76, § 13. In Zeak v. United States, 84-1 U.S. Tax
Cas. (CCH) 83,789 (S.D. Ohio 1984), the Court found persuasive that the House, after considerable
debate, defeated on two separate occasions resolutions declaring TEFRA violative of the House's
constitutional prerogatives. "Although it is not conclusive, it is certainly relevant and persuasive
evidence suggesting the constitutionality of section 6702 [of TEFRA]." Id. at 83,793. Alternatively,
the House may elect to pass a House bill instead of a pending Senate bill. 3 DESCHLER'S PRECE-
DENTS, supra note 76, §§ 13, 18.1-18.4. The action of the House in reporting out a House bill will
resolve any judicial issue concerning the origination clause, as the courts will not look behind the bill
number. Id. § 13.
117. In addition to the instances cited in the text, see also 6 CANNON'S PRECEDENTS, supra note
61, § 316 (Senate bill proposing gasoline tax for District of Columbia), § 317 (Senate bill proposing
increase in postage rates); 2 HINDS' PRECEDENTS, supra note 73, § 1481 (Senate bill enlarging scope
of House bill), § 1487 (Senate bill to repeal part of income tax law), § 1489 (Senate substitution of
bill generally revising import duty and internal tax provisions for House bill repealing existing duties
on tea and coffee); 3 DESCHLER'S PRECEDENTS, supra note 76, § 15.7 (Senate bill to amend Na-
tional Firearms Act). Additional citations to House rejection of Senate bills can be found in F.
RIDDICK, SENATE PROCEDURE: PRECEDENTS AND PRACTICES 985 n.1 (1974).
118. 3 DESCHLER'S PRECEDENTS, supra note 76, § 15.1.
119. Id. §§ 15.2, 15.6.
120. Id. § 15.3.
121. Id. § 15.4.
122. Id. § 15.5.
123. Id. § 15.8; 2 HINDS' PRECEDENTS, supra note 73, § 1485 (Senate Revenue amendment to
House appropriation bill), § 1493 (same), § 1495 (House bill to establish postal routes amended by
Senate to provide franking privilege; setting new postal rates deemed by House to be a revenue
measure); see also 2 W. WILLOUGHBY, supra note 113, § 365.
124. 2 HINDS' PRECEDENTS, supra note 73, § 1489 (quoting the House resolution addressing its
constitutional prerogative, passed unanimously in 1872 in response to the Senate's action in originat-
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However, the House has also taken the position, although not consist-
ently, that the presence of a revenue section incidental to the main pur-
pose of the statute is not a violation of its constitutional prerogative.
1 25
A controversy exists over whether the origination clause applies to ap-
propriations bills. 126 In general, the construction placed by the House on
its constitutional prerogative is, understandably, a broader one than that
placed upon the clause by the courts - but only slightly so.'27
2. The Senate
As in the House, a question concerning the constitutionality of a
ing a bill reducing internal taxes).
125. See 6 CANNON'S PRECEDENTS, supra note 61, § 315. But see id. § 317 (objecting to Senate
bill with incidental provisions relating to revenue).
126. The controversy is reviewed in Sargent, supra note 12, at 345-59 (concluding that Senate
does have power to originate appropriation bills); T. NICOLA, PARLIAMENTARY LAW AND PROCE-
DURE REGARDING ORIGINATION OF REVENUE LEGISLATION 16-17 (Congressional Research Ser-
vice Report No. 222A). Appropriation bills, unlike revenue bills, are bills in which Congress
"earmarks funds already in the treasury for specific governmental purposes." Comment, supra note
12, at 421 n.14. The few federal and state cases on this point are collected in Annotation, supra note
16, at 973, 978. The House has taken the position that legislative custom, if not constitutional
prescription, requires general appropriation bills to be introduced into the House. See 3
DESCHLER'S PRECEDENTS, supra note 76, §§ 20, 20.2, 20.3; 2 HINDS' PRECEDENTS, supra note 73,
§§ 1500, 1501; 6 CANNON'S PRECEDENTS, supra note 61, §§ 319-22. The Senate has disagreed, most
notably in a resolution addressing the issue. 3 DESCHLER'S PRECEDENTS, supra note 76, § 20.1. See
Sargent, supra note 12, at 345-49. See also 2 W. WILLOUGHBY, supra note 113, § 366 (noting cus-
tom that important appropriation bills are introduced into the House, although there is no constitu-
tional compunction to do so); S. MILLER, supra note 12, at 204-05 (supporting Senate's right to
originate appropriation bills); 1 1. TUCKER, supra note 27, § 211 (examining legislative dispute and
concluding that reason for reposing revenue origination in House does not exist as to appropriations,
as the burdens on the taxpayers remain the same); A. PRESCOTT, supra note 21, at 433-51, 733
(Madison chronicles deletion of provision requiring appropriation bills to originate in House, origi-
nally part of origination clause; later motion to require appropriation bills to originate in House as
part of what eventually became U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 6; defeated 10-1); J. PRESSMAN, HOUSE V.
SENATE: CONFLICT IN THE APPROPRIATION PROCESS 2 (1966) (noting tradition of House origina-
tion of appropriation bills).
127. In addition to the obvious institutional pressure on the House to broadly interpret the scope
of its prerogative, another reason for a greater Congressional assertion than is supported by the
judicial precedents is that while a statute carries a presumption of constitutionality before the courts
(as well as the protection of the enrolled bill doctrine), a bill reported to the Senate or House carries
no equal presumption. T. NICOLA, supra note 126, at 10-1 1. See supra note 61 and accompanying
text (noting disparate judicial and House treatment of postal legislation). In the following instances,
the House rejected a resolution asserting an origination clause challenge. 3 DESCHLER'S PRECr-
DENTS, supra note 76, § 16.1 (Senate amended House bill relating to excise tax rates by adding
general surtax on income), § 17.1 (Senate joint resolution authorizing Secretary of Treasury to use
proceeds from certain securities to effectuate English-American debt agreement subject to House
privilege resolution; the House resolution was referred to committee from which it never emerged:
the Senate joint resolution was eventually passed); 6 CANNON'S PRECEDENTS, supra note 61, § 322
(bond bill); 2 HINDS' PRECEDENTS, supra note 73, § 1490 (Senate amendment authorizing govern-
mental obligations), § 1491 (Senate substituted act reducing internal revenue taxation for House bill
on same general matter), § 1496 (Senate amendment to House tax bill). See also discussion on
TEFRA, supra notes 71-98 and accompanying text.
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measure originating in the Senate as being a bill for raising revenue is one
for the Senate, not the chair, to decide. 2 ' The Senate has, on several
occasions, determined that proposed measures violated the House's con-
stitutional prerogative. 29 However, the Senate has determined that it
has the constitutional authority to add to House bills, for example, re-
garding tax refund provisions, a tax on a commodity not set forth in the
original House bill, and an amendment repealing the 1911 reciprocity act
with Canada to a bill amending a tariff act."' The relatively slight
number of disputes reported in the congressional authorities suggests
that a fairly close reading of the origination clause is shared by the two
houses. 131
128. F. RIDDICK, supra note 117, at 43; 3 DESCHLER'S PRECEDENTS, supra note 76, § 19.1.
129. 3 DESCHLER'S PRECEDENTS, supra note 76, § 19.3 (Senate revenue amendment to Senate
bill granting independence to the Phillipines), § 19.4 (Senate amendment to House bill to repeal
certain provisions relating to the publicity of income statements), § 19.5 (Senate deleted a tariff
schedule it had previously proposed, and which had been returned by the House), § 19.6 (amend-
ments to Internal Revenue Code deleted from Senate bill to make equity capital and long-term credit
more readily available for small business concerns); 6 CANNON'S PRECEDENTS, supra note 61, § 316
(Senate bill providing gas tax for District of Columbia); 2 HINDS' PRECEDENTS, supra note 73,
§ 1482 (Senate bill to abolish duties and reduce taxes), § 1483 (motion for leave to introduce bill for
gradual abolition of the duty on alum salt defeated), § 1486 (Senate revenue amendment deleted),
§ 1493 (after House objection, Senate deleted revenue amendment to House appropriation bill),
§ 1497 (Senate bill to suspend duty on coal for ninety days); see also F. RIDDICK, supra note 117, at
985.
130. F. RIDDICK, supra note 117, at 987; see also 2 HINDS' PRECEDENTS, supra note 73, § 1485
(Senate insisted on right to add revenue amendment to appropriation bill taking position that Senate
has power to amend House revenue bills with any amendment which would be in order under Senate
rules), § 1487 (Senate bill to repeal portions of act reducing internal taxes), § 1489 (Senate amend-
ments to House revenue bill), § 1494 (Senate right to pass bills with incidental revenue provisions),
§ 1495 (Senate amendments providing new mailing fees to House bill setting postal routes).
131. See 3 DESCHLER'S PRECEDENTS, supra note 76, § 19.2 (Senate bill containing incidental
revenue provision does not violate House prerogative). Deschler reports that the common under-
standing is that the Senate amendment power is broad, but not unlimited. Id. § 19. The Senate may
substitute one kind of tax for one proposed by the House, but may not impose a tax if one had not
originally been proposed by the House. Id. Furthermore, the Senate has conceded that the Senate's
authority to attach revenue-raising amendments to House bills applies only to revenue bills. 2
HINDS' PRECEDENTS, supra note 73, § 1489. As to the Senate's power of amendment in the context
of the origination clause, see Hoffer, supra note 21, at 7-20 (especially the discussion of congressional
precedents at 11-12); Sargent, supra note 12, at 349-52. See also 1 N. SINGER, supra note 16, § 9.05.
One treatise concludes that the Senate has used its power of amendment to undermine the House's
origination prerogative by originating revenue measures under the guise of amendments. 1 J. No-
WAK, R. ROTUNDA, & J. YOUNG, supra note 8, § 10.2(c). There have been at least two proposals to
amend the Constitution to require that every act shall embrace but one subject matter, with an
additional requirement that the subject be embraced within the title. Neither proposal went very far
in the legislative process. H. AMES, THE PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE CONSTITUTION OF THE
UNITED STATES 251 (1896, reprint in 1970). Many state constitutions do contain limitations of this
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III. THE STATES' EXPERIENCE: THE FEDERAL
EXPERIENCE REPEATED
A. Introduction
The state courts have construed their respective origination clauses
strictly. 32  Indeed, most of the state courts have adopted the narrow
reading of the origination clause employed by the federal courts in con-
struing the federal origination clause. 3 3 By less strictly construing their
respective clauses, Alabama, Idaho, and Louisiana appear to be excep-
tions to the general rule. 134 In contrast, Pennsylvania has literally read
the clause out of its constitution. 135 Under the strict construction com-
monly employed, the following are not revenue bills: bills delegating tax-
ing authority to local institutions; 36 bills which only incidentally raise
132. The availability of the advisory opinion mechanism in some state courts has facilitated
challenges based on origination clause grounds. Of the states having origination clauses, Alabama,
Colorado, Delaware, Maine, Massachusetts, and New Hampshire provide for advisory opinions. See
ALA. CODE § 12-2-10 (1975); COLO. CONsT. art. VI, § 3; DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 141 (1974);
ME. CONST. art. VI, § 3; MASS. CONST. pt. 2, ch. 3, art. II; N.H. CONST. pt. 2, art. 74. See Field,
The Advisory Opinion -An Analysis, 24 IND. L.J. 203 (1949); Stevens, Advisory Opinions- Present
Status and an Evaluation, 34 WAsH. L. REV. 1 (1959); Comment, The State Advisory Opinion in
Perspective, 44 FORDHAM L. REV. 81 (1975); Note, Advisory Opinions on the Constitutionality of
Statutes, 69 HARV. L. REV. 1302 (1956).
133. See, e.g., Opinion of the Justices, 102 N.H. 80, 150 A.2d 813 (1959); Northern Counties
Inv. Trust v. Sears, 30 Or. 388, 41 P. 931 (1895); Day Land & Cattle Co. v. State, 68 Tex. 526, 4
S.W. 865 (1887); Andrews v. Lathrop, 132 Vt. 256, 315 A.2d 860 (1974). The extent to which a
state court should rely on federal precedent construing a similar federal provision is a question of
some controversy. See Matlz, The Dark Side of State Court Activism, 63 TEx. L. REV. 995 (1985);
Williams, In the Supreme Court's Shadow: Legitimacy of State Rejection of Supreme Court Reason-
ing and Result, 35 S.C.L. REV. 353 (1984); 2A N. SINGER, supra note 16, § 52.04 (use of construc-
tion of similar constitutional provisions in other states); 16 C.J.S. Constitutional Law § 33 (use of
federal and state constitutional counterparts). A sample of the burgeoning literature on state consti-
tutional law includes NettikSimmons, Towards a Theory of State Constitutional Jurisprudence, 46
MONT. L. REV. 261 (1985); Comment, Rediscovering State Constitutions for Individual Rights Pro-
tection, 37 BAYLOR L. REV. 463 (1985); Brennan, State Constitutions and the Protection of Individ-
ual Rights, 90 HARv. L. REV. 489 (1977); Linde, First Things First: Rediscovering the States' Bill of
Rights, 9 U. BALT. L. REV. 379 (1980); Linde, E Pluribus-Constitutional Theory and State Courts, 18
GA. L. REV. 165 (1984); Sager, Foreword: State Courts and the Strategic Space Between the Norms
and Rules of Constitutional Law, 63 TEx. L. REV. 959 (1985).
134. See 1972-1974 Op. Att'y Gen. 159 (January 18, 1973) (Vt.) noting that Alabama has a long
tradition of broad construction of the clause, and observing that Montana, Idaho, and Kentucky also
have cases more liberally construing their respective origination clauses. Alabama's liberality in
construing its origination clause may stem from the existence of the flexible Alabama advisory opin-
ion practice. The advisory opinion permits the court to provide an early adjudication (especially
when the bill is still in the legislative process) so as to minimize the disruption entailed when a bill is
opined to violate the constitution. Comment, supra note 12, at 420 n.9. See also Note, supra note
132, at 1303-05. Louisiana's origination clause includes appropriation bills within its ambit. See
infra notes 229-39 and accompanying text.
135. See infra notes 332-40 and accompanying text.
136. See cases collected in Annotation, supra note 16, at 984-86; 71 AM. JUR. 2D State and Local
Taxation § 9; 82 C.J.S. Statutes § 12; 59 C.J. Statutes § 24; Sargent, supra note 12, at 338-40.
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revenue pursuant to an exercise of the state's police or regulatory
power;1 37 and acts regulating or enforcing the collection of taxes.1 38 In
general, only bills which directly raise revenue for the state, which reve-
nue is deposited into the state treasury to be used for general state pur-
poses, are likely to be considered revenue bills.139
The following survey is a detailed and comprehensive state-by-state
analysis of origination clauses currently in effect." 4 The survey was
designed to be exhaustive."'
137. See cases collected in Annotation, supra note 16, at 981-84; 1 N. SINGER, supra note 16,
§ 9.06; 71 AM. JUR. 2D State and Local Taxation § 9; 82 C.J.S. Statutes § 12; 59 C.J. Statutes § 24;
Sargent, supra note 12, at 338-40.
138. See cases collected in Annotation, supra note 16, at 986-87.
139. 1 N. SINGER, supra note 16, § 9.06; 71 AM. JUR. 2D State and Local Taxation § 9; 59 C.J.
Statutes § 24; 82 C.J.S. Statutes § 12; see, eg., Andrews v. Lathrop, 132 Vt. 256, 315 A.2d 860
(1974); Opinion of the Justices, 249 Ala. 389, 31 So. 2d 558 (1947); Opinion of the Justices, 116 N.H.
351, 358 A.2d 667 (1976) (declaring tax statutes not within origination clause because revenue gener-
ated was to be used for a particular purpose).
140. The one exception in the survey is Montana. Montana no longer has an origination clause.
However, the significance of the Montana court's decisions was such that inclusion of the Montana
case law in the survey rather than relegation to a footnote seemed appropriate. Puerto Rico's consti-
tution also contains an origination clause, P.R. CONST. art. III, § 17, which has apparently not been
judicially construed.
Other states which at one time had an origination clause include Arkansas, ARK. CONST. OF
1868 art. V, § 19; Iowa, IOWA CONST. OF 1846 art. 3 § 16; Kansas, KAN. CONsr. OF 1859 art. 2,
§ 12, repealed, 1864 (requiring all bills to originate in House of Representatives); Maryland, MD.
CONST. OF 1776 pt. 2, art. X (requiring origination of all money bills in lower house); Mississippi,
MISS. CONST. OF 1832 art. III, § 23; Nebraska, NEB. CONST. OF 1875 art. III, § 9, repealed, 1934
(requiring only appropriation bills to originate in House of Representatives); and Virginia, VA.
CONST. OF 1830 art. III, § 10 (requiring all bills to be introduced into lower house; Senate's power of
amendment dependent on lower house's consent). In addition, the Constitution of the Confederate
States of America also contained an origination clause identical to the federal clause, CONFEDERATE
CONST. OF 1861 art. I, § 7(l), reprinted in 20 ALA. LAW. 325 (1959). See W. SWINDLER, SOURCES
AND DOCUMENTS OF UNITED STATES CONSTITUTIONS (1987) for these repealed articles. Another
useful series of reference materials is F. THORPE, THE FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS
(1909). Two noteworthy cases not otherwise covered by the survey are Fletcher v. Oliver, 25 Ark.
289 (1868) (law authorizing levy of tax to build bridges and roads not revenue bill since taxes levied
not to be used for general government purposes), and State ex rel. Davis v. Cox, 105 Neb. 75, 178
N.W. 913 (1920) (Senate bill appropriating money out of state treasury to enable school districts to
purchase equipment struck down).
141. In an effort to canvass all the available interpretive law, the office of the attorney general of
each state having an origination clause was contacted. The attorney general opinions so obtained are
incorporated in appropriate parts of the survey. As to the opinion function of the state attorney
general, see Abraham & Benedetti, The State Attorney General: A Friend of the Court?, 117 U. PA.
L. REV. 795 (1969); Heiser, The Opinion Writing Function ofAttorneys General, 18 IDAHO L. REV. 9
(1982); Larson, The Importance and Value of Attorney General Opinions, 41 IOWA L. REV. 351
(1956); Thompson, Transmission or Resistance: Opinions of State Attorneys General and the Impact
of the Supreme Court, 9 VAL. U.L. REV. 55 (1974); Powers, Duties and Operations ofState Attorneys
General, 175-93 (National Ass'n of Atty's Gen. 1977). A useful though dated discussion of the
availability of state attorney general opinions, with helpful bibliographical notes, can be found in
Chanin, The Opinions of the State Attorneys General, 69 LAV. LIBR. J. 210 (1976).
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B. Survey
1. Alabama
Alabama's origination clause142  has received extensive judicial
142. All bills for raising revenue shall originate in the house of representatives. The gover-
nor, auditor, and attorney general shall, before each regular session of the legislature, pre-
pare a general revenue bill to be submitted to the legislature, for its information, and the
secretary of state shall have printed for the use of the legislature a sufficient number of
copies of the bill so prepared, which the governor shall transmit to the house of representa-
tives as soon as organized, to be used or dealt with as that house may elect. The senate
may propose amendments to revenue bills. No revenue bill shall be passed during the last
five days of the session.
ALA. CON S. art. IV, § 70. Thus, the term revenue bill comes up in two contexts: (1) "bills for
raising revenue" must originate in the house and (2) "revenue bills" cannot be passed during the last
five days of the legislative session. Oklahoma has a similar provison, OKLA. CONST. art. V, § 33,
which, however, does not have the requirement that a general revenue bill be submitted. Oklahoma
has construed the two terms to be synonymous and co-extensive. Anderson v. Ritterbusch, 22 Okla.
761, 98 P. 1002 (1908). The Alabama court, however, has gone a different way. In Opinion of the
Justices, 223 Ala. 369, 136 So. 589 (1931), the justices construed a house originated act imposing a
gasoline tax. The act was passed in the last five days of the legislative session. The justices first
found that the act was not one for raising revenue, but was passed in the exercise of the police power.
Id. at -, 136 So. at 590. The justices observed that the former constitution simply followed the
federal origination clause. Id. The 1901 Convention which drafted the current constitution added
the provisions concerning submission of a general revenue bill by the state officers before commence-
ment of the session and concerning passage during the last five days of the session. The convention
records indicated that the five day restriction was meant to provide the governor with adequate time
to consider the general revenue bill, and if such bill in any part were vetoed, to provide time for the
legislature to respond. The justices therefore concluded that the term "revenue bill" as used in the
last sentence of the clause should be limited to general revenue bills, and not bills concerning a
specific tax. Id. One dissenting justice would have found the gasoline tax bill in question to be
within the house's exclusive originating jurisdiction. Id. at -, 136 So. at 591. This restrictive read-
ing of "revenue bill," as contrasted with the more liberal construction accorded "bills for raising
revenue," has been repeatedly followed. See Opinion of the Justices, 269 Ala. 679, 115 So. 2d 464
(1959) (house bill proposing to authorize additional license and excise taxes in certain counties not a
revenue bill, but is a bill "for raising revenue"); Opinion of the Justices, 270 Ala. 38, 115 So. 2d 484(1959) (house bill proposing to levy additional license tax on alcoholic liquor sold in certain counties
not a revenue bill); Dorsky v. Brown, 255 Ala. 238, 51 So. 2d 360, cert. denied, 342 U.S. 818 (1951)
(house bill which imposed a tax on coin operated radios was a "bill for raising revenue," but not a
revenue bill); Opinion of the Justices, 233 Ala. 463, 172 So. 661 (1937) (house originated bill to
provide a sales tax was a bill "for raising revenue," but not a "revenue bill"); Harris v. State ex rel.
Williams, 228 Ala. 100, 151 So. 858 (1933) (bill to amend the revenue law in respect to specific taxes
not a revenue bill, although it is one to raise revenue); State ex rel Dally v. Woodall, 225 Ala. 178,
142 So. 838 (1932) (statute regulating practice of cosmetology not a revenue bill nor a bill for raising
revenue); Woco Pep Co. v. Butler, 225 Ala. 256, 142 So. 509 (1932) (act imposing excise tax on
gasoline distributors, retailers and stores not a revenue bill; constitutional restriction only applies to
general revenue bills); State ex rel. Ward v. Henry, 224 Ala. 224, 139 So. 278 (1931) (establishing
commissioner of license in certain counties and providing for assessment of ad valorem tax on
automobiles not a revenue bill); State ex rel Franklin County v. Hester, 224 Ala. 460, 140 So. 744
(1932) (revenue bill restriction does not extend to every bill whose chief aim is to raise revenue; bill
in question neither a revenue bill nor a bill raising revenue in reallocating the revenue derived from
the trial tax since revenue neither increased or decreased). This dichotomous reading of the origina-
tion clause was criticized as inducing chaos and defeating the purpose of the five day limitation in
Reynolds, The Alabama Constitution of 1901: The Antithesis of States' Rights After 71 Years, 3
CuMB. L. REv. 33, 39-40 (1972). See also Opinion of the Justices, 511 So. 2d 505 (Ala. 1987) (house
bill which imposed environmental protection fees upon motor fuels, such fees to be used to provide
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construction1 43 and has been liberally construed.'" Alabama courts,
however, have also employed the terminology and reasoning used by
other states to find challenged acts and bills not to be "bills for raising
revenue." 1
4 5
environmental protections for polluted ground water, was not a revenue bill; the justices used the
incidental revenue test more commonly employed in determining that a certain bill was not a "bill
for raising revenue"). See infra note 145 and accompanying text.
143. Alabama's statutory advisory opinion procedure, ALA. CODE § 12-2-10 (1975), has been
extensively utilized in origination clause cases. Although advisory opinions are technically not deci-
sions of the Alabama Supreme Court and therefore bind no one, Opinion of the Justices, 373 So. 2d
1051 (Ala. 1979); Alabama Educ. Ass'n v. James, 373 So. 2d 1076 (Ala. 1979), they are almost
universally followed and treated, in practical terms, the same as adversary opinions of the court.
Sands, Government by Judiciary-Advisory Opinions in Alabama, 4 ALA. L. REV. 1, 13-16, 24-31
(1951).
144. In addition to the cases discussed in the text, in the following cases, statutes or proposed
bills were found to be violative of the origination clause: Weissinger v. Boswell, 330 F. Supp. 615
(M.D. Ala. 1971) (senate act which lowered ad valorem assessment rate on property should have
originated in house); Wofford Oil Co. v. Smith, 263 F. 396 (M.D. Ala. 1920), appeal dismissed mem.,
256 U.S. 705 (1921) (senate act which required dealers to pay a fee per gallon was a bill "for raising
revenue" and thus unconstitutional); Opinion of the Justices, 379 So. 2d 1267 (Ala. 1980) (proposed
senate bill to provide for excise tax rate on gasohol is act "raising revenue" which should originate in
house, distinguishing "raising revenue" from "revenue bill"); Opinion of the Justices, 342 So. 2d 787
(Ala. 1977) (senate bills allowing carry back and carry forward of net operating losses and deduc-
tions from gross income were bills "raising revenue" as the effect of the bills is to decrease taxable
income of those taxpayers affected, thereby decreasing revenue to the state); Glasgow v. Aetna Ins.
Co., 284 Ala. 177, 223 So. 2d 581 (1969) (senate act which imposed a premium tax of 1% of the
gross premium receipts on specified types of policies, and required payment of the tax to the Ala-
bama Fire Fighters Pension Fund, invalid as being a bill "raising revenue"); Opinion of the Justices,
260 Ala. 81, 68 So. 2d 840 (1953) (senate bill exempting certain oil, gas, and mineral interests from
ad valorem tax and levying a mineral documentary tax was for purpose of raising revenue, and not
an exercise of the police power incidentally affecting revenue); Opinion of the Justices, 238 Ala. 289,
190 So. 824 (1939) (senate bill to amend sales tax act to exempt prescription medicine and inexpen-
sive caskets decreases amount of revenue, and is thus within origination clause; senate's right to
propose amendments to revenue measures only extends to revenue bills then pending which have
originated in house, not to such measures after they have been passed into law); Opinion of the
Justices, 232 Ala. 95, 166 So. 807 (1936) (bill to amend existing revenue act must originate in house;
senate bill thus violates origination clause); cf. Hornbeak v. Hamm, 283 F. Supp. 549 (M.D. Ala.
1968), affd mem., 393 U.S. 9 (1968) (senate-originated act permitting ad valorem assessment at rates
of 1% to 30% was challenged on the basis of federal equal protection; in his dissent on other
grounds, Chief Judge Johnson observed that the act, having originated in the senate, violated § 70.
Id. at 556 n. 1). See also supra note 142, contrasting the interpretation of "bills for raising revenue"
and "revenue bills."
145. Thomas v. Alabama Mun. Elec. Auth., 432 So. 2d 470 (Ala. 1983) (act creating State Mu-
nicipal Electricity Authority and permitting authority to charge fees not a bill raising revenue where
chief purpose of act was to create the authority, not to raise revenue); Yancey & Yancey Const. Co.
v. DeKalb County Comm., 361 So. 2d 4 (Ala. 1978) (act authorizing county commission to impose
tax upon coal severance activities not within clause as the act does not levy a tax, but merely permits
counties to so levy); Opinion of the Justices, 357 So. 2d 331 (Ala. 1978) (senate bill providing for
annual distribution to local governmental units of percentage of moneys paid by federal agencies in
lieu of tax only reallocated revenue, and did not increase, decrease, or raise revenue); Heck v. Hall,
238 Ala. 274, 190 So. 280 (1939) (Merit System Act does not violate origination clause); Beeland
Wholesale Co. v. Kaufman, 234 Ala. 249, 174 So. 516 (1937) (state unemployment compensation act
whose main purpose is to enact scheme through police power, not within origination clause even
though it incidentally does raise revenue); Dearborn v. Johnson, 234 Ala. 84, 173 So. 864 (1937)
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The foundation case is Perry County v. Selma, Marion & Memphis
Railway Co.'46 At issue was a senate-originated amendment that ex-
empted railroad property from county taxation. 147 The court, acknowl-
edging the case to be one of first impression, 148 first rejected the
argument that the distinction between the British governmental system,
from which the power of revenue in the lower house arose, and Ala-
bama's popularly-elected bicameral legislature, indicated that the origi-
nation clause should be construed as directory and not mandatory.' 49
"But whether there be a reason for its maintenance or not, it has been a
canon... of the Constitution of this state from the time of its birth. A
rule thus sanctioned and preserved - thus imbedded in the very marrow
of our system - we feel not at liberty to disregard."' '
The court then rejected the argument that the constitutional phrase
"for raising revenue" should be limited to bills increasing the state reve-
nue, and not, as in this case, a bill actually decreasing revenue by creating
exemptions. 5' "The precise meaning in this clause is, to levy a tax, as a
(senate act to provide for more economical and uniform tax collection and assessment system neither
bill "for raising revenue" nor "revenue bill" as the act is one of administration); Houston County v.
Covington, 233 Ala. 606, 172 So. 882 (1937) (senate act authorizing Houston County board of reve-
nue to impose excise tax on motor fuels not within § 70; act only concerned with municipal power to
enact ordinance, with revenue to be used for purely local purposes); Kennamer v. State, 150 Ala. 74,
43 So. 482, 483 (1907) (act which in part authorized Jackson County commissioners to require
license for hauling logs or to require timber concerns to maintain public roads was not within clause;
simply compelled "those enjoying a special benefit . . . to pay a reasonable sum for the privilege
given."); Sheppard v. Dowling, 127 Ala. 1, 28 So. 791 (1900) (act whose principal purpose was to
provide for dispensing of liquors by municipality was exercise of police power; act only provided
that municipalities dispensing liquor shall pay to state the same tax paid by other dealers); Dunbar v.
Frazer, 78 Ala. 538 (1885) (senate act regulating the granting of licenses to sell liquors and providing
a tax thereon not an act to raise revenue); Bozeman v. State, 7 Ala. App. 151, 61 So. 604, cert.
denied, 183 Ala. 91, 63 So. 201 (1913) (motor vehicle registration act imposing a license fee was an
exercise of the police power, not a revenue measure, even though revenue generated in excess of
administrative expenses); cf Opinion of the Justices, 232 Ala. 60, 166 So. 710 (1936) (governor's call
for extraordinary session to provide revenue for schools and government should not be limited to
"revenue bills," but should encompass bills to raise revenue; however, house bill to regulate sale of
alcoholic beverages, to impose a license upon their sale, and to levy an excise tax was not a bill to
raise revenue, although it may have that incidental effect, and thus was not within the governor's
call).
146. 58 Ala. 546 (1877).
147. Id.
148. Id. at 557.
149. Id. at 556.
150. Id. The court quoted and approved Cooley's warning:
[Glourts tread upon very dangerous ground when they venture to apply the rules, which
distinguish directory and mandatory statutes to the provisions of a constitution .... If
directions are given respecting the times or modes of proceeding in which a power should
be exercised, there is at least a strong presumption that the people designed that it should
be exercised in that time and mode only.
Id. See T. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON CONSTUTIONAl. LIMITArIONS 78-79 (1st ed. 1868).
151. Perry County, 58 Ala. at 557. The court examined the legislative journals to determine the
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means of collecting revenue." '152 The court then found the challenged
statute violative of the origination clause and unconstitutional.
53
A severely split court found in Opinion of the Justices54 that a sen-
ate-originated act providing for a refund of the state sales tax on gasoline,
when the gasoline purchased was to be used exclusively for agricultural
purposes, did not constitute a bill for raising revenue; rather, the act was
an appropriation measure not subject to the origination clause. The ma-
jority recognized that an act to amend an existing revenue act was subject
to the origination clause if the amendment affected the amount of reve-
nue which flowed into the state treasury.' 55 The majority concluded that
the act's language was one of appropriation: the person intended to ben-
efit must first pay the tax.1 56 The act then provided a means by which
qualified tax-payers could obtain a refund.15 7 Justice Lawson, dissent-
ing,15 1 found Perry directly controlling and relied on an earlier advisory
opinion t59 to conclude that the senate act's chief purpose was to provide
a tax refund, and that the appropriation made came out of the tax money
collected by the state.' 60 The justice would have found the act violative
of the origination clause.
16 1
The Alabama Supreme Court returned to a liberal construction of
the clause in its advisory opinion of August 11, 1953.162 A pending sen-
ate bill would have levied an additional license and excise tax on gross
retail sales made in Franklin County to be used for constructing agricul-
tural and school buildings.163 The court found the bill to be a "bill for
raising revenue." 1 64 Any bill to levy a tax as a means of collecting reve-
origination of the act. In Alabama, the courts go behind the enrolled bill to examine the legislative
journals, according the enrolled bill only a prima facie presumption of constitutionality. See Note,
Judicial Review of the Legislative Process of Enactment: An Assessment Following Childers v. Couey,
30 ALA. L. REx'. 495 (1979).
152. Perry County, 58 Ala. at 557.
153. Id. at 558.
154. Opinion of the Justices, 249 Ala. 389, 31 So. 2d 558 (1947) (a 4-3 decision).
155. Id. at -, 31 So. 2d at 559.
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Id. at -, 31 So. 2d at 560.
159. Opinion of the Justices, 238 Ala. 289, 190 So. 824 (1939) (discussed supra note 144).
160. Opinion of the Justices, 249 Ala. at -, 31 So. 2d at 560.
161. Id. at -, 31 So. 2d at 561. The Justice noted that the majority's construction of the act as
an appropriation measure would probably doom the bill, if passed, as an impermissible appropriation
of public monies to private individuals for non-governmental purposes. Id.
162. Opinion of the Justices, 259 Ala. 514, 66 So. 2d 921 (1953).
163. Id. at..., 66 So. 2d at 922.
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nue was found to be within the clause. 165 The court distinguished those
cases in which the exercise of the police power incidentally served to
raise revenue. 16
6
In those cases, 67 the people who derived special benefits from the
expenditure of the revenue collected were required to bear the heavier
burden created by the revenue raising measure. Therefore, the power to
collect the revenue derived from the state's police power, not its revenue
power. In contrast, the bill considered in the advisory opinion sought to
impose the burdens on the general public, in order to raise revenue for a
specific purpose. "Therefore, it is designed to impose a general burden
for special benefits rather than 'special burdens for special benefits,' "and
thus fell squarely within the limitations of the origination clause.'
68
2. Colorado
The Colorado Supreme Court has narrowly construed its origina-
tion clause 169 In several opinions. The court has used the incidental reve-
nue theory to exclude various statutes and bills from operation of the
origination clause.170 In the leading case of Colorado National Life As-
surance Co. v. Clayton,17 1 the court held that an insurance statute requir-
ing all insurance companies in the state to pay the insurance
commissioner two percent of premiums received in the state was not a
revenue bill. 172
The court reasoned that a bill with the incidental effect of raising
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Kennamer v. State, 150 Ala. 74, 43 So. 482 (1907) (discussed supra note 145); Houston
County v. Covington, 233 Ala. 606, 172 So. 882 (1937) (discussed supra note 145); Opinion of the
Justices, 223 Ala. 369, 136 So. 589 (1931) (discussed supra note 142).
168. Opinion of the Justices, 259 Ala. at -, 66 So. 2d at 923.
169. "All bills for raising revenue shall originate in the House of Representatives; but the Senate
may propose amendments, as in the case of other bills." COLO. CONsT. art. V, § 31. It is interesting
to note that this provision has been used by the courts to strike down administrative tax regulations
which the courts find to have gone beyond the legislative authorization. See, e.g., Miller Int'l, Inc. v.
State, 646 P.2d 341 (Colo. 1982); Cohen v. State, 197 Colo. 385, 593 P.2d 957 (1979); Weed v.
Occhiato, 175 Colo. 509, 488 P.2d 877 (1971); Meyer v. Charnes, 705 P.2d 979 (Colo. Ct. App.
1985).
170. In addition to the other Colorado cases discussed, see In re Interrogatories of the Governor
Concerning Initiated Amendment No. 4, 99 Colo. 591, 65 P.2d 7 (1937) (old age pension constitu-
tional amendment does not conflict with origination clause). Colorado's unusual advisory opinion
process and the Colorado Supreme Court's reluctance to issue advisory opinions are discussed in
Robinson, Limitations upon Legislative Inquiries Under Colorado Advisory Opinion Clause, 4 RoCmv
MTN. L. REv. 237 (1932); See also Note, Has the Colorado IRA Met an Advisory Death?, 8 RocKY
MTN. L. REV. 140 (1936).
171. 54 Colo. 256, 130 P. 330 (1913).
172. Id. at -, 130 P. at 332.
[Vol. 23:165
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revenue would not be, by that fact alone, a revenue bill. 73 A bill whose
principal purpose is not to raise revenue, but the enforcement of which
does produce revenue, therefore, would not be subject to the origination
clause.'7 4 Revenue bills are limited to those bills which have for their
purpose the levying of taxes in the strict sense of the words. 17 5 The court
also found that the primary purpose of the act was to regulate insurance
companies and the insurance business and not to raise revenue, even
though the statute provided that any excess revenue was to be turned
over to the state's general fund. 176
The court followed Clayton in Chicago, B. & Q. R. R. Co. v. School
Dist. No. 1,177 where the court addressed a challenge to senate-originated
bills establishing a system of free schools and providing for the levy of a
tax to support them. The court rejected the origination clause challenge
and found that the revenue produced would only go to maintaining the
public schools and not to defray the general expenses of the state
government. 78
3. Delaware




176. Id. Other Colorado cases adopting the incidental revenue or municipal/local taxation ap-
proaches include: May v. Supreme Court of Colorado, 374 F. Supp. 1210 (10th Cir. 1974), cert.
denied, 422 U.S. 1008 (1975) (state court rule requiring registration fees of attorneys sought to be
invalidated on basis that rule violates revenue-raising power found in origination clause; held that
any violation of state's separation of powers principle was purely a matter of state, not federal,
constitutional law); Geer v. Board of Comm'rs, 97 F. 435 (8th Cir. 1899) (statute enabling counties
to refund bonded debt and providing for the levy and collection of taxes to fund the refunding not a
revenue bill); Public Utilities Comm'n v. Manley, 99 Colo. 153, 60 P.2d 913 (1936) (senate act
regulating use of highways for commercial enterprise and providing that revenue generated from a
tax imposed upon such use is to be split between administration costs, the state highway department,
and the counties was not a revenue bill); Opinion of the Justices, 94 Colo. 215, 29 P.2d 75 (1934) (act
titled to provide revenue for unemployed but actually providing for comprehensive regulation of
liquor not a revenue bill). See also In re McNichols Interrogatories. 142 Colo. 188, 350 P.2d 811
(1960) (majority declined to render opinions; two justices opined that senate bill permitting cities
and counties to levy a retail sales tax did not violate origination clause); cf. Western Heights Land
Corp. v. Fort Collins, 146 Colo. 464, 362 P.2d 155 (1961) (ordinance charging rates for municipal
service not a tax since not a revenue measure, as chief purpose was to defray expense of operating a
utility by charging those desiring to use service); Ard v. People, 66 Colo. 480, 182 P. 892 (1919)
(motor vehicle act requiring a license fee not a tax within meaning of uniformity of taxation clause
[COLO. CONST. art. X, § 3] and not a revenue measure disguised as a police power measure, being
only a charge in the nature of compensation for damage done to the roads by driving).
177. 63 Colo. 159, 165 P. 260 (1917).
178. Id. -, 165 P. at 262-63.
179. DEL. CONST. art. VIII, § 2 provides:
All bills for raising revenue shall originate in the House of Representatives; but the Senate
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In Yourison v. State,8 ' the superior court rejected an origination clause
challenge to a statute requiring a license to carry fishing parties for hire
in boats. The court examined cases from other jurisdictions, and ac-
cepted Professor Cooley's narrow definition of the revenue bill.'8 ' Find-
ing that the license bill did not serve to defray the general expenses of the
state government, the court concluded that the bill was not a revenue
bill.' 82 Furthermore, the bill did not require someone to do anything; if
the person wanted to hire out his boat for fishing parties, then and only
then was a license required.'83 The court found the bill to be an exercise
of the police power, observing that in a law directed towards raising reve-
nue, the citizen subject to the law must pay the tax imposed: he has no
choice. 18 4 In contrast, a law requiring payment of a fee for a license to
engage in a business affords the citizen the choice of whether or not to
engage in that business."8 5
The Delaware Supreme Court adopted the narrow construction of
the origination clause in their advisory opinion of September 12, 1967.186
may propose alterations as on other bills; and no bill from the operation of which, when
passed into a law, revenue may incidentally arise shall be accounted a bill for raising reve-
nue; nor shall any matter or cause whatever not immediately relating to and necessary for
raising revenue be in any manner blended with or annexed to a bill for raising revenue.
Id. It would therefore seem that the drafters of the Delaware Constitution intended for a strict
construction to apply, given the proviso that incidental raising of revenue shall not be construed to
convert a bill into a bill for raising revenue. The Delaware courts, however, have not specifically
cited this proviso in adopting a narrow constuction of the clause.
180. 33 Del. 577, 140 A. 691 (1928).
181. Id. "Revenue bills are those which have for their object the levying of taxes in the strict
sense of the term. They are those which take money from the people without giving a direct
equivalent in return therefor." Id. at -, 140 A. at 692, quoting COOLEY Taxation § 498.
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. Id. at -, 140 A. at 693.
185. Id. Yourison was discussed in Conard v. State, 41 Del. 107, 16 A.2d 121, 124 (Del. Super.
Ct. 1940), where a statute substantially similar to the boat license of Yourison was involved. In
Conard, however, the Court determined the license fee to be a revenue measure because the payment
of the fee by itself entitled the person to a license. Id. at -, 16 A.2d at 125. A license act passed
under the police power, on the other hand, would permit the government to refuse the license or
would impose restrictions in addition to the payment of a fee, such as an examination of boating
skills. Id. Conard did not involve the origination clause, but was a challenge under the Fourteenth
Amendment of the United States Constitution and the Uniformity of Taxation clause of the Dela-
ware Constitution.
186. Opinion of the Justices, 233 A.2d 59 (Del. 1967). The opinion was rendered pursuant to
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 141 (1975), which at the time authorized the supreme court to render
advisory opinions upon request of the governor in limited situations, including the constitutionality
of statutes. In 1983, the statute was amended to permit advisory opinions upon request of a majority
of either house of the general assembly. The supreme court has narrowly construed the advisory
opinion provision, Opinion of the Justices, 413 A.2d 1245 (Del. 1980); Opinion of the Justices, 382
A.2d 1364 (Del. 1978); Opinion of the Justices, 305 A.2d 608 (Del. 1973), while finding the provision
constitutional, Opinion of the Justices, 47 Del. 117, 88 A.2d 128 (Del. 1952). Advisory opinions of
the Delaware court are technically not binding precedent, Opinion of the Justices, 424 A.2d 663
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In the advisory opinion, the justices opined that an act empowering
county vocational technical high schools or technical center districts to
levy and collect taxes for local school purposes was not within the origi-
nation clause.187 To be a revenue bill, an act must raise revenue that is
available for defraying the state's general governmental expenses and ob-
ligations. 88 Thus, laws granting authority to local governmental units to
levy and collect taxes for local purposes are not "bills for raising reve-
nue" within the origination clause.189
(Del. 1980); Opinion of the Justices, 324 A.2d 211 (Del. 1974), but are more than just advice. Since
the advisory opinion emanates from members of the state's highest court, the opinion is authoritative
in a practical sense. Opinion of the Justices, 413 A.2d 1245 (Del. 1980).
187. Opinion of the Justices, 233 A.2d at 61. The justices noted that under the enrolled bill
doctrine, the senate origination of the bill would be irrelevant. Id. Since the bill was enacted and
authenticated by the general assembly and signed by the governor, the regularity of the legislative
action ordinarily would be conclusively presumed. Id. However, because the issue concerned a
constitutional question, the justices of the supreme court declined to apply the enrolled bill doctrine
in this case, although noting its continued vitality under ordinary circumstances. Id. For a disus-
sion of the enrolled bill doctrine in the context of the federal origination clause, see Comment, supra
note 12, at 454-59.
188. Opinion of the Justices, 233 A.2d at 61. In a brief historical excursus, the court traced the
evolution of the origination clause to the exclusive right held by the British House of Commons to
originate money bills. Justification for reposing this power in the federal house of representatives
was based on the senate's composition of 2 representatives for each state selected by that state's
legislature. Id. With passage of the seventeenth amendment, of course, senators are now popularly
elected. The court noted that in Delaware this traditional reason for reposing the revenue power in
the house did not exist, since both the Delaware house and senate have always been popularly
elected. Id. at 62. The Delaware court's reasoning was flawed. Although both houses of the Dela-
ware Legislature are popularly elected, the lower house has a two year term and is renewed during
each general election, while the upper house only faces staggered elections. Under the principle of
tax accountability, therefore, the origination clause still retains vitality. The Delaware court should
have followed the reasoning of the Montana Supreme Court in Morgan v. Murray, 134 Mont. 92,
328 P.2d 644, 653-54 (1958), where a similar historical argument was advanced and rejected. The
Montana court found the origination clause to be a substantive interdict. Id. The Delaware court
missed another important reason for enforcing the origination clause: the balance of power between
the two houses. For instance, in Delaware, the senate has the power to consent to appointments
made by the governor, DEL. CONST. art. III, § 9, including members of the judiciary, DEL. CONsr.
art. IV, § 3, and the state board of agriculture, DEL. CONST. art. XI, § 3. For an analysis of the
development of the federal origination clause in the context of the balance of power between the
house and senate, see Comment, supra note 12, at 437-40; Hoffer, supra note 21, at 2-11. The fact
that a house of representatives in a particular case may fail to protect its prerogative is no reason for
the court to ignore the constitutional provision. Passing political conditions (for example, both
houses being controlled by the same political party) can account for the lower house's willingness to
waive its constitutional prerogative. See supra note 73. Courts in similar situations have rejected
this type of argument. See, e.g.. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (where the Court declared part
of the legislation creating the Federal Election Commission void as infringing on the President's
powers, even though the legislation had been signed by the President); H.A. Thierman Co. v. Com-
monwealth, 123 Ky. 740, 97 S.W. 366 (1906) (in finding act unconstitutional as violating origination
clause, court rejected defense that since house had passed measure, the house must have determined
the bill did not violate its constitutional prerogative).
189. Opinion of the Justices, 233 A.2d at 61. See also the dissenting opinion of Justice McNeilly
in Opinion of the Justices, 385 A.2d 695, 707 (Del. 1978), reaching the origination clause issue not
reached by the majority and opining that a senate bill authorizing pool and pari-mutual wagering on
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4. Georgia
Georgia's origination clause, like that of Louisiana, 190encompasses
both revenue and appropriation bills. 191 The Georgia Supreme Court
has not discussed the provision extensively. The few cases have cursorily
held that senate origination of municipal charters granting taxing
power,192 the creation of a state bridge building authority with the power
to issue bonds, 193 and the creation of a state toll bridge authority having
the power to both issue bonds and exact tolls,194 were neither revenue
nor appropriation bills. In Shadrick v. Bledsoe,195 the supreme court per-
mitted the senate's substitution of its version of the revenue tax act on
alcoholic beverages for the house's version, noting that substitution is
one method of amendment, and that the origination clause specifically
permits senate amendment.'96
5. Idaho
Idaho's origination clause' 97 has been construed liberally. In the
leading case of Dumas v. Bryan,198 the Idaho Supreme Court struck
down a senate-originated measure which provided for the transfer of a
state-supported school and imposed a state-wide property tax to fund the
building of the new facility. 99 The court rejected the argument that the
jai-alai exhibitions and providing for payments to the state from the monies generated from the jai-
alai operations was not a revenue bill within the meaning of the origination clause. Id. at 714.
Furthermore, the dissenting justice would rely on the enrolled bill doctrine to preclude challenge to
the measure. Id.
190. LA. CONST. art. III, § 16 (B).
191. "All bills for raising revenue, or appropriating money, shall originate in the House of Rep-
resentatives." GA. CONST. art. III, § V, 2 (Code § 2-1002).
192. Harper v. Comm'rs of Elberton, 23 Ga. 566 (1857). "[Ihe delegation of the power to tax,
and the laying of a tax, are two things. This Act does the first, the last it does not do. The constitu-
tional provision applies to an Act which does the last, and does not apply to an Act which does the
first." Id. at 570.
193. McLucas v. State Bridge Bldg. Auth., 210 Ga. 1, 77 S.E.2d 531 (1953).
194. State v. State Toll Bridge Auth., 210 Ga. 690, 696, 82 S.E.2d 626 (1954).
195. Shadrick v. Bledsoe, 186 Ga. 345, 198 S.E. 535 (1938).
196. Id. at -, 198 S.E. at 543. The court also invoked the enrolled bill doctrine. The origina-
tion clause was subsequently revised in the 1982 constitution to omit the phrase "but the Senate may
propose or concur in amendments, as in other bills." The editorial note to the clause states that the
phrase was deleted as being unnecessary and inherent in the legislative process.
197. "Bills may originate in either house, but may be amended or rejected in the other, except
that bills for raising revenue shall originate in the house of representatives." IDAHO CONST. art. Ill,
§ 14. The court in Dumas v. Bryan, 35 Idaho 557, 207 P. 720 (1922), observed that the purpose of
Idaho's origination clause was to reserve the right to determine the necessity of the burden of taxa-
tion on that body of the legislature which came most directly from the people. Id. at -, 207 P. at
722.
198. 35 Idaho 557, 207 P. 720 (1972).
199. Id. at -, 207 P. at 723.
[Vol. 23:165
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tax was merely incidental to the act's main purpose of transferring the
school.200
Section 5 of this act is a measure for raising revenue; that is, it is a
revenue bill, or money bill, as those terms are usually used. It provides
for levying a direct tax against all property in the state, for governmen-
tal purposes. It requires no argument to prove that the state maintains
the Albion normal school in its governmental capacity. It will not do
to say that this tax represents a mere incident to the main purpose of
the bill, for this would be a mere evasion. Most revenue bills could in
the same manner be made incidental. The amount of the tax levied is
immaterial, for the Constitution requires that all bills for raising reve-
nue shall originate in the House.20 1
In the more recent decision of Worthern v. State,2 °2 the court con-
strued the Idaho origination clause to permit senate amendment of a
house-originated revenue bill. Unlike the federal clause which specifi-
cally permits Senate amendments,20 3 the court found Idaho's clause to be
silent.204 The court concluded, however, that in the absence of an ex-
press prohibition against amendment, the normal principles of legislative
process should obtain, permitting senate amendment.20 5
200. Id. The court followed Hubbard v. Lowe, 226 F. 135 (S.D.N.Y. 1915), appeal dismissed
mem., 242 U.S. 654 (1916), and distinguished the following cases from other jurisdictions: Chicago,
B. & Q. R. R. Co. v. School Dist. No. 1, 63 Colo. 159, 165 P. 260 (1917); Evers v. Hudson, 36 Mont.
135, 92 P. 462 (1907); United States v. James, 26 F. Cas. 577 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1875) (No. 15,464).
201. Dumas, 35 Idaho at -, 207 P. at 723. In the later case of State v. Workmen's Compensa-
tion Exch., 59 Idaho 256, 81 P.2d 1101 (1938), the court found that the workman's compensation
statute was not transformed into a revenue bill simply by the inclusion of a provision remitting to the
state $1,000 upon the death of a dependentless covered employee. See also State v. Workmen's
Compensation Exch., 59 Idaho 265, 81 P.2d 1105 (1938) (companion case); Op. Att'y Gen. No. 73-
132 (Feb. 12, 1973) (bill in the nature of a mandatory minimum price law regulating relationship
between distributors and retailers of beverages was not a revenue bill, as the proposed bill did not
provide for the levying of any tax by the state on the collection of monies to defray its expenses).
202. 96 Idaho 175, 525 P.2d 97 (1974).
203. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 1 provides: "All bills for raising revenue shall originate in the
House of Representatives; but the Senate may propose or concur with Amendments as on other
bills." See supra notes 32-131 and accompanying text for a discussion of the federal clause and its
interpretation.
204. Worthen, 96 Idaho at -, 525 P.2d at 960-61. The court noted that Idaho had a long-held
position that legislative journals are to be consulted in determining whether an act was constitution-
ally passed. Id. at 958. Idaho therefore goes beyond the enrolled bill itself. See, e.g., Dumas v.
Bryan, 35 Idaho 557, 207 P. 720 (1922); Cohn v. Kingsley, 5 Idaho 416, 49 P. 985 (1897).
205. Worthen, 96 Idaho at -, 525 P.2d at 961. Compare, however, Idaho Atty. Gen. Legal
Guidance Letter (February, 15, 1984), where the question was whether the senate could amend a
house non-revenue bill by attaching a revenue amendment. The Idaho Attorney General concluded
that such an amendment would violate the origination clause. Id. Otherwise, the origination
clause's purpose in reposing in the house the power to originate revenue bills would be rendered
negatory. Id. Compare the dissenting opinion of Chief Justice Shepard in Worthen, 96 Idaho at -,
525 P.2d at 963, where, in concurring with the majority's determination on the origination clause
issue, the chief justice stressed the fact that in Worthen the revenue measure originated in the house.
Id.
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6. Indiana
Indiana's origination clause2° 6 has been narrowly construed to in-
clude only acts levying taxes in the strict sense of the words and to ex-
clude bills incidentally raising revenue.2°v In Orbison v. Welch,20 8 the
court held the Indiana Port Commission Act constitutional because it
was not a bill for raising revenue. The Act, in creating the Indiana Port
Commission, provided for the maintenance of the port from the proceeds
of tolls, rentals, fees, and charges to be assessed against the users of the
port.20 9 In rejecting the origination clause challenge, the court deter-
mined that the purpose of the Act was not primarily for the raising of
revenue, but for the construction and operation of a modern port on
Lake Michigan. a"0
The interesting case of Stith Petroleum Co. v. Department of Audit
and Controla" l raised a unique origination clause issue. The appellant
contended that although the senate-originated gasoline inspection fee act
was arguably a regulatory measure when enacted in 1919, the enormous
206. "Bills may originate in either House, but may be amended or rejected in the other; except
that bills for raising revenue shall originate in the House of Representatives." IND. CONsT. art. 4,
§ 17. The Indiana Attorney General has construed this provision to forbid the practice of "bill-
stripping," that is completely stripping a bill and replacing it with text concerning an entirely differ-
ent matter. Ind. Att'y Gen. Rep. 156 (1979) (senate bill as introduced concerned judgeships in
certain counties; house stripped bill and substituted provision concerning property tax deductions);
Ind. Att'y Gen. Rep. 276 (1979) (house bill concerned medical licensing; senate stripped bill and
substituted provisions authorizing department of natural resouces to purchase materials for rehabili-
tation or repair of an improvement within department's control).
In May v. Rice, 91 Ind. 546, 548 (1883), the Indiana Supreme Court observed that to guard
against extravagant and unjust impositions of public burdens by raising revenue, drafters of the
constitutions, both federal and state, reposed the power to originate revenue bills in the branch of the
legislature nearest the people. Id. The court expressed grave doubts about construing constitutional
provisions to be directory only. Id. at 553. The court also indicated that appropriation bills could
not be passed by joint resolution, perhaps suggesting that appropriation bills must also originate in
the house. Id.
207. In addition to cases discussed in the text see also the following cases adopting a narrow
construction: Patrons v. School City of Kendallville, 244 Ind. 675, 194 N.E.2d 718 (1963) (School
Corporation Reorganization Act constitutional); Ennis v. State Highway Comm'n, 231 Ind. 311, 108
N.E.2d 687 (1952) (act providing for establishment of toll roads and creating commission was con-
stitutional); Rosencranz v. Evansville, 194 Ind. 499, 143 N.E. 593 (1924) (statute authorizing crea-
tion of port city of Evansville constitutional, as the taxation provisions in the statute were incidental
to the statute's real purpose). But see Ind. Att'y Gen. Rep. 109 (1977) (act to amend statute to
provide that fees collected for personalized license plates will be deposited with state treasurer
clearly revenue bill and cannot originate in senate); Ind. Att'y Gen. Rep. 113 (1977) (bill permitting
county park and recreation boards to establish cumulative building funds, and authorizing county
councils to levy a tax on taxable property clearly a revenue bill).
208. 242 Ind. 385, 179 N.E.2d 727 (1962).
209. Id. at __,117 N.E.2d at 730.
210. Id. at ._, 117 N.E.2d at 743.
211. 211 Ind. 400, 5 N.E.2d 517 (1937).
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increase in the use of gasoline in the succeeding years converted the act
into a revenue measure.212 The increase in use of gasoline resulted in a
surplus being paid into the general fund of the state treasurer. The Indi-
ana Supreme Court properly rejected the contention.213 In determining
whether a given act was a revenue measure, the court must examine the
act itself and the facts existing at the time of passage. Subsequent events




Kentucky's origination clause215 has been construed strictly in ac-
cordance with the majority view.2" 6 However, the Kentucky courts have
enforced the clause when appropriate.21 7 In the early case of Common-
212. Id.
213. The court primarily relied on the United States Supreme Court decision in Pure Oil Co. v.
Minnesota, 248 U.S. 158 (1918), sustaining a similar Minnesota provision. The Minnesota provision
also generated, in years succeeding its passage, a substantial surplus. The United States Supreme
Court rejected the contention that the act constituted a revenue measure offending the commerce
clause of the federal Constitution.
214. Stith, 211 Ind. at -. , 5 N.E.2d at 521.
215. "All bills for raising revenue shall originate in the House of Representatives, but the Senate
may propose amendments thereto: Provided, No new matter shall be introduced, under color of
amendment, which does not relate to raising revenue." KY. CONST. § 47. Maine and Delaware have
similar provisions restricting amendments. See ME. CONST. art. IV, pt. 3, § 9; DEL. CONST. art.
VIII, § 2. Other constitutions contain general limitations on the amending process. See, e.g., TEx.
CONsT. art. III, § 30; WYO. CONST. art. 3, § 20; LA. CONsT. art. III, § 15(c); see also INDEX DIGEST
OF STATE CONSTITUTIONs 605 (2d ed. 1959) (listing 13 states).
216. In addition to the cases discussed in the text, see also: City of Louisville v. Miller, 697
S.W.2d 164 (Ky. 1985) (Mass Foreclosure Act, passed to provide simplified, cost-effective method
for cities to enforce delinquent tax liens, not a revenue bill as it does not involve the levying of taxes);
Walton v. Carter, 337 S.W.2d 674 (Ky. 1960) (act providing for submission to voters of question of
issuing bonds was not a revenue measure); Dalton v. State Property and Bldgs. Comm'n, 304 S.W.2d
342 (Ky. 1957) (use of license fees, excise taxes, and fees already collected to pay bond issue debt was
not revenue measure, but rather was an appropriation measure appropriating revenues already being
raised and committing the state to continue such taxes as may be necessary to pay the bonds and
interest); Ravitz v. Steurele, 257 Ky. 108, 77 S.W.2d 360 (1934) (act regulating those in business of
making loans and requiring license tax to obtain license not revenue bill; tax incidental to purpose of
regulation); Cassady v. Oldham County, 246 Ky. 773, 56 S.W.2d 368 (1933) (act conferring power
upon school district to levy school tax, no proceeds of which goes to state treasury, not revenue bill):
Livingston County v. Dunn, 244 Ky. 460, 51 S.W.2d 450 (1932) (statute prescribing sheriff's duties
in collecting school taxes and making settlement not a revenue measure); Central Constr. Co. v. City
of Lexington, 162 Ky. 286, 172 S.W. 648 (1915) (act providing for submission to voters of question
of incurring a debt to build sewage disposal plant and storm water system not revenue bill within
state statute requiring such measures to be originated in board of councilmen and not board of
aldermen; although the ordinance provided that a tax be levied, it did not fix or indicate the amount
of the tax. The actual levying of the tax would have to originate in the board of councilmen); Rankin
v. Henderson, 9 Ky. L. Rptr. 861, 7 S.W. 174 (1888) (statute authorizing cities to impose license tax
upon certain occupations, the tax being for municipal purposes only, not a revenue bill.)
217. See, in addition to H.A. Thierman Co., infra, the following: Farris v. Shoppers Village
Liquors, Inc., 669 S.W.2d 213 (Ky. 1984) (senate amendment to house-passed alcoholic beverage tax
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wealth v. Bailey,218 the court of appeals (then Kentucky's highest court)
rejected the argument that a statute regulating the fees and salaries of
public officers constituted a revenue bill. The court adopted the view
that revenue bills were bills to levy taxes in the strict meaning of the
words.2" 9 A bill which required the officers to remit to the trustee of the
jury fund amounts received in excess of $3,000 was therefore not a reve-
nue bill.22°
In Lang v. Commonwealth,221 the court applied the incidental reve-
nue test to hold that an act regulating the admission of inmates to houses
of reform and requiring the county to pay to the state $100 for mainte-
nance of each inmate was not a revenue bill. The court nevertheless ob-
served, somewhat grudgingly, that the clause was part of the constitution
and should be enforced in appropriate cases.222 The statute in question
did not impose any tax, but could have required the counties to levy a tax
in the future to meet its requirements. The incidental revenue to the
state was not a tax within the meaning of the constitution.223
In H.A. Thierman Co. v. Commonwealth,224 however, the court
struck down as violative of the Kentucky origination clause a senate-
which provided for regulation of wholesaler invoices and allowances struck down as violating both
§ 51 of the Kentucky Constitution, requiring one subject per act, and § 47 of the constitution, since
senate amendment did not relate to the subject matter of the house bill); Legislative Research
Comm'n v. Brown, 664 S.W.2d 907 (Ky. 1984) (statute requiring budget to be introduced as joint
resolution was unconstitutional as violating §§ 47 and 48 of the constitution concerning revenue and
appropriation bills; these sections construed to require that such budget be introduced as a bill). The
Brown case is extensively analyzed in Snyder & Ireland, The Separation of Governmental Powers
under the Constitution of Kentucky: 4 Legal and Historical Analysis of L.R.C. v. Brown, 73 Ky. L.J.
165 (1984) (noting at 225 that § 47 is part of the constitutional framework reposing the power of the
purse in the legislature). See also Sancho v. Valiente & Co., 93 F.2d 327 (Ist Cir. 1937) (joint resolu-
tion providing for tax invalid as violating Puerto Rico Organic Act requiring laws to be passed as
bills). See also Ky. Op. Att'y Gen. No. 26 (1979) (a revenue bill, if such, remains a revenue bill,
regardless of whether the bill increases or decreases the tax rate). For a discussion of the Kentucky
Attorney General's opinion function see Akers, The Advisory Opinion of the Attorney General. 38
KY. L.J. 561 (1951). See also Montague, The Office of Attorney General in Kentucky, 49 KY. L.J.
194 (1960).
218. 81 Ky. 395 (1883).
219. Id. at 398-99.
220. Id. at 400. The court had earlier opined that appropriation bills were not within the origi-
nation clause's domain. Id. at 399.
221. 190 Ky. 29, 226 S.W. 379 (1920).
222. Id.
[T]hat reason for lodging power of revenue in lower house] is not very impressive in this
country at the present time, as all members of both the upper and lower houses of Legisla-
ture are elected by the people and answerable to them, but, whatever the reason for reten-
tion in our Constitution, its enforcement is incumbent upon the courts.
Id. at -, 226 S.W. at 381.
223. Id. at -, 226 S.W. at 381-82.
224. 123 Ky. 740, 97 S.W. 366 (1906).
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originated bill providing for the equivalent of a sales tax on blended spir-
its. The court rejected the state's attempt to portray the bill as a regula-
tory matter which only had the incidental benefit of raising revenue.22 5
The bill did not seek to regulate the manufacture or sale of liquor; all it
imposed was a tax.2 26 Even the title of the bill provided that it was "an
act relating to revenue and taxation, providing for license taxes .... 227
Significantly, the court refused to be bound by the fact that the house, in
passing the senate bill, did not view the bill as an infringement on its
prerogative.22 8
8. Louisiana
Louisiana's origination clause encompasses both revenue and appro-
priation bills, 229 so it is somewhat surprising to find that few cases have
construed the clause.23° In Succession of Sala 23 1 and Succession of Giva-
novich,z3 z the Louisiana Supreme Court declared invalid as violating the
origination clause an act imposing a succession tax on foreign heirs and
legatees inheriting property located in Louisiana. The proceeds of the
tax were to benefit New Orleans Charity Hospital.233 The court found
that the legislation was both a revenue measure in imposing the tax and
an appropriation measure in appropriating the revenue raised to the
225. Id. at -, 97 S.W. at 369.
226. Id.
227. Id. at -, 97 S.W. at 366.
228. Id. As the Court tellingly reasoned:
It is insisted by appellee that it is a delicate duty for the court to declare an act unconstitu-
tional; that, in case of doubt, the doubt should be resolved in favor of the validity of the act
in a case of this sort; that, if the House had deemed the act an infringement of its preroga-
tive, it might have refused to consider it when it came to it from the Senate; that, if the
Governor had deemed it unconstitutional, he might have vetoed it after it had passed both
houses; and that after the act had been concurred in by both houses, and had been ap-
proved by the Governor, if there is any construction of it, which may reasonably be
adopted, rendering it constitutional, that construction should be followed. This is true. A
legislative act should never be held unconstitutional, if its validity can be, by any reason-
able construction, upheld. But, in the case before us, the only construction that can be
given the act in question is that it is an act for revenue, pure and simple; and, originating,
as it did, in the Senate, it was passed in violation of the plain provision of the Constitution.
Id. at -, 97 S.W. at 369.
229. "All bills for raising revenue or appropriating money shall originate in the House of Repre-
sentatives, but the Senate may propose or concur in amendments, as in other bills." LA. CONST. art.
III, § 22.
230. The Louisiana court's aversion to advisory opinions might be one reason so few origination
clause cases appear. See Note, Advisory Opinions and the Requisites of Justiciability in Louisiana
Courts, 35 LA. L. REV. 898 (1975).
231. 50 La. Ann. 1009, 24 So. 674 (1897).
232. 50 La. Ann. 625, 24 So. 679 (1897).
233. Sala, 50 La. Ann. at 1009, 24 So. at 674; Givanovich, 50 La. Ann. at 625, 24 So. at 679.
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Charity Hospital.234 In a subsequent decision,235 the Louisiana Supreme
Court held a bill void which waived sovereign immunity of the state so as
to authorize a particular plaintiff to initiate suit and which also directed
that payment of any judgment so obtained should be paid out of the state
revolving fund or out of any state funds not otherwise appropriated. The
bill was void because the act originated in the senate.2 36 The court deter-
mined that the bill constituted an appropriation bill and refused to sever
the offending part from the remainder of the bill.237 Louisiana's courts,
at least as evidenced by the tenor of the few reported cases, 238 are not
inclined to read the origination clause as narrowly as most other
courts.2 3 9
234. In Sala, the act was defended as being neither a revenue or appropriation bill but only a
legal limitation on the right of inheritance. Sala, 50 La. Ann. at -, 24 So. at 677. It was argued
that the bill was not an appropriation bill, since the money appropriated was that of individual heirs
and legatees. The origination clause was meant to assure accountability of the legislature in reposing
the right to originate revenue bills in the legislative house closest to the people. Id. The bill was
therefore not a revenue bill since the revenue raised was not from the citizens of the state, but from
foreigners. Id. The supreme court properly rejected these arguments, noting that the beneficiary of
the revenue raised, the Hospital, was a public institution sustained almost entirely by public appro-
priations. Id. at -, 24 So. at 677-78. The separate opinion of Justice McEnery in Givanovich noted
that the sums appropriated for the support of the Hospital must first come into the treasury and then
be appropriated. Givanovich, 50 La. Ann. at -, 24 So. at 680. The money appropriated therefore
belonged to the state, not the foreign individuals. Id. On rehearing in Sala, the court distinguished
the succession tax from a bill whose incidental effect was to raise revenue. Sala, 50 La. Ann. at -,
24 So. at 679.
235. Cobb v. Louisiana Bd. of Insts., 237 La. 315, 111 So. 2d 126 (1958).
236. Id. at -, 111 So. 2d at 129-31.
237. Cobb arose in a unique legislative context. Under a constitutional article since amended,
the legislature alone was empowered to waive sovereign immunity. The governor's signature was
not required. The waiver in Cobb, originating in the senate, was passed by the legislature but vetoed
by the governor. In its original opinion, the court implicity assumed the ineffectiveness of the gover-
nor's veto and held the entire bill invalid as a senate-originated appropriation bill. Id. at -, Il l So.
2d at 130-31. The dissenters also assumed the invalidity of the appropriation part of the bill, but
argued that it should either be severed, id. at -, 111 So. 2d at 131 (Justice Hamiter); id. at -, I ll
So. 2d at 132 (Justice Hawthorne), or construed as merely directory, id. at -, 111 So. 2d at 132
(Justice Tate). The court, in an opinion on rehearing, shifted ground and held that the appropriation
provision of the bill made the bill more than just a legislative waiver immune from gubernatorial
veto, but rather, a legislative statute, which when vetoed by the governor, never became law. Id. at
_-, 111 So. 2d at 137-38. For an examination of the Louisiana legislative immunity waiver power,
see McMahon & Miller, The Crain Myth -. A Criticism of the Duree and Stephens Cases, 20 LA. L.
REV. 449 (1960).
238. In Excelsior Planting & Mfg. Co. v. Green, 39 La. Ann. 455, 1 So. 873 (1887), however, the
supreme court found a bill establishing a levee district, vesting the district's board of commissioners
with the power to levy a tax on property, to be neither an appropriation nor a revenue bill.
239. The office of the attorney general also expansively construes the clause. See Op. Att'y Gen.
No. 798 (Dec. 11, 1986) (bill adding charge to be imposed for handling of renewal of registration or
license by mail revenue bill); Op. Att'y Gen. No. 588 (June 1, 1978) (bill to remove tax exemption
revenue bill requiring house origination); Op. Att'y Gen. No. 1486 (Oct. 12, 1976) (senate amend-
ment appropriating money to a house originated non-appropriation bill violative of both origination
and germane amendment provisions of the constitution); cf Op. Att'y Gen. No. 550 (April 23, 1980)
(joint resolution to amend constitution so as to authorize legislature to increase annual fees may be
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9. Maine
The Maine courts have rarely addressed240 construction of the
state's origination clause.24' The leading case242 held that senate origina-
tion of the Quahog Tax Act was not impermissible because the re-enact-
ment was meant merely to correct a legislative error in section
assignment.243 In dictum, the court indicated that a bill to repeal the tax
would not be within the constitutional prohibition, while a bill to enact
such a tax would be.244 In another case, the Supreme Judicial Court of
Maine held that a proposed statute increasing the resident hunting and
fishing license fees was not a revenue bill, but was a regulatory act.24 5
introduced in senate, but bill actually increasing the annual fee must originate in the house). Two
general commentaries on the legislative process in Louisiana are: Owen, The Concept of Legislative
Power in Louisiana Constitutions, 14 LA. L. REV. 764 (1954) and Comment, Judicial Review of the
Legislative Enactment Process: Louisiana's "Journal Entry" Rule, 41 LA. L. REV. 1187 (1981) (not-
ing that Louisiana goes beyond the enrolled bill doctrine and permits reliance on the legislative
journals to determine the validity of the legislative process).
240. The Maine Attorney General has issued at least three opinions on the clause. In Op. Att'y
Gen. (May 11, 1977), the attorney general, in an extensive analysis of the precedents, determined
that a senate bill providing for creation of a criminal justice training fund and providing for an
amount to be deposited into the fund by any defendant seeking bail was not a revenue bill. The
attorney general concluded that in Maine the origination clause was to be strictly construed, and was
not applicable to acts which have a legitimate purpose independent of generating revenue. Id. Thus,
the senate bill was constitutional (in a later part of the opinion, the attorney general concluded the
deposit requirement violated Maine's excessive bail prohibition) because the primary purpose was to
develop the means for training of law enforcement personnel. Id. See also Op. Att'y Gen. (July 22,
1977). The attorney general found that a senate bill to provide exemption of sales of turbojet fuel for
international flights from sales tax was not a revenue bill, since the primary purpose of the exemp-
tion was to foster economic development. Id. In addition, by stating that a bill that decreases
revenue was not a "bill for raising revenue," the attorney general refused to follow Alabama prece-
dent to the contrary. Furthermore, the attorney general found that a senate amendment to the
committee bill to increase gasoline taxes as a partial substitute for the loss of revenue caused by the
exemption was also not a revenue bill, relying on Andrews v. Lathrop, 132 Vt. 256, 315 A.2d 860
(1974). Id. In Op. Att'y Gen. No. 17 (Feb. 11, 1981) the attorney general found that senate co-
sponsorship of a revenue bill did not violate the origination clause so long as control of the house
over the revenue bill was the same as it would be without senate co-sponsorship.
241. "[A]II bills for raising a revenue shall originate in the House of Representatives, but the
Senate may propose amendments as in other cases; provided that they shall not, under color of
amendment, introduce any new matter, which does not relate to raising a revenue." ME. CONST.
art. IV, pt. 3, § 9.
242. State v. Lasky, 156 Me. 419, 165 A.2d 579 (1960).
243. Id. at -, 165 A.2d at 581-82. The court did note, in dictum, that the original house-
introduced act was a bill to raise revenue, since the purpoe of the act was not to regulate the shell fish
dealers, but to provide funds for the benefit of the state. Id.
244. Id. at -, 165 A.2d at 581. The court specifically reserved the issue of the justiciability of
origination clause issues, distinguishing its earlier case of Opinion of the Justices, 133 Me. 537, 178
A. 620 (1935), on the basis that in the earlier case the legislature requested advice concerning the
course of the legislative process. The court thus may have made a distinction between justiciability
when an advisory opinion is sought (at least, if sought by a branch of the legislature) and jus-
ticiability when the case is at issue.
245. Opinion of the Justices, 133 Me. 537, 178 A. 620 (1935). In the case, the justices criticized
the frequency of advisory opinion requests. For a discussion of the Maine advisory opinion proce-
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10. Massachusetts
Given its long history, Massachusetts' origination clause 2 46 has re-
ceived little construction. There are only three advisory opinions247 of
the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court which address the issue.
In the leading case, Opinion of the Justices,248 the justices undertook
a detailed examination of the power of the lower house of the legislature
to originate money bills. The justices examined precedent from British
parliamentary procedure, from the federal constitutional convention, and
from prior Massachusetts legislative practice in determining whether the
Massachusetts origination clause included appropriation bills.249 After
the historical review, the justices concluded that the term "money bills"
used in the state constitution was meant to parallel the term "bills for
raising revenue" used in the federal Constitution250 and advised the legis-
lature that:
[T]he exclusive constitutional privilege of the House of Representatives
to originate money bills is limited to bills that transfer money or prop-
erty from the people to the State, and does not include bills that ap-
propriate money from the Treasury of the Commonwealth to particu-
lar uses of the government, or bestow it upon individuals or cor-
dure, see Comment, The Validity of the Restrictions on the Modern Advisory Opinion, 29 ME. L.
REV. 305 (1978). One other case deserves notation. In Board of Overseers of the Bar v. Lee, 422
A.2d 998 (Me. 1980), the supreme judicial court rejected a challenge to its imposition of registration
fees on Maine attorneys, finding that such a fee was not a revenue bill within the proscriptions of the
origination clause.
246. "All money bills shall originate in the house of representatives; but the senate may propose
or concur with amendments, as on other bills." MASS. CONST. pt. 2, ch. I, § 3, art. VII. New
Hampshire has a similar provision. See N.H. CONST. pt. 2, art. 18.
247. These opinions were issued pursuant to MAss. CONSr. pt. 2, ch. 3, art. II, providing that
the governor, council, and either branch of the legislature shall have the authority to require opin-
ions of the justices of the supreme judicial court. See Goodman, Advisory Opinions, I I ANN. SUR-
VEY OF MAss. L. 95 (1964); Goodman, Effect of Advisory Opinions, 11 ANN. SURVEY or MASS. L.
108 (1964); Goodman, Factual Bases for Advisory Opinions, 11 ANN. SURVEY OF MASS. L. 110
(1964); Goodman, Functions of Advisory Opinions, 11 ANN. SURVEY OF MASS. L. 113 (1964); Note,
supra note 132; Note, Extra-Judicial Opinions, 10 HARv. L. REV. 50 (1896).
248. 126 Mass. 557 (1878).
249. Id. at 593-94.
250. Id. The court had earlier discussed its advisory opinions, issued in 1781, reprinted in 126
Mass. 547, where the individual justices gave their opinions on whether the senate had an equal
privilege with the house to originate an inquiry for the purpose of enforcing property tax valuation.
The majority of the justices concluded that the senate could originate such an inquiry. See Opinion
of Cushing, 126 Mass. at 548-49 (noting that unlike in England, the upper chamber in Massachusetts
is popularly elected; money bill is a bill imposing a direct tax on the people); Opinion of Sargent, id.
at 550-51 (senate action not act of legislation, but only a rule to assist in legislation); Opinion of
Sewall, id. at 552-53 (settling a valuation list is a previous business to passage of a money bill, since
no money is raised, levied, or granted by settling such a list); Opinion of Sullivan, id. at 553-56
(settlement of a valuation not an act of legislation).
[Vol. 23:165
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In a later advisory opinion,252 the justices of the supreme judicial
court interpreted the clause in light of proposed legislation authorizing
payment of money to a railroad company for an option to purchase facil-
ities to be held by the commonwealth. The legislation provided that the
funds to pay for the option and the related continuance of service were to
be raised by local taxation in the annual property tax assessment and by
assessments on certain cities.253  The justices examined federal prece-
dent2 54 and the earlier advisory opinion 255 and determined that "money
bills" and "bills for raising revenue" were equivalents.25 6 The justices
further opined that the assessments, being imposed locally to reimburse




Minnesota's origination clause 258 has only been construed in two
cases and neither case exhaustively discusses the issue. In one case, the
Minnesota Supreme Court held that a bill appropriating funds for the
purchase of textbooks for the public schools was not a revenue bill, even
though the appropriation might in the future lead to the necessity of tax-
ation.2 59 In the other case, the supreme court preemptorily held that a
nuisance statute that imposed a $300 penalty was not a revenue bill, even
though the statute provided that the penalty was to be collected in the
same manner as a tax.2 60
251. Id. at 601. The court emphasized, in distinguishing the power of the House of Commons in
England from the origination provision of the Massachusetts constitution, the unelected nature of
the House of Lords. Id. at 600. See infra notes 421-30 and accompanying text for more detailed
discussions of the British parliamentary conventions.
252. Opinion of the Justices, 377 Mass. 800, 152 N.E.2d 90 (1958).
253. Id.
254. Id. at -, 152 N.E.2d at 95. Specifically, the justices discussed Millard v. Roberts, 202 U.S.
429 (1905); Twin City Nat'l Bank v. Nebeker, 167 U.S. 196 (1897); United States v. Norton, 91 U.S.
566 (1875).
255. Opinion of the Justices, 126 Mass. 557 (1878).
256. Opinion, 377 Mass. at -, 152 N.E.2d at 95.
257. Id. at -, 152 N.E.2d at 96.
258. MINN. CONST. art. IV, § 18 provides "all bills for raising revenue shall originate in the
house of representatives, but the senate may propose and concur with the amendments as on other
bills."
259. Curryer v. Merrill, 25 Minn. 1, 33 Am. Rep. 450 (1878).
260. State v. Stroup, 131 Minn. 308, 155 N.W. 90 (1915). See also Op. Att'y Gen. (March 8,
1939) (appropriation bill not within origination clause); Op. Att'y Gen. No. 734 (Biennial Report,
1933) (bill whose main purpose was to assist counties and other municipalities in taking care of their
financial obligations was not a revenue bill; tax levy provision only incidental to the other provisions
of the act); Williams, A Legislative History ofthe Minnesota "Superfund"Act, 10 WM. MITCHELL L.
1987]
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12. Montana
Montana's origination clause,2 61 since abandoned,262 was construed
in an extensive and thorough opinion in the case of Morgan v. Murray.263
The senate-originated act in Morgan concerned submitting to the people
for their approval a measure authorizing the state to become indebted
over the constitutional maximum.2 ' The indebtedness, incurred
through the sale of bonds, was to provide funds for the construction of
facilities for the University of Montana.265 The bonds were to be re-
deemed through imposition of a property tax which was to be paid into
the state treasury. The taxes were then to be used exclusively for the
payment of principal and interest on the bonds.2 66 The court struck
down the act as violating the origination clause.
After reviewing the precedents, 267 the court excluded from the
origination clause bills which have for their primary purpose a policing
function and which only incidentally raise revenue. 268  The court also
excluded from coverage acts authorizing or delegating to local authori-
ties the power to levy taxes for local purposes.269 For a revenue bill to be
REV. 851, 871 n. 113 (1984) (Superfund Act subject to origination clause as act included revenue-
raising measure).
261. "All bills for raising revenue shall originate in the House of Representatives, but the Senate
may propose amendments, as in the case of other bills." MONT. CONST. OF 1889, art. V, § 32. In
Op. Att'y Gen. No. 2 (March 3, 1967), the Montana Attorney General opined that the origination
clause applied to extraordinary sessions of the legislature, as well as to regular sessions.
262. The Montana Constitution of 1972 does not contain an origination clause.
263. 134 Mont. 92, 328 P.2d 644 (1958).
264. Id. at -, 328 P.2d at 646.
265. Id.
266. Id.
267. See, eg., State v. Driscoll, 101 Mont. 348, 54 P.2d 571 (1936) (statute prohibiting sale of
intoxicating liquor except by the state, providing for establishment of state liquor stores, for sale and
issuance of permits to individuals and licenses to beer clubs, and for disposition of surplus profits was
not revenue bill; the court analyzed the precedents, especially of Justice Story, in concluding that the
revenue features of the bill were incidental to the main purpose of limiting and regulating the sale of
intoxicating liquors); Evers v. Hudson, 36 Mont. 135, 92 P. 462 (1907) (act establishing free high
schools and providing for a county property tax to supply funds for the county high school so
established was not a revenue bill, because the tax was confined to the county in which the high
school was established and funds from such tax did not make their way into the state treasury); State
v. Bernheim, 19 Mont. 512, 49 P. 441 (1897) (senate bill regulating sale and redemption of transpor-
tation tickets of common carriers not made a revenue bill by inclusion in bill of license fee charged to
each person seeking the right to sell tickets as agent for the common carriers; primary purpose ofbill
was to regulate the sale of the tickets, to prevent fraudulent practices upon the public, and to provide
for the redemption of certain tickets by carriers). See also Carey v. McFatridge, 115 Mont. 278, 142
P.2d 229, 238 (1943) (Adair, J., dissenting) (citing and discussing Driscoll in context of revenue bill),
268. Morgan, 134 Mont. at -, 328 P.2d at 648. The bill was submitted to the people through
the referendum provision, art. V, § 1, and the indebtedness provision, art. XIII, § 2, of the
constitution.
269. Id. at -, 328 P.2d at 648-49.
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within the origination clause, the purpose of the bill must be to raise
money for defraying the expenses of the general government and such
moneys must be paid into the state treasury.2 70 Applying this test, the
court concluded that the act at issue was a revenue bill and thus void.2 7 t
The court specifically found that the tax was not incidental to the pri-
mary purpose of the bill and noted its statewide application, the confer-
ring of no special benefit to the property taxpayer, and the essential
element of the tax to the bill in general.2 72
The court then rejected the contention that the origination clause
was procedural only, declining to follow Mikell v. School Dist. 2 73  The
court concluded that the origination clause "was a substantive inter-
dict. ' 274 Furthermore, the origination clause was not rendered inappli-
cable because the bill was to be voted upon by the people.275 "The origin
of revenue bills must be the same .... No distinction exists between stat-
utes enacted by the people or those enacted by the legislature. 276
13. New Hampshire
New Hampshire's origination clause 27 7 has been narrowly construed
in a series of advisory opinions by the New Hampshire Supreme
Court.2 7S In one advisory opinion, the justices, relying on Massachu-
270. Id. at -, 328 P.2d at 648.
271. Id. at -, 328 P.2d at 654.
272. Id. at -, 328 P.2d at 650. The court relied heavily on Dumas v. Bryan, 35 Idaho 557, 207
P. 720 (1922), in which the court struck down a similar Idaho act. See supra notes 198-201 and
accompanying text.
273. 359 Pa. 113, 58 A.2d 339 (1948), discussed infra at notes 332-40 and accompanying text.
Morgan also relied in part on art. III, § 29, which makes the provisions of the constitution
mandatory and prohibitory except as otherwise specifically provided.
274. Morgan, 134 Mont. at -, 328 P.2d at 654.
275. Id.
276. Id. Justice Angstman dissented, plausibly observing that the reason for the origination
clause was to repose the power of taxation on the legislature closest to the people and the one being
most often renewed by elections, citing Dumas v. Bryan, 35 Idaho 557, 207 P. 720 (1922). Morgan,
134 Mont. at -, 328 P.2d at 654. As the people were to vote on the bill, the protection for the
people found in the origination clause was not needed. The justice concluded, noting that the refer-
endum provisions were added to the 1889 Constitution in 1906, "it is my view that section 32 of
article V... was intended to apply to such bills only when the entire legislative process is based upon
action of the two houses of the Legislative Assembly, i.e., the bill originating and terminating in the
Legislative Assembly, and has no application to referendum measures such as that involved here."
Id. at -, 328 P.2d at 655. The justice would also have found the tax provision incidental to the
primary purpose of the bill which was to seek authority to exceed the constitutional limit of indebt-
edness. Id.
277. "All money bills shall originate in the house of representatives; but the senate may propose,
or concur with, amendments, as on other bills." N.H. CONST. pt. 2, art. 18.
278. N.H. CONST. pt. 2, art. 74 provides that each branch of the legislature, as well as the
governor and council, may require the opinions of the justices of the supreme court upon important
1987]
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setts' precedent, 279 excluded appropriation bills from operation of the
clause. 80 In a subsequent opinion, the justices held that a senate-
originated bill to increase license fees for pharmacies and pharmacists
was not a money bill, limiting money bills to "bills which raise money by
direct taxation.",28' In a more recent opinion the justices upheld a senate
amendment to a house sweepstakes commission bill which would author-
ize the commission to operate a game in which eligible purchasers would
attempt to select the winners of sporting events.28 2 The justices noted
that the effect of the amendment would be to raise money by a "volun-
tary act of the purchaser, not of an enforced contribution to provide for
the support of government, the standard definition of a tax. ' 283  Most
recently, a tax on pari-mutuel pools was held to not be within the defini-
tion of a money bill.284
14. New Jersey
New Jersey's origination clause285 has been the focus in a variety of
questions of law and upon solemn occasions.
279. Opinion of the Justices, 126 Mass. 557 (1878).
280. Opinion of the Justices, 70 N.H. 642, 50 A. 329 (1901).
281. Opinion of the Justices, 102 N.H. 80, 150 A.2d 813, 815 (1959). In the later decision of
Niemiec v. King, 109 N.H. 586, 258 A.2d 356, 358 (1969), the court cited this case and observed
that imposition of a reimbursement charge to be paid into the general fund as unrestricted revenue
was not subject to the origination clause. In Opinion of the Justices, the justices examined federal
precedents and noted that the limited and strict construction of the origination clause was supported
by the overwhelming weight of authority. Opinion, 102 N.H. at -, 150 A.2d at 815. Although the
house objected to the senate's request for an opinion, the house having already taken the position
that the bill was a money bill, the court proceeded to issue the opinion, advising the legislature that
the opinion expressed by the court did not "detract from the power of the house to settle the rules of
proceedings in their own house." Id. at -, 150 A.2d at 816.
282. Opinion of the Justices, 115 N.H. 304, 339 A.2d 721 (1975).
283. Id. at -, 339 A.2d at 722 (quoting, in part, United States v. State Tax Comm'n, 421 U.S.
599 (1975), and reaffirming its position that appropriations bills were not money bills).
284. Opinion of the Justices, 116 N.H. 351, 358 A.2d 667 (1976). See also Op. Att'y Gen. (May
20, 1957) (bill setting forth ratio for assessment of property which is to be followed in certain cases
where valuation of property is required was not a revenue bill, since, as a matter of fact, the bill
raised no money and no state tax was raised on the classes set forth in the bill); Op. Att'y Gen. (Jan.
30, 1957) (two bills, one establishing a fund for persons killed or injured by accidental shooting and
one establishing a fund for towns and cities for deer killed therein, not revenue bills; the bills
amended statutes whose purposes were not primarily for revenue raising and thus were not them-
selves revenue bills). But see Op. Att'y Gen. (July 29, 1955) (bill reducing the rate of tax on interest
and dividends was a revenue bill, citing Perry County v. R.R. Co., 58 Ala. 546 (1877); also noting
the New Hampshire parliamentary practice permitting senate-originated amendments to existing
revenue statutes could be taken into account by the courts in concluding that the senate bill did not
fall within the origination clause).
285. "All bills for raising revenue shall originate in the General Assembly; but the Senate may
propose or concur with amendments, as on other bills." N.J. CONST. art. IV, § 6, ' I. In Township
of Bernards v. Allen, 61 N.J.L. 228, 39 A. 716 (1898), the court traced the evolution of the power of
revenue from Norman law through the Magna Carta to its emergence in colonial constitutions and
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factual contexts, due in part to New Jersey's unique statutory enactment
reference provision.2 86 The general approach of the New Jersey courts is
to narrowly construe the definition of a revenue bill.287 Thus, one case
held that a bill exempting certain transfers from tax was not a revenue
finally in the state constitution. Typically, the lower house of colonial assemblies had the exclusive
power to originate a revenue bill, the upper (commonly non-elected) chamber the power only to
defeat (not amend) the revenue bill. Id. at -, 39 A. at 717-18.
286. In N.J. STAT. ANN. § 1:7-1 to -7 (West Supp. 1985), the legislature provided a method by
which a statute could be challenged as not having been duly passed by both houses of the legislature
or approved by the governor. Either the attorney general or two citizens of the state may apply to
the Appellate Division of the Superior Court of New Jersey for resolution of issues concerning the
machinery of enactment. Id. The operation of this statutory mechanism is discussed in detail in
Application of McCabe, 81 N.J. 462, 409 A.2d 1158 (1980), and was obviously meant to overcome
the enrolled bill doctrine. The referenced procedure was invoked in In re Ross, 86 N.J.L. 387, 94 A.
304 (1914), where a revenue bill originated in the senate, was sent to the house, was recast as an
assembly substitute and treated as a new bill, then was sent to the senate where it passed and was
signed into law. The court held the origination clause to be satisfied, finding that both the house and
senate considered the assembly substitute to be an original house bill. Id. at -, 94 A. at 306. The
court did not find determinative the fact that the house substitute was captioned as a substitute for
the senate bill. See Marder, Power of New Jersey Supreme Court to Give Advisory Opinions, 74
N.J.L.J. 305, 310 (1951).
287. In Kervick v. Bontempo, 29 N.J. 469, 150 A.2d 34 (1959), noted with approval on this issue
in Biunno & Meanor, Constitutional Law, 14 RUTGERS L. REV. 304, 320-21 (1960), the supreme
court held that although the bond legislation was a revenue bill, the specific debt limitation provision
of the New Jersey Constitution, art. VIII, § 2, 3, removed the bond bill from operation of the
origination clause. That provision provides that it operates "regardless of any limitation relating to
taxation in this Constitution." Id. The supreme court revealed its cramped understanding of the
origination clause when it sought to reconcile the two constitutional provisions:
When the delegates met in 1947 they sought to create a living document embodying
their high concepts of democratic government for themselves and oncoming generations.
They generally avoided the pitfalls which had resulted from the inflexible provisions in the
State's earlier Constitution by replacing them with general expressions of modern govern-
mental principles. Where, as when dealing with the bill origin clause, they bowed to history
and determined to retain an ancient concept though it had lost much of its meaning, their
judgment must of course be honored; but they would be the last to suggest that its sweep
should be any broader than dictated by its antecedents or that it should now be imported into
the independent debt limit clause. The Constitution was made to serve and protect the
people of the State and all of its language must be sensibly construed with that uppermost
in mind. A bond issue preceded by the safeguarding steps in the debt limit clause necessar-
ily has the support of each branch of the Legislature and the favorable expresson of the
people of the State. The technical insistence that it also originate by ail Assembly rather
than a Senate bill could serve no public purpose whatever and we are satisfied that the Con-
stilution imposed no such requirement.
Kervick, 29 N.J. at -, 150 A.2d at 39-40 (emphasis added). Contra Morgan v. Murray, 134 Mont.
92, 328 P.2d 644 (1958). There is nothing in the debt limitation clause that is directly contrary to a
requirement that such bills originate in the lower house, however, and the two clauses could have
been equally well reconciled by requiring bond legislation to originate in the lower house. The origi-
nation clause, being the more specific provision, should have been held to be controlling. See 16 Am.
JUR. 2D Constitutional Law § 103; 16 C.J.S. Constitutional Law § 28; cf Hoffer, supra note 21, at 15
(in conflict between federal origination clause limitation and the proceedings clause grant of power
to each house to determine its own rules of proceedings, origination clause should prevail), 2 Rn-
SIATIEMENT (SECOND) OF CONrRACTS § 203(c) (in construing contract, specific clause governs
general).
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bill.288 Subsequently, in State v. Thermoid Co.,289 the New Jersey
Supreme Court held that a bill providing for an alternate method of es-
cheat to the state was not a revenue bill. The court recognized that the
escheat acts were motivated by a desire to increase the state's funds, but
found that merely because the bill was for the purpose of increasing the
state's revenue it was not necessarily a bill for raising revenue within the
meaning of the origination clause.290 The court observed that there ex-
isted a distinction between the state's assumption of custody over aban-
doned property and the production of revenue. 291 The escheat statute
imposed neither a tax nor a levy.292
More recently, a New Jersey court construed an act which imposed
a tax equal to the total amount of non-vested pension benefits of employ-
ees having served fifteen or more years upon certain employers who were
ceasing operations in New Jersey.293 The tax was to provide a fund to
which employees having completed fifteen years of service could make a
claim for the current value of their non-vested pension benefits.294 While
finding the act unconstitutional on other grounds, 295 the court rejected
an origination clause challenge.296
In Thiokol Chemical Corp. v. Morris County Board of Taxation,
however, the court struck down as violating the origination clause a bill
for assessment of leasehold interest privately used for profit in property
otherwise exempt. 297 The court found that in New Jersey, taxes collected
by the municipalities were state taxes even though they were collected by
288. In re Paton's Estate, 114 N.J. Eq. 324, 168 A. 422 (Prerog. Ct. 1933). The court noted that
the contrary rule obtained in England, but found no American support. The court overlooked Perry
County v. Selma, Marion & Memphis Ry. Co., 58 Ala. 546 (1877), which directly holds that a bill
decreasing revenue falls within the origination clause. See also Armstrong v. United States, 759 F.2d
1378 (9th Cir. 1985) (bill to decrease revenue within federal origination clause definition of revenue
bill).
289. 16 N.J. 274, 108 A.2d 421 (1954), noted with approval in Heckel, Constitutional Law, 10
RUTGERS L. REV. 28-29, 305-06 (1955).
290. Thernoid Co., 16 N.J. at -, 108 A.2d at 423.
291. Id. at -, 108 A.2d at 424.
292. Id.
293. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc. v. Glaser, 144 N.J. Super. 152, 365 A.2d 1 (1976), aff'd, 56 N.J.
Super. 513, 384 A.2d 176 (1978).
294. Id.
295. The lower court found the statute invalid on the basis that the classifications employed by
the Act were arbitrary and without rational basis, thus violating special legislation provisions of the
New Jersey Constitution. Glaser, 144 N.J. Super. at -, 365 A.2d at 15-21. The appellate division
affirmed on the additional ground that the act constituted a prohibited private purpose tax. Glaser,
56 N.J. Super. at __, 384 A.2d at 177. See also French v. City of Camden, 77 N.J. Eq. 151, 76 A.
980 (N.J. Ch. 1910) (senate act authorizing city's asessment not subject to origination clause).
296. Glaser, 144 N.J. Super. at -, 365 A.2d at 24.
297. 76 N.J. Super. 232, 184 A.2d 75, 82 (1962), aff'd, 41 N.J. 405, 197 A.2d 176 (1964).
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the municipality under power granted by the state.298 Refusing to steril-
ize the constitutional provision, the court asserted that the clause, as part
of the constitution, must be enforced.299
15. Oklahoma
Oklahoma has a wealth of interpretive lav 300 construing its origina-
298. Id. at -., 184 A.2d at 82. The court rejected the argument that the origination clause only
encompassed bills for the raising of revenues for state purposes which were paid into the treasury of
the state. Id. at -, 184 A.2d at 81.
299. There is a tendency in many places to belittle the bill origin clause in the State Consti-
tution on the theory that there is no practical need for such a provision in these days in our
State. However, the fact remains that it is a part of the Constitution and must be observed
and enforced.
Id. at -, 184 A.2d at 82. The court distinguished In re Ross, 86 N.J.L. 387, 94 A. 304 (1914), as
not involving the same fact situation. In Thiokol, the senate originated the basic bill and the assem-
bly only added an amendment. See also Atlantic City Casino Hotel Ass'n v. Casino Control
Comm'n, 203 N.J. Super. 203, 496 A.2d 714 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1985) (origination clause
cited in case striking down proposal to increase permit fees; finding that such commisson action was
really a revenue-raising measure, and that such power vested in the general assembly and was not
delegable to non-governmental bodies without explicit standards).
300. In addition to the case law discussed in this section, the Oklahoma Attorney General, pur-
suant to his statutory duty, OKLA. STAT. tit. 74, § 18b (e) (1982), to give his opinion upon request by
designated state officers and agencies, has rendered a substantial number of opinions on Oklahoma's
origination clause. The attorney general has construed the clause narrowly. See 15 Op. Att'y Gen.
330 (1983) (bill which authorized Employment Security Commission to assess a surcharge on em-
ployers in certain instances was not a revenue bill, as the principal object of the bill was to revamp
the employment security program); 15 Op. Att'y Gen. 363 (1983) (bill which effects major change in
the Oklahoma Tax Commission was not made a revenue bill by inclusion within bill of provisions
relating to calculation of depreciation of assets and defining consideration in relation to taxes on real
estate deeds and instruments); 10 Op. Att'y Gen. 164 (1977) (comprehensive senate bill restructuring
motor vehicle registration system, making appropriations, and modifying license fee provisions, was
not a revenue bill); Op. Att'y Gen. No. 240 (May 19, 1965) (senate amendment to house bill the
effect of which would be to raise revenue not barred); Op. Att'y Gen. No. 138 (Feb. 23, 1965) (since
principal purpose of senate bill regulatory and not the raising of revenue, the senate bill did not
violate the origination clause); Op. Att'y Gen. No. 135 (Feb. 23, 1965) (origination clause construed
strictly; since proposed bill did not levy a tax but merely rendered a previously levied tax inapplica-
ble under certain conditions, not barred); Op. Att'y Gen. No. 514 (May 14, 1959) (house may amend
a senate bill so as to include a revenue-raising measure); Op. Att'y Gen. No. 313 (Mar. 13, 1957)
(senate bill to authorize school districts to raise revenue by vote of the people not within origination
clause); Op. Att'y Gen. No. 520 (May 20, 1955) (although revenue bill may not be passed within last
five days of session, the bill may be signed by the presiding officers of the legislature during that
period); Op. Att'y Gen. (Apr. 5, 1961) (senate-originated legislation to repeal exemptions from sales
tax valid). But see 14 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 100 (1982) (senate bill providing for increased assessments
to fund a law enforcement training fund may be revenue bill).
The opinions of the attorney general are binding on the state officers affected thereby, unless the
opinion declares a state law unconstitutional. In that instance, the opinion is advisory only. State ex
rel. York v. Turpen, 681 P.2d 763 (Okla. 1984). The attorney general's opinion is generally accorded
substantial, though not controlling, weight by the Oklahoma courts. Goodin v. Board of Educ.. 601
P.2d 88 (Okla. 1979); Lowery v. Oklahoma Alcoholic Beverage Control Bd., 584 P.2d 724 (Okla.
1978). See generally Sparling, Opinions of the Oklahoma Attorney General: An Analysis, 6 OKLA.
CITY U.L. REv. 373 (1981); Comment, Attorney General The Effect of the Attorney General's Opin-
ion in Oklahoma, 28 OKLA. L. REv. 106 (1975).
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tion clause.3"' The Oklahoma provision, like the Alabama one,3" 2 pro-
vides that (1) bills for raising revenue shall not originate in the senate,
and that (2) revenue bills shall not be passed within the last five days of
the legislative session.3°3 The Oklahoma courts have strictly construed
the origination provision limiting its operation to acts levying taxes in the
strict sense for a state-wide purpose.3°
301. "All bills for raising revenue shall originate in the House of Representatives. The Senate
may propose amendments to revenue bills. No revenue bill shall be passed during the five last days
of the Session." OKLA. CONsT. art. V, § 33.
302. ALA. CONST. art. IV, § 70. See supra note 142 and accompanying text.
303. The Oklahoma Supreme Court considers "bills for raising revenue" for purposes of house
origination to be synonomous with "revenue bill" for purposes of the five day limitation. Anderson
v. Ritterbusch, 22 Okla. 761, 98 P. 1002 (1908). Thus, no distinction is made in this section between
the two phrases and cases involving either provision shall be considered within the scope of this
article.
304. In addition to the cases discussed in the text, in the following cases the Oklahoma appellate
courts rejected an origination clause challenge: Board of County Comm'rs v. Oklahoma Pub. Em-
ployees Retirement Sys., 405 P.2d 68 (Okla. 1965) (statute providing for the establishment of a
retirement system for state and county employees does not levy taxes nor does it contain provisions
for revenue; principal purpose was to establish retirement system); Pure Oil Co. v. Oklahoma Tax
Comm'n, 179 Okla. 479, 66 P.2d 1097 (1936), appeal dismissed, 302 U.S. 635 (1937) (statute impos-
ing tax on motor vehicle doing inter-city business; purpose of statute was to regulate use of highways
and the tax was only incidental to that purpose); Thompson v. Huston, 170 Okla. 195, 39 P.2d 524
(1935) (statute reducing interest rate on delinquent real estate taxes); Jones v. Blaine, 149 Okla. 153,
300 P. 369 (1931) (cemetery tax levy); Wallace v. Gassaway, 148 Okla. 265, 298 P. 867 (1931)
(senate bill providing for the resale of realty for delinquent taxes by the county treasurer); Fullerton
v. State, 140 Okla. 122, 282 P. 674 (1929), appeal dismissed, 281 U.S. 705 (1930) (statute providing
for taxation of lands sold by commissioners of land office); Protest of Chicago, R.I. & P. Ry. Co., 137
Okla. 186, 279 P. 319 (1929) (bills authorizing municipalities to levy taxes to establish public library
and to levy taxes to construct and maintain cemeteries not revenue bills, as the taxes only author-
ized, not levied, and are for local, not state, governmental expenses); Ex Parte Sales, 108 Okla. 29,
233 P. 186 (1924) (provision of Motor Vehicle Act requiring payment of license fee for privilege of
operating transportation services on public highways only incidental to main purpose of act, to regu-
late common carriers and use of public highways); Ex Parte Tindall, 102 Okla. 192, 229 P, 125
(1924) (companion case to Sales); Ryan v. State, 102 Okla. 168, 228 P. 521 (1924) (law providing for
correction of the tax rolls, refunding taxes illegally levied, and authorizing emergency tax levy if
approved by the people of the city not a revenue bill); Dickey v. State, 90 Okla. 106, 217 P. 145
(1923) (origination clause did not apply to bills which authorize a municipality to raise revenue to
defray municipality's expenses; clause limited to bills raising revenue for state government expenses;
quoting Harper v. Comm'rs of Elberton, 23 Ga. 566 (1857) to the effect that delegating power to tax
was different from laying of a tax); Lusk v. Ryan, 69 Okla. 165, 171 P. 323 (1918) (section providing
a procedure for recovery of illegal taxes paid, severing section from unconstitutional provisions); I
re Okla. Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 68 Okla. 219, 173 P. 376 (1918) (severs recovery procedure from por-
tions of statute unconstitutional as being revenue bill); In re Sprankle Co., 69 Okla. 178, 170 P. 1147
(1917) (same holding as in Lusk, fact that section incidentally may have effect of raising revenue not
determinative); In re Lee, 64 Okla. 310, 168 P. 53 (1917) (law providing for a docket fee not a
revenue measure, but designed to compensate for service rendered to public); Trustees', Ex'rs.' &
Secs.' Ins. Corp. v. Hooton, 53 Okla. 530, 157 P. 293 (1916) (registration tax on recording of mort-
gages); Johnson v. Grady County, 50 Okla. 188, 150 P. 497 (1915) (statute relating to office of
county assessor and the assessment and equalization of property for taxation); Cornelius v. State, 40
Okla. 733, 140 P. 1187 (1914) (statute providing for exemption of certain realty and imposing tax on
mortgages not a revenue bill as the statute's principal purpose was not the raising of revenue); Meek
v. State, 54 Okla. Crim. 415, 22 P.2d 933 (1933) (act regulating sale of securities which provided
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The foundation Oklahoma case is Anderson v. Ritterbush.30 5 In
Anderson, a statute providing for the discovery of property not listed for
taxation, its assessment, and the subsequent collection of taxes thereon,
was attacked both because the act was a senate-originated revenue bill
and because the act was passed during the last five days of the legislative
30630session. Quoting extensively from Judge Story,3 °7 the court distin-
guished the seminal Alabama case of Perry County v. Selma, Marion &
Memphis Ry. Co.,308 on the grounds that the Alabama act actually levied
a tax.309 The statute before the Oklahoma court only provided for a
means to enforce the already established tax laws against property which
for some reason had been omitted from taxation. 310 Thus, "such a law is
in no sense a bill for raising revenue, although it may incidentally have
that effect. It does not belong to that class of revenue bills mentioned by
Judge Story as those that levy taxes in the strict sense of the word." 31'
The Oklahoma Criminal Court of Appeals,31a however, in Ex Parte
Fuller, struck down as violative of the origination clause a provision pro-
viding for a license tax for vending machines operated in a public
place.3" 3 The defendant had failed to obtain a license and was fined the
collection of fees not a revenue bill as principal purpose of act was to prevent fraud in the sale and
disposition of securities); Ex Parte Ambler, 11 Okla. Crim. 449, 148 P. 1061 (1914) (Medical Prac-
tices Act which incidentally required a payment of a fee to obtain certificate to practice). In addi-
tion, several separate opinions have addressed the origination clause. See State v. Oklahoma Tax
Comm'n, 462 P.2d 536, 544 (Okla. 1969) (McInerney, J., dissenting) (in dicta, observing that gaso-
line and sales tax were revenue laws whose principal purpose was the raising of revenue for general
state purposes); Oklahoma City v. Griffin, 403 P.2d 463, 467 (Okla. 1965) (Blackbird, J., dissenting)
(joint resolution providing that portion of traffic fines collected by cities deposited with state for
driver education not a revenue bill); Carter v. Rathburn, 85 Okla. 251, 257, 209 P. 944, 964 (1922)
(Elting, J., dissenting) (origination clause controls revenue bills, not appropriation bills); cf. Chicka-
sha Cotton Oil Co. v. Grady County, 177 Okla. 240, 242, 58 P.2d 590, 592 (1936) (act of levying
taxes under revenue laws to be collected and used in future different from collecting of debt already
due).
305. 22 Okla. 761, 98 P. 1002 (1908).
306. Id. at 765, 98 P. at 1004.
307. Id. at 768-70, 98 P. at 1005-07.
308. 58 Ala. 546 (1877).
309. Anderson, 22 Okla. at 771, 98 P. at 1006. The supreme court approved the result reached in
Perry, noting that the Alabama law was one that levied a tax for state purposes. The court noted
that the senate act in Perry actually would lower the rate of taxation. Nevertheless, Perry was
"clearly right." Id.
310. Id. at 771-72, 98 P. at 1006.
311. Id.
312. Now the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals. The Oklahoma Constitution, like that of
Texas, creates two separate courts of last resort: the supreme court and the court of criminal ap-
peals. OKLA. CONST. art. VII, § 4. Unlike the Texas system, however, the Oklahoma Constitution
specifically empowers the Oklahoma Supreme Court to decide any conflict as to jurisdiction. Carder
v. Court of Criminal Appeals, 595 P.2d 416 (Okla. 1978). See Fraser, Oklahoma's New Judicial
System, 2 OKLA. L. REV. 373 (1968).
313. 31 Okla. Crim. 289, 238 P. 512 (1925).
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sum of $25.00. Upon his refusal to pay the fine, the defendant was
placed in custody.3" 4 He filed an original proceeding in habeas corpus,
seeking his discharge on the basis that the act in question, a revenue bill,
had been passed in the last five days of the legislative session and was
thus void.3" 5 The court sustained the claim and granted relief, rejecting
the state's claim that the statute was an exercise of the police power and
not a revenue measure. 31 6 The court observed that it sometimes is diffi-
cult to distinguish between the exercise of the police power and the exer-
cise of the taxing power, but that the act in question did not present such
difficulties.317 The exercise of the police power is regulatory in nature,
and the fee or tax charged is in theory compensation to the state for the
regulatory service.318 The act in question, however, did not regulate
anything.
No limitation is placed upon the number of machines that may be
installed. Their location is not limited to any particular place of busi-
ness or location. No qualifications of the persons operating such de-
vices are provided for. No duty is imposed upon the person owning
such machines. No system of inspection is provided. The act provides
only for the payment of the license tax, and on the failure to pay a
penalty by way of fine is imposed. This act is a revenue measure; its
purpose was the raising of revenue and not that of regulation, and,
since it was enacted within five days of the close of the legislative ses-
sion, falls clearly within the inhibition of section 33, art. 5, of the Con-
stitution, and is invalid.319
The supreme court returned to the strict construction of the origina-
tion clause in Leveridge v. Oklahoma Tax Commission.32 The house bill
under challenge had been passed in the last five days of the legislative
session.321 The bill lifted the tax exemption on certain late model cars
owned by used car dealers.322 Since the house bill did not, "within its
four corners," levy a tax, but rather removed a tax exemption, it was not
a revenue bill.323
These cases, and the numerous cases discussed in the footnotes,
314. Id. at 290, 238 P. at 512.
315. Id. at 291, 238 P. at 512-13.
316. Id. at 293-94, 238 P. at 513.
317. Id.
318. Id. at 293, 238 P. at 513.
319. Id. at 294, 238 P. at 513.
320. 294 P.2d 809 (Okla. 1956).
321. Id. at 810.
322. Id. at 811.
323. Id. at 811-12. For a discussion of the legislative process in Oklahoma, see S. KIRKI'ATRICK.
THE LEGISLATIVE PROCESS IN OKLAHOMA: POLICY MAKING, PEOPLE & POLITICS (1978).
[Vol. 23:165
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place Oklahoma squarely in the mainstream of contemporary construc-
tion of the origination clause: a strict construction is employed to ex-
clude all but bills levying taxes to be used for general governmental
purposes.
16. Oregon
Oregon's origination clause 32 4 has been strictly construed to include
only measures raising revenue for general state purposes. 25 In Northern
Counties Investment Trust v. Sears,32 6 the court upheld a statute prescrib-
ing fees to be paid to sheriffs and court clerks for particular services, such
fees to be turned over to the county treasury, against an origination
clause attack. Relying principally upon federal precedents,327 the Oregon
Supreme Court found the statute not to be one for the levying of taxes in
the strict sense but to be incidental to the primary purpose of the legisla-
tion which was to prescribe the compensation and duties of clerks and
sheriffs.328 In the earlier federal case of Dundee Mortgage Trust Invest-
ment Co. v. Parrish,3 29 the federal court found that the mortgage tax law
was not a revenue bill. The bill only provided the procedure for valua-
tion; it did not authorize or provide for the levying of any tax.33° In
addition to judicial construction, the origination clause has been the sub-
ject of a considerable number of attorney general opinions. 331
324. "Bills may originate in either house, but may be amended or rejected in the other: except
that bills for raising revenue shall originate in the House of Representatives." OR. CONST. art. IV,
§ 18. In Northern Counties Inv. Trust v. Sears, 30 Or. 388, 403, 41 P. 931, 936 (1895), the Oregon
Supreme Court applied to the Oregon clause the construction applied to the federal clause by the
federal courts. The court in a later opinion observed the following: "[O]bjections to unconstrained
taxation have been perennial mainsprings of constitutionalism. The American colonists demanded
Ino taxation without representation,' not representation in the abstract, and American constitutions
still insist that revenue bills begin in the more popular house of their legislatures, where members
also face the most frequent elections." Oregon State Homeowner's Ass'n v. Roberts, 299 Or. 460,
-, 703 P.2d 954, 957 (1985).
325. In addition to the other cases discussed, see also State v. Wright, 14 Or. 365, -, 12 P. 708,
712, (1887), overruled on other grounds, Warren v. Crosby, 24 Or. 558, 34 P. 661 (1893) (bill provid-
ing for an increase in license fee for sale of liquor not a bill for raising revenue, but an exercise of the
police power of the state to regulate a business "detrimental to the public morals"); Barnum v. Dep't
of Revenue, 5 Or. Tax 508 (1974), aff'd, 270 Or. 867, 530 P.2d 28 (1974) (applying incidental
revenue test and reiterating strict construction of origination clause).
326. 30 Or. 388, 41 P. 931 (1895).
327. Id. at 401-02, 41 P. at 935.
328. Id. at 402-03, 41 P. at 935-36.
329. 24 F. 197 (D. Or. 1885), appeal dismissed, 140 U.S. 690 (1890).
330. Id. at 201. The court discusses the Oregon case of Mumford v. Sewall, 11 Or. 67, 4 P. 585,
587 (1883), where the Oregon court expressed reservations concerning the constitutionality of the
law in terms of the origination clause, as the act originated in the senate. The federal court had no
such doubts. "But I am clear that this is not a bill for raising revenue." Parrish, 24 F. at 201.
331. See Op. Att'y Gen. No. 7632 (June 7, 1978) (bill originating in senate which eliminates tax
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17. Pennsylvania
In the influential decision of Mikell v. School Dist., the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court went to great lengths to emasculate the state's origination
clause.332 The court first held that the senate act, which imposed a per-
sonal property tax upon the residents of certain school districts for public
school purposes, was not a "bill for raising revenue" within the clause.333
The court noted that to be a revenue bill, "the revenue derived from the
tax imposed should be coverable into the treasury of the exacting sover-
eign for its own general governmental uses.",334 The court was on solid
precedential ground for this part of its analysis. 335
The court then, however, gratuitously found the origination clause
to be a purely procedural directive and not a substantive interdict.3 36
exempt status of floating homes and households not a revenue bill; clause to be construed to the
"narrowest possible terms" so that existence of a non-revenue raising purpose to bill would remove it
from the origination clause); Op. Att'y Gen. No. 6387 (Nov. 8, 1967) (origination clause does not
prohibit creation of joint ways and means committee); Op. Att'y Gen. No. 2365 (Mar. 3, 1953) (bill
amending corporate excise tax to broaden the tax base and therefore increase the revenue generated
should originate in house, distinguishing Mumford v. Sewall, on basis that in Mumford, act regu-
lated classification, collection, or enforcement of taxes while proposed senate bill imposed a tax and
raised revenue); Op. Att'y Gen. No. 1657 (Jan. 22, 1951) (bill amending provisions for licenses and
fees for race meets was a revenue bill that should originate in house of representatives; one point to
consider is that the amount generated by the fee will far exceed the cost of regulation); Op. Att'y
Gen. 258 (Mar. 15, 1939) (bill declaring sale of motor vehicle fuels a public utility and providing for
rates, prices, and fees for obtaining permits, proceeds of which were to be credited to special fund,
not a revenue bill because not to be used for payment of general expenses of the state government);
Op. Att'y Gen. (Mar. 13, 1939) (bill which levies a tax for special purpose, and not to raise revenue
for general expenses of state government not a revenue bill); Op. Att'y Gen. (Feb. 13, 1939) (exten-
sive discussion of the limitations of the origination clause); Op. Att'y Gen. (Mar. 4, 1935) (bill
relating to pilots and pilot commissioners and authorizing collection of fees not a revenue bill, since
it is not directed towards raising revenue; even if it were, not subject to the origination clause as it
does not impose taxes generally upon all of the property or people of the state); Op. Att'y Gen. (Feb.
11, 1931) (bill authorizing incorporated cities and towns to levy and collect a privilege tax on pri-
vately owned and operated public utilities operating without a franchise was a revenue bill because
amount generated was beyond that necessary to cover the costs of regulation). The Oregon position
on the enrolled bill rule and the mandatory nature of constitutional provisions is extensively dis-
cussed in Note, Constitutional Provisions Regulating the Mechanics of Statutory Enactment hi Oregon
- Effect of Enrollment, 27 OR. L. REv. 46 (1947).
332. 359 Pa. 113, 58 A.2d 339 (1948). The origination clause is found in art. III, § 10 of the
Pennsylvania Constitution: "All bills for raising revenue shall originate in the House of Representa-
tives, but the Senate may propose amendments as in other bills." PA. CONsT. art. III, § 10.
333. Mikell, 359 Pa. at -, 58 A.2d at 341.
334. Id. The court communicated its view of the origination clause when, after tracing briefly
the history of the revenue power, the court disclaimed, "[b]ut, we need not base our decision with
respect to the particular constitutional provision, now under consideration, upon its present-day
inappropriateness." Id.
335. See, involving school property taxation, Chicago, B. & Q. R.R. Co. v. School Dist. No. 1.
63 Colo. 159, 165 P. 260 (1917); Patrons of Noble County School Corp. v. School City, 244 Ind. 675.
194 N.E. 2d 718 (1963); Cassady v. Oldham County, 246 Ky. 773, 56 S.W. 2d 368 (1933): Evers v.
Hudson, 36 Mont. 135, 92 P. 462 (1907).
336. Mikell, 359 Pa. at -, 58 A.2d at 344.
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The remedy for infringement of such a directive would not be judicial; a
point of order in the legislative chamber was the remedy found by the
court.3 3 7 "A failure of the legislature to follow a directory provision of
the Constitution, respecting the introduction and passage of legislation,
does not present a justiciable question, and, in no event, does it impair
the validity of a duly certified enactment." '338 Finding refuge in the en-
337. Id. (rejected in Morgan v. Murray, 134 Mont. 92, 328 P.2d 644 (1958)). Dicta in a later
decision of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, however, casts some doubt on Mikell's continued force.
In Sweeney v. Tucker, 473 Pa. 493, 375 A.2d 698 (1977), an action finding justiciable the question of
whether a member of the Pennsylvania House of Representatives was properly expelled, the court
observed that "[s]pecific limitations on the Legislature's power to determine its internal operating
procedures are imposed elsewhere in the Constitution. See PA. CONST. art. III, §§ 1-13 [which
includes the origination clause]. These limitations are judicially enforceable." Id. at -, 375 A.2d at
708-09. The court cited two of its early decisions to support its observation: Scudder v. Smith, 331
Pa. 16, 200 A. 601 (1938) (constitution requires bills, not joint resolutions) and Stewart v. Hadley,
327 Pa. 66, 193 A. 41 (1937) (statute violates provision requiring only one subject). Neither case was
cited in Mikell.
338. Mikell, 359 Pa. at -, 58 A.2d at 344. The court, in finding the origination clause direc-
tory, disregarded the general rule that constitutional provisions are construed to be mandatory. 2 N.
SINGER, supra note 16, § 57.13; H. BLACK, HANDBOOK OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 59
(4th ed. 1927) (constitutional provisions almost invariably mandatory); 16 AM. JUR. 2D Constitu-
tional Law § 136; 16 C.J.S. Constitutional Law § 52. The Pennsylvania court erred in eviscerating
the constitutional provision. The Idaho court noted in Cohn v. Kingsley, 5 Idaho 416, 49 P. 985
(1897), where the state attorney general argued that the constitution's tehnical procedural require-
ments were directory only:
It is true that the doing of these things is a matter of procedure. But by what right shall
any one be permitted to say that any of the things required by the constitution to be done
are "insignificant," and may therefore be omitted? Has anyone more right to say that one
of the things required by the constitution is insignificant and may be omitted than he has to
say that any other thing required is insignificant and may therefore be omitted? If the right
to ignore one provision exists, the right to ignore all exists. If the court must wink at one
violation of the constitution, it must wink at other violations of it.... We think that safety
and security demand that we stick to the letter and spirit of the constitution, that we obey
all of its mandates, until the people, the source of all power, who made it, change its
provisions."
Id. at 431-32, 49 P. at 490. The court noted that Sutherland's original work on statutory construc-
tion criticized the directory approach: "whatever constitutional provision can be looked upon as
directory merely is very likely to be treated by the legislature as if it was devoid of moral obligation,
and to be therefore habitually disregarded." Cohn, 5 Idaho at -_, 49 P. at 990. See also 16 AM. JUR.
2D Constitutional Law § 136. Judge Cooley warned that
the courts tread upon very dangerous ground when they venture to apply the rules which
distinguish directory and mandatory statutes to the provisions of the Constitution. Consti-
tutions do not usually undertake to prescribe mere rules of proceeding except when such
rules are looked upon as essential to the thing to be done, and they must be regarded in the
light of limitations upon the power to be exercised.
T. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS 78-9 (Ist ed. 1868). See also Perry
County v. Selma, Marion & Memphis Ry. Co., 58 Ala. 546 (1877) (quoting Judge Cooley with
approval). The danger of which Judge Cooley warned is amply illustrated by two Mississippi cases.
Hunt v. Wright, 70 Miss. 298, 11 So. 608 (1892), involved constitutional provisions which prohibited
passage of revenue and appropriation bills during the last five days of the legislative session and
required a three-fifths vote to pass revenue measures. In dicta, the court observed that the courts
would not enforce either provision and then remanded their enforcement to the conscience of the
legislature. Id. at -, 11 So. at 610-11. In Green v. Weller, 32 Miss. 650, 691 (1856), the Mississippi
court refused to consider the validity of a constitutional amendment against the claim that it had
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rolled bill doctrine, 339 the court concluded that since the certified enact-
ment did not disclose the origin of the act, the challenge had to fail in any
event.340
18. South Carolina
South Carolina's origination clause341 has been the subject of few
judicial constructions.342 In State ex. rel. Coleman v. Lewis, the court
held the state highway commission act was not a revenue bill because its
only revenue-producing measure was a license tag charge.343 Further-
more, the license tag feature had originated in the house bill, although
failed to receive the vote of two-thirds of all the members of the senate, as required by the constitu-
tion. But see Dodd, supra note 16, at 54-56 (criticizing view that all constitutional provisions
mandatory). One must observe that the issue of whether a constitutional provision is mandatory or
directory must be distinguished from the separate issue of what evidence will be examined to deter-
mine compliance with the constitutional provision. Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 670 (1891). It is in
this context that the enrolled bill doctrine comes into play.
339. Mikell, 359 Pa. at -, 58 A.2d at 345-46.
340. See Velasquez v. Depuy, 46 Pa. D. & C.2d 587 (1969) for an extensive discussion of the
Pennsylvania enrolled bill rule. In the early case of McCoy v. Washington County, 15 F. Cas. 1341
(C.C.W.D. Pa. 1862) (No. 8,731), Justice Grier, riding circuit, stated in dicta that a Pennsylvania act
authorizing the citizens of Washington County to decide whether commissioners should buy stock in
a railroad, to borrow the necessary funds, and to issue loan certificates was not a revenue bill for
purposes of Pennsylvania's origination clause. Id. at 1344.
341. "Bills for raising revenue shall originate in the House of Representatives, but may be al-
tered, amended or rejected by the Senate; all other Bills may originate in either house, and may be
amended, altered or rejected by the other." S.C. CONST. art. III, § 15. The section was cited, but
not discussed, in Jackson v. Breeland, 103 S.C. 184, 88 S.E. 128 (1916) (court found objection that
drainage act originated in senate a misapprehension of the facts); Crouch v. Benet, 198 S.C. 185, 17
S.E.2d 320 (1941) (clause provides that bills may be amended by either house).
342. The origination clause, however, has received considerable discussion in attorney general
opinions. These opinions reflect the South Carolina Supreme Court's strict construction of the origi-
nation clause to include only bills raising revenue for the state. See Op. Att'y Gen. No. 95 (Sept. 3,
1985) (annual state appropriations bill may be introduced simultaneously into house and senate,
since an appropriation bill is not a revenue bill; the opinion noted that it was the historical custom to
introduce the general appropriation bill in the house, and the decision on whether to continue that
custom was with the legislature); Op. Att'y Gen. (May 15, 1981) (bill to confer authority on school
districts to levy and collect a sales tax may originate in senate since the funds raised will not go into
the state treasury); Op. Att'y Gen. (March 23, 1981) (bill to enable local governmental units to
finance redevelopment projects through bond issues not a revenue bill since the revenue raised not
for the state, but for local purposes); Op. Att'y Gen. (March 23, 1981) (bill to enable localities to
levy a joint county-municipal sales tax not a revenue bill as merely delegating authority to local
government units to levy taxes for local purposes); Op. Att'y Gen. (March 1, 1979) (bill amending
procedure by which annual budget report is submitted to the legislature and amending procedure of
annual appropriations bill not a revenue bill, but only a procedural bill); Op. Att'y Gen. (March 23,
1970) (senate bill provided for extensive modification of gasoline tax not revenue bill; proceeds to go
to highway purposes, and not to general state funds); Op. Att'y Gen. (March 15, 1965) (bill whose
primary purpose was to make capital improvements in Aiken County not a revenue measure as a
result of provision to permit county to sell bonds; the origination clause must be strictly construed to
only include those measures which raise revenue for the state treasury and are used for the state's
general governmental uses).
343. 181 S.C. 10, -, 186 S.E. 625, 628 (1936).
56
Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 23 [1987], Iss. 2, Art. 1
https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol23/iss2/1
1987] ORIGINATION CLA USE
the senate had amended the bill in other respects. 3" In State v. Stanley,
the court found a statute regulating the trapping, shipping, and transpor-
tation of furs was not a revenue bill because fines were provided only for
violations of the statute.345
19. Texas
The Texas origination clause3 4 6 has been narrowly construed by
both the courts347 and the Texas Attorney General's Office.348 In the
344. Id. at -, 186 S.E. at 628. The court in Lewis reviewed the legislative journal and estab-
lished that the bill originated in the house. The court did invoke the enrolled bill doctrine to reject a
challenge based upon the constitutional provision requiring an act to be read three times in each
house. Id. at -, 186 S.E. at 629. Compare State ex. rel. Richards v. Moorer, 152 S.C. 455, 150 S.E.
269 (1929), cert. denied, 281 U.S. 691 (court declined to look behind enrolled bill to determine
whether state highway system bill originated in house or senate; rejecting origination clause chal-
lenge on basis that enrolled bill showed no facial defect); Wingfield v. South Carolina Tax Comm'n,
147 S.C. 116, 144 S.E. 846 (1928) (court declined to review journals to determine whether license tax
act originated in senate, relying on enrolled bill to reject origination clause claim); Hicks v. Cleve-
land, 106 F. 459, 466 (4th Cir. 1901) (act incorporating a railroad and providing for a railroad tax
constitutional on alternative bases that enrolled bill doctrine prevents use of legislative journals to
establish origination and because act was not a revenue bill in any event but was to incorporate
railroad and promote its construction).
345. 131 S.C. 513, -_, 127 S.E. 574, 575 (1925). See also, Pineland Club v. Berg, 110 S.C. 505,
96 S.E. 915 (1918), where the court, in dictum, found that the license tax involved was not a revenue
measure, but merely an instrumentality to the main purpose of the act which was regulating the
raising and protecting of fish and game. Id. at -, 96 S.E. at 917.
346. "All bills for raising revenue shall originate in the House of Representatives, but the Senate
may amend or reject them as other bills." TEx. CONST. art. III, § 33. The Texas Constitution in an
earlier section somewhat misleadingly provides that "[b]ills may originate in either House, and,
when passed by such House, may be amended, altered or rejected by the other." TEX. CONST. art.
III, § 31. There appears to be no discussion of the relationship between these two constitutional
provisions, either in case law or commentaries. Mississippi's Constitution of 1832 also contained
both clauses. MIss. CONsT. art. III, §§ 23, 24. The interpretative commentary to § 33 notes that the
origination clause was borrowed from the practice of the British House of Commons and carried
over to Texas, as the lower house more directly represents the people and is renewed by more fre-
quent elections.
347. In addition to the cases discussed in the text, see also the following: Smith v. Davis, 426
S.W.2d 827 (Tex. 1968) (senate bill which authorized creation of hospital district with power to levy
taxes not a revenue bill since taxes not to be used for general purposes, and revenue raising not
principal purpose of bill); Yeary v. Bond, 384 S.W.2d 376 (Tex. Civ. App. 1964, writ ref'd n.r.e.)
(hospital district act constitutional because revenue generated was only incidental to main purpose
which was to create hospital district); Stuard v. Thompson, 251 S.W. 277 (Tex. Civ. App. 1923,
n.w.h.) (poll tax not revenue bill because principal purpose of statute was to set forth qualifications
of women voters); Raymond v. Kibbe, 95 S.W. 727 (Tex. Civ. App. 1906, writ ref'd) (act imposing
tax on fishing boats and on fish taken for market not revenue bill); cf Utter v. State, 571 S.W.2d 934
(Tex. Crim. App. 1978) (license fee imposed by municipality on wrecker operator was regulatory
measure, not prohibited occupation tax); Atkins v. State Highway Dep't, 201 S.W. 226 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1918, writ dismissed) (vehicle registration fee not a tax).
348. See, e.g., Op. Att'y Gen. No. 5212 (1943) (bill which would not raise revenue, but which
either reduced or abolished existing tax could originate in senate); Op. Att'y Gen. No. 4061 (1941)
(senate bill amending a prior enacted revenue bill not invalid; bill decreasing revenue not within
meaning of origination clause). As to the role of the Texas attorney general's opinion function, see
Dickson, Vital Crucible of the Law: Politics and Procedures of the Advisory Opinion Function of the
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early case of Day Land & Cattle Co. v. State,349 the Texas Supreme Court
validated against an origination clause attack a bill which set apart one-
half of the unappropriated public domain in Greer County for the benefit
of public schools and the other half for the payment of the public debt.
The Texas Supreme Court held that such an act was not a revenue bill,
for "[i]t merely withdrew that land from the body of unappropriated
lands and reserved it for specific uses, leaving it to some future legislature
to determine when and how the proceeds of those lands should be
brought into the state treasury. ' 350 The court adopted Judge Story's po-
sition that the origination clause should be strictly confined to bills levy-
ing taxes in "the strict sense of the words. 311
The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals 352 later adopted the same nar-
row test in Gieb v. State.3 53 The court found that a statute authorizing
towns to levy taxes was not subject to the origination clause, observing
that the origination clause is directed towards acts of the legislature rais-
ing revenue for general purposes and towards funding appropriations
made by the legislature.354 The origination clause does not apply to laws
of special or local character; neither does it apply to police regulations
voted on by the people in particular locations. 5  Therefore, if the law is
local in its operation, and the tax only incidental to the law, or if the tax
will be raised by a municipality for local purposes, the law will not be
deemed a bill for raising revenue within the ambit of the origination
clause.356
The Austin Court of Civil Appeals, in a case subsequently reversed
on other grounds, 357 noted the limitations imposed by the enrolled bill
doctrine on review of enacted legislation. 358 The court found that a stat-
Texas Attorney General, 9 Hous. L. REv. 495 (1972). Attorney general opinions are customarily
accorded great weight in Texas. 7 TEX. JUR. 3D Attorney General § 11 (1980).
349. 68 Tex. 526, 4 S.W. 865 (1887).
350. Id. at 545, 4 S.W. at 874.
351. Id.
352. In Texas two courts of last resort exist, the supreme court for civil cases (TEX. CONST. art.
V, § 3) and the court of criminal appeals for criminal matters. (TEX. CONST. art. V, § 5). As the
interpretive commentary on art. V, § 5 notes, there have been instances of disagreement between
these courts as to the constitutionality of statutes. See Judice, The Texas Judicial System: Historical
Development and Efforts Towards Court Modernization, 14 S. TEX. L.J. 295, 299-302 (1972).
353. 31 Tex. Crim. 514, 21 S.W. 190 (1893).
354. Id. at 514, 21 S.W. at 190.
355. Id.
356. Id.
357. James v. Gulf Ins. Co., 179 S.W.2d 397 (Tex. Civ. App. 1944), rev'd on other grounds, 43
Tex. 424, 185 S.W.2d 966 (1945) (reversed on basis that purpose of act not sufficiently expressed in
title in violation of TEx. CONsT. art. III, § 35).
358. Id. at 401-02, 406. Texas applies the enrolled bill doctrine strictly, limiting the court's
[Vol. 23:165
58
Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 23 [1987], Iss. 2, Art. 1
https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol23/iss2/1
ORIGINATION CLA USE
ute providing for the transfer of portions of certain taxes, license fees, or
assessments already deposited in special funds or in accounts in the state
treasury for the General Revenue Fund was not a revenue bill.359 The
primary purpose of the act was not to increase revenue, which it did not
in any event do, but to provide for the disposition of surpluses.36 °
20. Vermont
In the only published case construing Vermont's origination clause,
Andrews v. Lathrop,36 1 the Vermont Supreme Court recognized the issue
as one of first impression362 and found that a land gains tax act did not
violate the clause. The tax was imposed in addition to all other taxes on
gains derived from the sale or exchange of land held by a transferor for
less than six years.363 The revenue generated by the tax was to be used
for funding property tax relief for basic housing.364 After rejecting chal-
lenges based on the Equal Protection Clause of the Constitution, the
court warily approached the origination clause issue. The court observed
that "[s]erious questions have arisen elsewhere as to the extent to which
the judicial branch may intrude upon the legislative process to declare an
act, duly approved by both houses and signed by the executive, void for
procedural infirmities., 36' Nevertheless, the court concluded that the
land gains tax was not a revenue bill and narrowly construed the consti-
tutional provision to include only bills purporting to raise revenue appli-
review to only the bill itself. Day Land & Cattle Co., discussed supra notes 349-51 and accompany-
ing text; 12 TEX. JUR. 3D Constitutional Law § 45 (1980).
359. James, 179 S.W.2d at 406-07.
360. Id.
361. 132 Vt. 256, 315 A.2d 860 (1974). The Vermont Attorney General, however, had in a
comprehensive opinion earlier opined that Vermont's origination clause should be strictly construed
to exclude bills incidentally raising revenue and bills delegating taxing powers to municipalities.
Delegation bills do not, in themselves, raise revenue, but merely grant the power to do so. Bills that
have the effect of decreasing revenue, such as a bill providing for additional tax exemptions, would
also not be a revenue bill. 1972-1974 Op. Att'y Gen. 159 (January 18, 1973).
VT. CONST. ch. II, § 6 provides in pertinent part: "[a]ll Revenue bills shall originate in the
House of Representatives; but the senate may propose or concur in amendments, as on other bills."
In an unusual reverse origination clause, the Vermont Constitution, in ch. II, § 79 reposes exclusive
authority in the senate to propose constiututional amendments. See 1970-72 Op. Att'y Gen. 299
(House may not amend amendment proposal, but may only concur or refuse).
362. Andrews, 132 Vt. at 265, 315 A.2d at 861.
363. Id. at 258, 315 A.2d at 861.
364. Id. at 259, 315 A.2d at 862.
365. Id. at 265, 315 A.2d at 865 (citing Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649 (1892)). The court also
mentioned the Pennsylvania Supreme Court decision of Mikell v. School Dist., 359 Pa. 113, 58 A.2d
339 (1948), and intimated that the Vermont Supreme Court favored the Pennsylvania court's deter-
mination that origination clause disputes were non-justiciable, and that the only remedy would be by
way of point of order on the legislative floor prior to enactment. See generally Stern, The Political
Question Doctrine in State Courts, 35 S.C.L. REV. 405, 412-15 (1984).
1987]
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cable to meeting the general expenses and obligations of the
government.366 The primary purpose of the bill was not to meet the
state's general obligations but to provide for tax relief to certain taxpay-
ers. 367 The Vermont court's construction of its origination clause reflects
the majority inclination to strictly construe the constitutional
provision.368
21. Wyoming
The author did not find any cases interpreting or applying Wyo-
ming's origination clause.369 However, one Wyoming Attorney Gen-
eral's opinion stated that a senate bill to decrease taxes would violate
Wyoming's origination clause.37°
IV. THE ORIGINATION CLAUSE IN OTHER NATIONS
A. Introduction
The origination clause37' is prominently featured and plays a vital
role in many countries which derive their constitutional foundations
from the British. 72 Indeed, a selective examination of these nations'
366. Andrews, 132 Vt. at 266, 315 A.2d at 866.
367. Id.
368. The Vermont court observed that the origination clause came from the House of Commons
and was adopted in the federal Constitution at a time when members of the Senate were elected by
the state legislatures. Id. at 265-66, 315 A.2d at 866.
369. "All bills for raising revenue shall originate in the house of representatives; but the senate
may propose amendments, as in the case of other bills." WYO. CONST. art. 3, § 33. The clause was
cited in Hansen v. Smith, 395 P.2d 944 (Wyo. 1964), but not applied.
370. Op. Att'y Gen. No. 005 (Feb. 13, 1986). The attorney general relied on the reasoning of the
Ninth Circuit in Armstrong v. United States, 759 F.2d 1378 (9th Cir. 1985), where the court held
that the Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982 (TEFRA) did not violate the federal
origination clause, despite TEFRA originating in the House as a tax-lowering measure, and being
amended in the Senate to be a tax increase. The constitutionality of TEFRA is addressed in Hoffer,
supra note 21 (concluding that most of TEFRA was unconstitutional). See also Comment, supra
note 12 (constitutionality not addressed; issue of origination clause a justiciable controversy). The
federal cases discussing TEFRA in connection with the federal origination clause are discussed supra
at notes 71-98 and accompanying text.
371. In the context of this section, the term "origination clause" is meant to refer to any special
power over revenue or other financial bills constitutionally enjoyed by the lower house of a bicameral
legislature. Less than half the nations of the world have bicameral legislatures. See 2 PARLIAMENTS
OF THE WORLD: A COMPARATIVE REFERENCE COMPENDIUM 881 (2d ed. 1986); J. BLONDEL,
COMPARATIVE LEGISLATURES 32-35 (1973); see also K. WHEARE, LEGISLATURES (1963); M.
MEZEY, COMPARATIVE LEGISLATURES (1979).
372. Sargent, supra note 12, at 335 n.11. Former British colonies with unicameral legislatures
include Singapore, Sudan, Sri Lanka, and New Zealand. The leading collection of constitutions is A.
BLAUSTEIN & G. FRANZ, CONSTITUTIONS OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD (1971). The specific
emphasis on revenue and other financial bills is by no means restricted to English related nations. 2
PARLIAMENTS OF THE WORLD: A COMPARATIVE REFERENCE COMPENDIUM 881-907 (2d ed.
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constitutional frameworks and unwritten conventions reveals that the
United States and its constituent states are unique in their restrictive and
grudging construction of the revenue (supply) power embodied in the
origination clause.373 The prominence of restrictions placed upon the
upper chambers' power to affect money bills (a term considerably
broader than the term "bills for raising revenue" used in most American
origination clauses) highlights the unique status enjoyed by the United
1986) (Table 30). For example, the Austrian Constitution (art. 42(5)) forbids the upper house (Fed-
eral Council, elected by the state legislatures) from objecting to federal budget estimates, accepting
final budget accounts, or disposing of federal property. See W. KOHN, GOVERNMENTS AND POLI-
TICS OF THE GERMAN-SPEAKING PEOPLE 180-90 (1980); C. KESSLER, THE AUSTRIAN FEDERAL
CONSTITUTION (1983). In France, finance bills must be introduced in the lower house, the directly
elected National Assembly. The indirectly elected Senate has power to reject finance bills, which are
treated no differently than any other bill. However, the deadlock provision in art. 45 permits the
government, if it favors the National Assembly version of the bill, to ask the National Assembly to
rule definitively on the matter, which in effect overrides the Senate. Only the government has this
power. Thus, the Senate, at the government's option, can cast an absolute veto. See I D. PICKLES,
THE GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS OF FRANCE 44-68 (1972); R. PIERCE, FRENCH POLITICS &
POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS 74-100 (1968); A. DRAGNICH & J. RASMUSSEN, MAJOR EUROPEAN
GOVERNMENTS 215-19 (4th ed. 1974); C. STRONG, supra note 24, at 208-10.
In Japan, the Kenpo requires that the government's budget bill first be submitted to the House
of Representatives, the lower house. KENPO ch. IV, art. 60. The House of Concillors, the elected
upper chamber, can reject, amend, or ignore a bill passed by the lower house. If the bill is not a
budget bill, the lower house can override the House of Concillors by a two-thirds vote of those
present. KENPO ch. IV, art. 59. However, if the bill is a budget bill, then the bill, if rejected by the
House of Concillors, is nevertheless considered passed if passed by the House of Representatives. Id.
art. 60. See 2 MODERN LEGAL SYSTEMS CYCLOPEDIA Japan § 2.4(A)(2) (K. Redden ed. 1984)
[hereinafter CYCLOPEDIA]; R. WARD, JAPAN'S POLITICAL SYSTEM 151-54 (1978); Williams, Japa-
nese Diet Under the New Constitution, 42 AM. POL. SC!. REV. 927 (1948).
Countries which have patterned their constitutions on the American model have origination
clauses similar to that found in the United States Constitution. See, e.g., LIBERIA CONST. (App.
Rev. Draft) ch. V, art. 36(d)(i) ("6[A]I revenue bills, whether subsidies, charges, imposts, duties or
taxes, and other financial bills, shall originate in the House of Representatives, but the Senate may
propose or concur with amendments as on other bills."); PARAGUAYAN CONST. art. 153(2); VENE-
ZUELAN CONST. ch. III, art. 153.
373. One additional explanation for the expansive definition given the revenue or money origina-
tion provisions of many constitutions is the existence of a parliamentary system in which the lower,
but not the upper, house can dismiss the government by either a vote of confidence or by a defeat on
a major bill. The power of supply, which is the power to provide the government with money, is
crucial to the lower house's ability to control the government. See 2 PARLIAMENTS OF THE WORLD:
A COMPARATIVE REFERENCE COMPENDIUM 1091-1174 (2d ed. 1986) (Tables 38-40); Driedger,
Money Bills and the Senate, 3 OTTAWA L. REV. 25, 28-40 (1968). In addition, the budget bill, while
voting the money necessary to support the government, almost always involves modifications of the
taxation system. See S. MILLER, LECTURES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 205-
07 (1893) (noting distinctions between American and English practice on scope of revenue bills);
Sargent, supra note 12, at 347. See, e.g., Japan, KENPO ch. IV, art. 67. In England, the power to
control revenue was the House of Commons' trump card in its struggle with first the Crown and
then the House of Lords. See Sargent, supra note 12, at 334-36; L. CUSHING, ELEMENTS OF THE
LAW AND PRACTICE OF LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLIES § 2299 (1874); C. STRONG, supra note 24, at
196-20; C. WESTON, ENGLISH CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY AND THE HOUSE OF LORDS (1965); see
also hifra notes 421-30 and accompanying text.
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States Senate, which is the most powerful upper chamber in the world.37 4
It is perhaps ironic that the origination clause of the United States Con-
stitution, based in part upon the then existing British parliamentary con-
ventions,375 should be so emasculated while its cousins remain vigorous
and enforced.376
B. Australia
The Australian Constitution creates a bicameral, federal parliamen-
tary system. The members of both the House of Representatives and the
Senate are popularly elected with the House members selected on a strict
population basis for three years and the Senate members selected on an
equal representation by state basis for six years.3 77 The Senate is given
equal lawmaking power with the House, except where appropriation and
tax bills are concerned.3 78  These bills must be introduced in the
House,379 and may not be amended by the Senate.38  Additionally, the
Senate may not amend a proposed law so as to increase any House pro-
posed charge or burden on the people. 381  An unsettled issue is whether
the Senate may reject an appropriation or revenue bill.382
374. "The powers of the Senate are very great. Probably no Second Chamber in the world today
has an influence so real and direct, not only in obviously national concerns, such as foreign affairs,
but down to the very minutest business of federal legislation, including finances." C. Strong, supra
note 24, at 213. See also D. OLSON, THE LEGISLATIVE PROCESS: A COMPARATIVE APPROACH 23
(1980) (Senate is unique); THE SENATE INSTITUTION 1 (N. Preston ed. 1969) ("The Senate is the
great curiosity of the American political system. Alone among the so-called upper houses of the
world, it enjoys great power, greater than that of its popular opposite chamber.").
375. Opinion of the Justices to the Senate and House of Representatives, 126 Mass. 557, 561
(1879); Perry County v. Selma, Marion & Memphis Ry. Co., 58 Ala. 546, 555-56 (1877); Andrews v.
Lathrop, 132 Vt. 256, 265-66, 315 A.2d 860, 866 (1974); Comment, supra note 12, at 421-23. But see
Hoffer, supra note 21, at 9 n.63 (concluding that the British practice was not the reason for the
origination clause in the federal Constitution; rather, the existing state and colonial provisions were
the basis).
376. Compare especially the American, Canadian, and Australian constitutions on this point.
377. AUSTL. CONST. pt. II, § 7, & pt. III, §§ 24, 28. See 2 CYCLOPEDIA, supra note 372, Austra-
lia § 1.2(B) for a brief summary of the constitutional provisions. See also Thomson, State Constitu-
tional Law: American Lessons for Australian Adventures, 63 TEX. L. REV. 1225 (1985).
378. AUSTL. CONST. pt. V, § 53; 2 CYCLOPEDIA, supra note 372, Australia § 1.2(C).
379. AUSTL. CONST. pt. V, § 53. As defined in § 53, a bill does not become an appropriation or
revenue bill merely by reason of the bill containing fines, penalties, or license fees.
380. Id. The Senate may, however, transmit to the House a message specifying the amendments
the Senate desires or the deletions it advocates. These changes do not become amendments to the
bill. It is within the House's discretion to either accept or reject any and all of the Senate's recom-
mendations. If the House accepts a recommendation, only then does it become a part of the bill.
381. Id. Section 56 provides that the House of Representatives may pass laws for the appropria-
tion of revenues or money only if the government has approved the purpose for the appropriation.
Sections 54 and 55 define and limit the contents of taxation and annual service bills.
382. See Richardson, The Legislative Power of the Senate in Respect of Money Bills, 50 AUSTL.
L.J. 273 (1976) (Senate has the power of rejection); O'Brien, The Power of the House of Representa-
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In the event of a deadlock between the houses on any bill, including
appropriation and revenue bills, the Constitution provides a deadlock
mechanism. If the House passes a bill which the Senate rejects or unac-
ceptably amends, and the same result occurs after at least a three month
interval, the government may request from the Governor-General a
double dissolution.383 A double dissolution dissolves both houses, per-
mitting the people to restaff the legislature.384 If after new elections the
deadlock continues, the Prime Minister may order a joint sitting of the
legislature. The members would then vote on the last proposed version
of the bill offered by the House.385 If the bill receives an absolute major-
ity of the joint sitting, the bill is deemed to have passed both houses.3 8 6
C. Canada
The Canadian Constitution387 provides for a bicameral federal sys-
tem with parliamentary governance similar to the British model. 388  The
House of Commons is popularly elected and is the dominant branch of
the legislature. 389 The drafters of the Canadian Constitution attempted
to recreate in Canada an upper house version of the House of Lords. The
effort, denominated the Senate, has been widely accepted as a total fail-
tives Over Supply, 3 MONASH U.L. REV. 8 (1976); Nicholas, Appropriation and the Senate, 26
AUSTL. L.J. 398 (1952); Sampford, Some Limitations on Constitutional Change, 12 MELB. U.L.
REV. 210, 239 (1979).
383. AUSTL. CONST. pt. V, § 57; 2 CYCLOPEDIA, supra note 372, Australia § 1.2(C).
384. 2 CYCLOPEDIA, supra note 372, Australia § 1.2(C).
385. Id.
386. The double dissolution process is summarized in 2 CYCLOPEDIA, supra note 372, Australia
§ 1.2(C). Of course, all things being equal, a joint sitting presumably favors the more numerous
House of Representatives. See O'Brien, Double Dissolution of Federal Parliament-the Fifth Double
Dissolution, 14 MELB. U. L. REV. 37 (1983); Note, The Double Dissolution and Joint Sitting of
Federal Parliament, 8 SYDNEY L. REV. 223 (1977); Lane, Double Dissolution of Federal Parliament,
47 AUST. L.J. 290 (1973); Lane, Double Dissolution of Federal Parliament: The Third Double Disso-
lution, 48 AUST. L.J. 515 (1974); Nygh, Federal Deadlocks: Origin and Operation of Section 57, 1
TASMANIAN L. REV. 706 (1962); C. STRONG, supra note 24, at 214-15.
387. The Canadian Constitution consists of the 1867 British North America Act (30 & 31 Victo-
ria, ch.3), renamed the Constitution Act of 1867, as amended by the Constitution Act of 1982. 1
CYCLOPEDIA, supra note 372, Canada § 1.2(C). See T. HOCKIN, GOVERNMENT IN CANADA 14-30,
172-73 (1975) for a discussion of the British North America Act and its limitations as a constitu-
tional document. A principal limitation was the legal inability of Canada to amend its constitutional
charter, as the British North America Act was a statute of the British Parliament. I CYCLOPEDIA,
supra note 372, Canada § 1.2(C). The process of patriation, that is, reverting control over the Brit-
ish North America Act back to Canada from the British Parliament, is discussed in Symposium, The
New Constitution and the Charter, 8 QUEEN'S L.J. 7 (1982); Symposium, The New Canadian Consti-
tution, 32 Am. J. COMP. L. 221 (1984); Recent Development, Constitutional Law: Patriation of
Canadian Constitution, 23 HARV. INT'L L.J. 395 (1983).
388. See R. DAWSON, THE GOVERNMENT OF CANADA (5th ed. 1970).
389. Id. at 279-303; 1 CYCLOPEDIA, supra note 372, Canada § 1.7(C)(4)(a).
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ure.390 The Senate members are appointed from the provinces (the num-
bers from each province are set in the Constitution) for life or until the
member reaches the age of seventy-five. 391 All bills appropriating part of
the public revenue, or imposing a tax or impost, must originate in the
House.39 2 The better view is that the Senate does not even have the
power to amend such a bill. 393  Although the Constitution places no
other restrictions on the power of the Senate, the Senate's power is very
limited in practice.3 94
D. India
The Indian Constitution also creates a federal bicameral system with
an overlay of parliamentary democracy. 395 The lower house, the House
of the People, is popularly elected. 396 The upper house, the Council of
States, is partially nominated and partially elected by the state legislative
assemblies.397 Bills other than money bills may originate in either
house398 and a special deadlock provision is applicable in cases where the
houses disagree on non-money bills.399 Money bills, as defined in the
Constitution' ° and certified by the speaker of the lower house,40 1 are not
subject to the deadlock provisions. Money bills may not be introduced in
the Council of States.4°2 Once passed by the lower house, the Council of
390. C. STRONG, supra note 24, at 202-04; T. HOCKIN, supra note 387, at 174; 1 CYCLOPEDIA,
supra note 372, Canada § 1.7(C)(4)(b).
391. British North America Act, art. IV, § 21.
392. Id. at § 53; 1 CYCLOPEDIA, supra note 372, Canada §§ 1.7(C)(4)(b), 1.8(B).
393. Driedger, Money Bills and the Senate, 3 OTTAWA L. REV. 25 (1968).
394. 1 CYCLOPEDIA, supra note 372, Canada § 1.7(C)(4)(b); R. DAWSON, supra note 388, at
279-303. T. HOCKIN, supra note 387, at 173-74 (1975). See also F. KUNTZ, THE MODERN SENATE
OF CANADA (1965).
395. INDIA CONST. pt. V, ch. 11, § 81.
396. Id.
397. Id. § 80.
398. Id. § 107.
399. Id. § 108. The deadlock provision resembles that of the Australian Constitution except that
it does not include money bills. Under § 108, the President, acting on the recommendation of the
government, may convene a joint sitting of the two houses. If the disputed bill is passed by a major-
ity of the members of the joint sitting, the bill is deemed to have passed both houses. As the lower
house (maximum of 545 members) is twice as populous as the upper house (maximum of 250), the
lower house would normally have a decided advantage in any joint sitting.
400. Id. Section 110 defines a money bill to generally include tax bills, borrowing or loan guar-
antees, appropriation bills, and matters incidental to these areas. An important limitation, contained
in § 1 10(1)(g) provides that the inclusion of fines, payments of fees for licenses, and fees for services
rendered will not make a bill a money bill. Furthermore, the same subsection excludes bills provid-
ing for the imposition, abolition, alteration, or regulation of any tax by local authorities for local
purposes from the definition of a money bill.
401. Id. § 110(3). The Speaker's determination is conclusive.
402. Id. § 109(1).
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States has fourteen days to either accept the bill or propose amend-
ments.4"3 The bill, with any proposed amendments, is returned to the
lower house which may either accept or reject the bill. If the lower house
rejects the Council amendments, the money bill is deemed to have passed
in the form favored by the House. 4°4
E. Ireland
The Irish Constitution creates a bicameral legislature composed of
the Dail Eireann (House of Representatives) and Seanad Eireann (Sen-
ate).4"5 The Senate consists partly of nominees and partly of persons
elected from electoral panels which represent various interests and con-
stituencies.40 6 The Senate has no power to reject any legislation; it can
only cast a suspensive veto of ninety days when ordinary legislation is
involved.40 7 Although the Senate has the power to originate non-money
legislation," this authority is rarely used.4° 9 The Senate's power is even
more limited when a money bill, as defined in the Constitution4 10 and
certified by the Chairman of the House of Representatives,41" ' is passed
by the House and sent to the Senate. The Senate has twenty-one days to
return the bill to the House with any recommendations it may have. The
House may accept or reject the recommendations in its discretion and
the money bill will be considered passed in the form the House desires.412
As a result of the extensive limitations on the Senate, the Senate plays a
403. Id. § 109(2). See A. HANSON & J. DOUGLAS, INDIA'S DEMOCRACY 98 (1972).
404. INDIA CONST. pt. V, ch. 11, § 109 (3)-(5). The political role of the upper house is a subject
of considerable debate in India. A. HANSON & J. DOUGLAS, supra note 403, at 101-02. For another
work concerning the Indian Constitution, see generally R. L. HARDGRAVE, INDIA: GOVERNMENT
AND POLITICS IN A DEVELOPING NATION (2d ed. 1975).
405. IR. CONST. art. 15; see 3 CYCLOPEDIA, supra note 372, Ireland §§ 1.2(C)(4)(a) & (b).
406. IR. CONST. art. 18; see 3 CYCLOPEDIA, supra note 372, Ireland §§ 1.2(C)(4)(b).
407. In. CONST. art. 23; see 3 CYCLOPEDIA, supra note 372, Ireland § 1.3(B)(1). The Senate in
non-money bill situations has ninety days from the date a bill passes the House to pass, reject, or
amend the bill. The Senate's action may be accepted or rejected by the House, whose decision is
final. Failure to act within ninety days will constitute passage in the Senate if the House so resolves.
See Delany, The Constitution of Ireland: Its Origins and Development, 12 U. TORONTO L.J. 1, 12
(1957); C. STRONG, supra note 24, at 206-07.
408. IR. CONST. art. 20(1) & (2).
409. M. AYEARsT, THE REPUBLIC OF IRELAND: ITS GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS 109-14,
143-48 (1970).
410. IR. CONST. art. 22(1)1 defines a money bill to include bills concerning taxes, supply, appro-
priations, loan guarantees, and audits of accounts of public moneys, and matters subordinate and
incidental to these subjects. A bill is not a money bill simply because it concerns taxation, money, or
loans raised by local authorities for local purposes.
411. Id. art. 22(2).
412. Id. art. 21(2)1-2. The legislatve process is summarized in 3 CYCLOPEDIA, supra note 372,
Ireland § 1.3(B)(1). Inaction constitutes acceptance. Delany, supra note 407, at 1, 12; C. STRONG,
supra note 24, at 206-07.
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very insignificant role in the governance of Ireland.4" 3
F. Jamaica
Jamaica's constitutional provisions regarding the legislature resem-
ble those of the United Kingdom. Jamaica's legislature is bicameral: the
House of Representatives is popularly elected414 while the Senate is nom-
inated by the Prime Minister and the Leader of the Opposition. 415 Bills
may originate in either house,41 6 although money bills must originate in
the House of Representatives. 417 On non-money bills, the Senate essen-
tially has a six-month suspensive veto.418 However, on money bills419
passed by the House, the Senate has only thirty days to pass the bill. If
not passed by the Senate within thirty days, the bill is presented to the
Governor-General for his signature.420
413. For example, the Senate sits for only twenty-five days a year, while the House sits for
around seventy-five days. 3 CYCLOPEDIA, supra note 372, Ireland §§ 1.3(B)(2), 1.2(C)(4)(b). See
also M. AYEARST, supra note 409, at 109-14, 143-48; C. STRONG, supra note 24, at 206-07; B.
CHUBB, THE CONSTITUTION OF IRELAND (7th ed. 1970).
414. JAMAICA CONST. ch. V, pt. 1, art. 36.
415. Id. art. 35(1). Thirteen are appointed by the Prime Minister, eight by the Governor-General
acting in accord with the advice of the Leader of the Opposition.
416. JAMAICA CONST. ch. V, pt. 2 art. 55(2).
417. Id. ch. V, pt. 1, art. 55(2).
418. Id. ch. V, pt. 1, art. 57(1)(a) & (b). If the House passed a non-money bill twice in the same
session and it was rejected both times by the Senate (the period separating passage being no less than
six months), or passed in two consecutive sessions and was rejected both times by the Senate, the bill
can then be presented to the Governor-General for his assent.
419. Article 58 defines a money bill to include tax bills, appropriation measures, audits of ac-
counts, guarantees of loans, and some other matters. Bills providing for taxation imposed, debt
incurred, fund or money provided, or loan raised by local authorities for local purposes are not
money bills. The Speaker of the House determines if a bill is a money bill. JAMAICA CONST. ch. V,
pt. 2, art. 56(2) and his determination is conclusive. Id. art. 58(4).
420. Id. ch. V, pt. 1, art. 56. Malaysia has a similar constitutional framework. The upper house,
mostly nominated by the King, has effectively a one year suspensive veto on non-money bills. MA-
LAYSIA CONST. pt. IV, ch. 5, § 68(2). On money bills, the Senate has only a one month suspensive
veto. Id. ch. 5, § 68(1). Money bills are defined in id. ch. 5, § 68(6), in a manner similar to the
provisions in the Jamaican Constitution. See R. MILNE & D. MAUZY, POLITICS AND GOVERN-
MENT IN MALAYSIA 239-40 (1980 rev. ed.); Jaya Kamras, Constitutional Limitations on Legislative
Power in Malaysia, 9 MALAYSIAN L. REV. 96 (1967); Groves, The Constitution of Malaysia and the
Malaysian Act, 5 MALAYSIAN L. REV. 245 (1963).
Swaziland introduces a new wrinkle in the money bill process. Under the Swaziland Constitu-
tion, appropriation bills must be considered by the Senate (which is half elected, half appointed by
the King) within five days. In any event, the House bill becomes law. SWAZILAND CONST. pt. V. C,
§ 62(1). All other money bills become law thirty days after passage by the House. Id. § 63(1). Non-
money bills may be both originated and rejected in the Senate. The deadlock provision of the joint
sitting is utilized to reach a decision. Id. § 65. Inaction by the Senate for a period of ninety days
constitutes assent. Id. § 65(3).
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G. United Kingdom
The two houses of the Parliament in the United Kingdom could not
be more different, both in power and in composition.4 21 The House of
Commons is popularly elected for a nominal five year term.422 Political
power resides in the House of Commons.423 The House of Lords, on the
other hand, is composed primarily of hereditary peers, with a sprinkling
of archbishops and bishops from the Anglican church, life peers, and law
lords.4 24 Although until the passage of the Parliament Act of 1911 the
Lords were formally equal with the Commons in legislative power, the
Lords had long since lost the right to originate or even amend money
bills.425 After the constitutional crisis of 1910,426 the Parliament Act of
421. The United Kingdom does not have a written constitution as such. Certain acts of Parlia-
ment and royal decrees (the Magna Carta, the Charter of Rights, the Bill of Rights, and the Habeas
Corpus Act) are deemed more fundamental than other parliamentary and royal legislation, but there
exists no legal impediment to a repeal of any law of Parliament. W. JENNINGS, THE LAW AND THE
CONSTITUTION 36-41, 64-79 (5th ed. 1959). See generally, as to the English Constitution, W. JEN-
NINGS, THE BRITISH CONSTITUTION (5th ed. 1968); R. SCHUYLER, BRITISH CONSTITUTIONAL HIs-
TORY SINCE 1832 (1957). A useful collection of fundamental English statutes can be found in C.
STEPHENSON & F. MARCHAM, SOURCES OF ENGLISH CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1937). New Zea-
land follows the English constitutional model. 2 CYCLOPEDIA, supra note 372, United Kingdom
§ 1.2.
422. 2 CYCLOPEDIA, supra note 372, United Kingdom § 1.2.
423. Id.
424. The composition of the House of Lords is unique among the legislative chambers of the
world. The basic characteristic is wealth, not aristocracy, R. NEUMANN, EUROPEAN AND COMPAR-
ATIVE GOVERNMENT 100 (1955), although some are created peers in recognition of services in sci-
ence, art, and public service. Id. at 107.
The presence of the lav lords, appointed by the government, is indicative of another function
served by the House of Lords: it is the final court of appeal in civil and criminal cases in England
and Northern Ireland and civil cases in Scotland. Theoretically, all peers are entitled to participate
in cases. In reality, however, only the law lords, the Lord Chancellor (who presides), the Lord Chief
Justice, and those others who have held high judicial office, participate. A. DRAGNICH, MAJOR
EUROPEAN GOVERNMENTS 82-83 (1966); R. NEUMANN, supra, at 116-17.
The material available on the House of Lords is voluminous. In addition to the texts specifically
cited, see also H. STOUT, BRITISH GOVERNMENT 110-25 (1953); D. VERNEY, BRITISH GOVERN-
MENT AND POLITICS 148-57 (1966); C. WESTON, ENGLISH CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY AND THE
HOUSE OF LORDS (1965); S. BAILEY, BRITISH PARLIAMENTARY DEMOCRACY 33-55 (2d ed. 1966);
C. STRONG, supra note 24, at 196-202; W. JENNINGS, PARLIAMENT (2d ed. 1957); Hadfield,
Whether or Whither the House of Lords, 35 N. IR. L.Q. 313 (1984).
425. Comment, supra note 12, at 421-22; Sargent, supra note 12, at 334. See also I J. TUCKER,
supra note 27, §§ 209-10; L. CUSHING, ELEMENTS OF THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF LEGISLATIVE
ASSEMBLIES § 2299 (1874).
426. In 1909, the Lords ventured to attack the fiscal supremacy of the House of Commons, and
therefore assumed the right to dismiss the Ministry. R. MUIR, How BRITAIN IS GOVERNED 247
(1930). The vehicle for this assumption of power was the rejection of the Lloyd George budget of
1909. After the Lords' rejection of the budget, the King dissolved Parliament. The voters returned
the Liberals. Id. The Lords then passed the budget, but by this time the Liberal ministry was
resolved to limit the Lords' power and find some means of overriding the Lords. The government,
therefore, introduced the Parliament Act of 1911. Id. (The bill was introduced in 1909, but was
passed in 1911). The bill passed the Commons, but was faced with certain defeat in the Lords. The
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1911 was passed. The Parliament Act of 1911 removed any control of
finance from the Lords. A money bill, certified as such by the Speaker of
the House,4 27 if passed by the Commons, may be submitted to the Royal
Assent and become law one month later. All other bills, with the impor-
tant exception of a bill to extend the life of Parliament, can become law if
passed by the Commons in three successive sessions; the time span was
set at a minimum of two years. In 1949, the span was reduced to one
year and two sessions.428 The Lords remains an active, although minor,
part of the English legislative process.4 29 One commentator has de-
scribed the House of Lords as follows: "In summation, they are respon-
sible to no one - but then no one is responsible to them. The life of the
government depends in no way on the wishes of the House of Lords."4 '
H. Summary
This comparative excursus into the treatment of money bills and the
cabinet then obtained a conditional pledge from King George V to create enough new Liberal peers
to pass the measure if a second election, fought specifically on the limitation of the Lords' powers,
returned a Liberal ministry. Id. The second 1910 election did exactly that; the King made public his
pledge, and the bill passed the Lords. G. ARTHUR, GEORGE V 131-61 (1930); P. ROWLAND, DAVID
LLOYD GEORGE 215-24, 230-42, 248-49 (1975); M. KNAPPEN, CONSTITUTIONAL AND LEGAL His-
TORY OF ENGLAND 554-55 (1964). The 1911 Act merely put into law what had become a reality:
when faced by a determined majority in the Commons, the Lords must yield. W. JENNINGS, THE
LAW AND THE CONSTITUTION 90 (5th ed. 1959). This has been evident since 1712 when Queen
Anne created twelve tory peers to pass the Treaty of Utrecht, and especially since 1832, when Wil-
liam IV threatened to use the Royal Prerogative to pass the Reform Bill. R. NEUMANN, supra note
424, at 105; W. JENNINGS, THE BRITISH CONSTITUTION 104 (15th ed. 1968); M. KNAPPEN, supra,
at 545-47.
427. The Speaker's certificate is conclusive and cannot be challenged in court. W. JENNINGS,
THE LAW AND THE CONSTITUTION 104 (5th ed. 1959). The Speakers have, however, used a strict
construction in defining a money bill; furthermore, established convention prevents the Commons
from tacking non-financial riders onto a money bill. W. JENNINGS, THE LAW AND THE CONSTITU-
TION 147 n.1 (5th ed. 1959). Ironically, the Budget Bill, rejection of which precipitated the constitu-
tional crisis leading to passage of the Parliament Act, would not have been certified as a money bill.
17 ENCYCLOPAEDIA BRITANNICA Parliament 381 (1969).
428. Parliament Act of 1949. See W. JENNINGS, THE LAW AND THE CONSTITUTION 141-43
(5th ed. 1959).
429. While the limited power of delay can be viewed derisively, the significance of this delay is
that it permits more careful consideration of these bills. The Lords has more time to debate the
lesser political issues, and it can approach some of the larger issues with a less obvious partisan
manner, since the life of government is not at stake and less emphasis is placed on party loyalty and
more on personal principle. See R. NEUMANN, supra note 424, at 103.
The Lords can also save the more pressed Commons much time through a careful working out
of the less controversial bills. The treatment of private bills by the Lords is far superior to that of the
Commons. In the private field there is need of much committee work, which can often be done
better in the Lords. A. DRAGNICH, supra note 424, at 82; W. JENNINGS, THE LAW AND THE
CONSTITUTION 143 (5th ed. 1959); W. JENNINGS, THE BRITISH CONSTITUTION 102-11 (15th ed.
1968).
430. R. NEUMANN, supra note 424, at 103.
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relative powers of the two houses of the legislature indicates the variety
of constitutional treatments afforded revenue and other financial bills in
the legislative framework. America stands at one extreme, giving little
actual precedence to revenue bills and according the more immediate leg-
islative voice of the people less constitutional prerogative than other
nations.43'
The noted constitutional historian Charles Beard accurately charac-
terized the perceived status and value of the origination clause: "It can
hardly be said that it constitutes any safeguard against careless and cor-
rupt finance in legislatures; and it must be admitted also that it has
slowly been declining in public esteem." '432 The clause, however, should
not be entirely negated. The Founding Fathers, both state and federal,
placed the origination power in the lower house, the body most accounta-
ble to the people.
The principal reason why the Constitution has made this distinction
[the origination prerogative] was, because they [the members of the
House of Representatives] were chosen by the People, and supposed to
be best acquainted with their interests, and ability. In order to make
them more particularly acquainted with these objects, the democratic
branch of the Legislature consisted of a greater number, and were cho-
sen for a shorter period, so that they might revert more frequently to
the mass of the People.433
431. See Comment, supra note 12, at 421 n.14; Sargent, supra note 12, at 345-47; J. TUCKER,
supra note 27, § 211.
432. C. BEARD, AMERICAN GOVERNMENT & POLITICS, 706-07 (1910), quoted in Sargent, supra
note 12, at 352. Beard wrote the classic work, AN ECONOMIC INTERPRETATION OF THE CONSTITU-
TION OF THE UNITED STATES (1913).
433. 3 RECORDS, supra note 14, at 356 (quoting James Madison speaking in the House of Repre-
sentatives on May 15, 1789). Also see J. MADISON, THE DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION
OF 1787 WHICH FRAMED THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 218 (1920), stating Benja-
min Franklin's position:
[I]t was always of importance that the people should know who had disposed of their
money, & how it had been disposed of. It was a maxim that those who feel, can best judge.
This end would, he thought, be best attained, if money affairs were to be confined to the
immediate representatives of the people.
Id. George Mason agreed, id. at 217, 362; so did Edmond Randolph, id. at 393-34. Elbridge Gerry
noted: "Taxation and representation are strongly associated in the minds of the people, and they
will not agree that any but their immediate representatives shall meddle with their purses." Id. at
391. The fact that Senators are now popularly elected does not destroy or alter the constitutional
design. Federal Senators are elected for six-year staggered terms and the apportionment of Senators
is not based on population, but is premised on state equality. Consequently, Senators are less imne-
diately accountable to the people than are representatives. See W. SKOUSEN, THE MAKING OF
AMERICA: THE SUBSTANCE AND MEANING OF THE CONSTITUTION 355 (1985); Hoffer, supra note
21, at 21. In most states, the same staggered pattern obtains, with senators commonly elected for
four years and house members for two years. INDEX DIGEST OF STATE CONSTITUTIONS 639 (1959),
182 (Supp. 1986). Of course, since the Court's decision of Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964),
state senatorial districts are governed, unlike the federal Senate, by the one-man, one-vote principle.
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It is clear that the Framers wanted the taxation powers of the govern-
ment subject to the power of the people.
V. CONCLUSION
At the very least, the origination clause should be construed to effec-
tuate the modest goal of maximum response to the popular will. Thus,
for example, TEFRA should have been declared unconstitutional as a
non-germane amendment to the original House revenue bill. The origi-
nation clause should be construed in the future to effectuate the constitu-
tional design that the House of Representatives be held accountable for
originating bills for raising revenue.
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